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INTRODUCTION

An enormous divide separates the two dominant views of precedent in the scholarly literature on the United States Supreme Court.
One view, especially popular among social scientists, conceives of
precedent-understood as prior judgments or rulings of the Supreme Court as sources of authority for its decisions-as having very
weak influence, if any at all, in constitutional acljudication. It holds
that precedent, for the most part, does not constrain the Court. A
contrasting view, widely shared among legal scholars, conceives of
precedent as having sufficient force to constrain the Supreme Court.
Legal scholars presume that the Court's constitutional decisions
make a difference in, and to, constitutional law. They believe, in
other words, that precedent imposes on constitutional law, meaningful path dependency-the phenomenon of past decisions or events
impeding, compelling, or foreclosing subsequent choices or actions. 1
Most social scientists reject altogether the possibility of the path dependency of precedent in constitutional law. They produce extensive
empirical studies, largely ignored by legal scholars, which purportedly
show that Supreme Court Justices base their constitutional decisions
not on precedent (or the law in any form, for that matter), but rather
on exogenous factors, such as their personal policy preferences or
2
strategic objectives.
This Article attempts to bridge the enormous gap separating these
two different views of precedent. Both are mistaken. The scholars
who advance these views overstate things, perhaps idealize them; and,
this Article suggests that a more realistic and careful appraisal of the
role of precedent in constitutional law is possible. It posits that
precedent exerts more path dependency in constitutional law than
social scientists acknowledge, but less path dependency than legal
scholars presume. It identifies a number of factors that ensure that
precedent generally has a limited, rather than a completely absent or
robust, degree of path dependency in constitutional adjudication.
Moreover, this Article maintains that social scientists generally have

1

The notion of path dependency employed in this Article derives from social science, especially economic theory. It describes a specific phenomenon of past events or decisions within
economic and social systems as foreclosing certain choices. See DOUGLAS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 99 (1990) (describing the notion of
path dependency). See also Paul A. David, Historical Economics in the Long Run: Some Implications
of Path Dependence, in HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN ECONOMICS 29, 29 (Graeme Donald Stokes ed.
1993) (describing path dependency as the inability "'to shake off the effects of past events'")
(footnotes omitted).
2

Social scientists generally operate from one of two different analytical perspectives in
studying the role of Supreme Court precedent in constitutional law. Part I addresses these perspectives in detail.
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ignored the numerous functions performed by precedent in constitutional law that go beyond merely constraining subsequent adjudication. Because conventional legal scholarship on precedent and the
dominant social science models of the Court do not explain, much
less predict, the limited path dependency of Supreme Court precedent or the multiple functions of precedent, a new model of constitutional adjudication is in order. The moderate view of precedent, advanced in this Article, synthesizes legal analysis with the insights and
techniques of each of the social science models of the Court, including the relatively new one commonly known as post-positivism or his3
torical institutionalism.
This proposed model provides a useful
framework for better understanding the rather extensive unacknowledged (if not unrecognized) common ground shared by legal scholars and social scientists who study the Supreme Court. This model
also illuminates connections between seemingly disparate, or disconnected, constitutional doctrines across a wide range of areas. A centerpiece of this model is the limited path dependency of precedent.
Part I examines the two dominant social science models of the
Court, each of which forcefully advances a relatively "weak" view of
precedent. 4 It first describes the empirical findings of both models
indicating that Supreme Court precedent generally does not impose
any path dependency in constitutional law and thus does not preclude the Justices from directly voting their policy preferences or
manipulating precedent to secure their preferred strategic objectives.
Second, Part I sets forth a number of criticisms of each model. While
I suggest many of these criticisms are apt, none fully refutes all of the
findings, particularly the most recent ones, made by the social scientists who claim precedent does not constrain the Court. Nor do these
criticisms dispel the nagging suspicion of many experts that personal
ideologies and strategic maneuvering do play a significant role in
constitutional adjudication.
Part II shows how structural and doctrinal analysis, which are basic
to legal reasoning, support, rather than refute, social scientists' findings that the path dependency of precedent is absent in constitutional adjudication. First, a close inspection of constitutional doctrine-the Court's collective decisions in particular areas of

' For a basic introduction to post-positivism or historical institutionalism, see SUPREME
COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONAUST APPROACHES 75 {Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
4
While a statutory precedent--or one in which the Court resolves a question about the
meaning of a statute-has path dependency, the Court has long distinguished between constitutional and statutory precedents. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in judicial
Decisions, 73 CoRNELL L. REv. 422, 426 (1988) (discussing the Court's disparate treatment of
constitutional and statutory precedents). The Court has given greater deference to statutory
precedents because of the greater ease with which Congress may overrule them.
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5

constitutional law -indicates that path dependency requires that
constitutional precedents must have at least five essential properties:
permanence, sequentialism, predictability, consistency, and compulsion. Although constitutional precedents generally need all these
properties to generate meaningful path dependency, many if not
most constitutional precedents lack one or more of the properties.
Second, the nature of the process of constitutional a<ljudication restricts the path dependency of precedent. Several factors endogenous to the process of constitutional adjudication explain why some
precedents impose more path dependency than others and particularly why some, but not other areas of constitutional law are amenable to judicial closure. These factors include the ways in which constitutional adjudication differs from common law judging; how the
Supreme Court frames its judgments (specifically, as rules or as standards); changes in the Court's composition; cycling and other phenomena that render the Court's decisions unpredictable and inconsistent; the different ways in which constitutional law is entrenched
(including institutional practices such as judicial review, doctrine that
provides a basis for further judicial review of specific areas of constitutional law, and particular decisions); political and other forces intensifying the political salience of some issues; and the absence of
rules for guiding the Justices' interpretation or manipulation of
precedent.
Part III demonstrates how precedent does more work in constitutional adjudication than social scientists say it does. Social scientists
discount precedent because they ask too much of it. They demand
that it must force Justices to routinely forego choices they would pre5

On the critical relationship between precedent and doctrine, see CHARLES FRIED, SAYING
WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 1-12 (2004). While constitutional doctrine generally consists of the "rules and principles that emerge from all ... sources"
of law, including judicial precedent, Fried explains that, "because the Supreme Court in deciding constitutional cases has acted like a common law court developing the law according to its
precedents, those five hundred-odd volumes of Supreme Court Reports are the principal source
of constitutional law, of constitutional doctrine." !d. at 1, 4. The Court is not free to reconsider
its doctrine anew in each case that comes before it:
No merely human judge would have the time or the intellect to think every case out
afresh. Doctrine not only mediates between first principles and particular results along
the timeless dimension of inference, but it in fact-if not in logical necessity-provides
continuity between a particular decision and those that have gone before. It is respect
for precedent that makes for continuity in doctrine. Such continuity gives Supreme
Court decisions the regularity and predictability they must have to make the Court's exercise of power both be and seem to be lawlike and acceptable.
ld. at 5. Furthermore, Fried explains, "[u]nless doctrine persists, unless doctrine itself is prolonged, it cannot sufficiently order social action. The Constitution promises that kind of persistence, and it can only deliver if its commands are instantiated in doctrines that persist." ld. at
7-8. Likewise, the successful implementation and adherence to laws "requires persistence of
doctrine over time and extension over cases and topics. Coherence requires consistency both
diachronically and synchronically." ld. at 10.
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fer not to make, and then the social scientists denounce precedent as
a failure when it cannot be shown to have exerted such power. By focusing on whether Supreme Court precedent fulfills the very narrow
purpose they have assigned to it, social scientists miss all that precedent otherwise accomplishes. Judicial precedent performs multiple
functions in constitutional law, besides merely constraining some
choices. These functions include: (1) serving as a modality and conceptual framework for constitutional argumentation; (2) legitimizing
constitutional arguments and sources of constitutional meaning; (3)
facilitating a dialogue among national leaders about the meaning of
the Constitution; ( 4) resolving particular cases or controversies (and
helping to drive settlement); (5) chronicling (and shaping) constitutional history; (6) educating the public, political leaders, other
judges, and future generations on the meaning of the Constitution;
and (7) implementing constitutional values. A particular judicial decision usually performs one or more of these functions. Moreover,
precedent is not unique to constitutional adjudication. There are at
least as many precedents as there are constitutional authorities creating them, and nonjudicial precedents perform many if not the same
array of functions as judicial precedents do, including constraining or
at least limiting the options available to nonjudicial authorities.
Finally, Part IV proposes a new framework for analyzing precedent
that blends multiple approaches to constitutional law and points to a
number of significant projects for future research on the role of
precedent in constitutional law. The latter include determining the
numbers and kinds of areas of constitutional law that are settled and
unsettled, exploring further the role of psychology in Supreme Court
decision making, investigatin'g the remarkable extensiveness and variety of nonjudicial precedent, documenting the multiple functions
performed by judicial and nonjudicial precedents, and establishing
the degree to which Article Ill judges fulfill the expectations (and selection criteria) of the administrations that selected them.
This Article concludes that the limited path dependency of
precedent is integral to a coherent, comprehensive, and ultimately
workable theory of constitutional law. Ironically, path dependency
appears to be stronger in constitutiomil theory than it has generally
been in constitutional adjudication. The presumption of path dependency among constitutional theorists has misled most theorists
into treating the frequent absence of path depe'ldency in constitutional law as a problem requiring resolution.
Constitutional theorists need to treat the absence of path dependency not as a problem but rather as a natural consequence of a number of different factors (mostly if not entirely) endogenous to constitutional adjudication. Consequently, the primary challenge for
scholars who study the Supreme Court is to explain how, when, and
why judicial closure of any particular constitutional matter is

Apr. 2005]

THE UMITED PATH DEPENDENCY OF PRECEDENT

909

achieved. They need to recognize that (and to explain why) the
more entrenched the Court's constitutional decisions become-or
the more deeply embedded within social and institutional practices
and expectations that particular Supreme Court decisions becomethe more path dependency they are likely to generate. Even when
some questions in constitutional law have not been foreclosed,
precedent performs its most significant function as a modality of argumentation. In performing this function, it helps to limit the range
of possible decisions and permissible arguments in constitutional adjudication. Making sense out of, and building upon, the various factors producing the limited path dependency of precedent is a longstanding, underappreciated mission of constitutional theory.
I. THE MYTH OF THE PATH DEPENDENCY OF PRECEDENT

This Part examines the arguments for and against the two dominant social science models of the Supreme Court that advance most
6
aggressively the "weak" view of precedent. Neither side in the debate
over the "weak" view of precedent has yet dealt a decisive blow, much
less a knock-out punch, in resolving conflicts over the role of precedent in constitutional law.
A. The Implications of Social Science Research Against Path Dependency

Most legal scholars are unaware of the two dominant models of
the Court in social science. The common ground shared by these
models is their claim that the Constitution and law in any other form,
including precedent, do not meaningfully constrain the Supreme
Court. The first is the attitudinal model. It asserts that Supreme
Court Justices primarily base their decisions on their personal prefer7
ences about social policy. Perhaps the best known attitudinalists are

6

Both models purport to provide accurate descriptions of the role that precedent plays in
constitutional law. Neither attempts to provide a normative view of precedent. While a few legal scholars make the normative argument that the Supreme Court ought to have a "weak" view
of precedent, they acknowledge that in· practice the Court consistently does not have such a
view. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
23, 23-24 (1994) (arguing that, despite the ubiquity of precedent in practice and in reasoning,
adherence to precedent is unconstitutional); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by
Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE LJ. 1535, 1543
(2000) ("Stare decisis is conceded to be a matter of policy-a judicial practice rooted in pragmatic concerns.").
7
See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED (2002) (analyzing the Supreme Court and its decisions from an attitudinal
perspective) (hereinafter SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL); HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A.
SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT (1999) (hereinafter SPAETH & SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE); Robert M. Howard &Jeffrey A.
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Harold Spaeth and Jeffrey Segal, who have undertaken extensive empirical studies showing that the law does not constrain the Justices
8
from merely voting their policy preferences. They insist that legal
scholars need to develop a model of the law that meets the exacting
standards of testable scientific research. On their view, such a "model
must be able to state a priori the potential conditions that, if observed, would refute the model." 9 Because the legal model posits no
such conditions, it is irrefutable and therefore unconvincing.
Segal and Spaeth consider "the best evidence for the influence of
precedent" to be dissents because "we know that these UJustices dis10
agree with the precedent." Segal and Spaeth reason that "[i]f the
precedent established in the case influences them, that influence
should be felt in that case's progeny, through their votes and opinion
writing. Thus, determining the influence of precedent requires examining the extent to which UJustices who disagree with a precedent
11
move toward that position in subsequent cases."
They searched
2,418 votes and cases for evidence of the "gravitational force" of
12
precedent claimed by leading scholars, including Ronald Dworkin.
In categorizing attitudes towards precedent, Segal and Spaeth treated
Justices who supported challenged precedents as "precedentialists"
(ranging from strong to weak) and Justices who did not as "preferen13
tialists" (ranging from strong to weak) . Segal and Spaeth further
broke down cases into "ordinary" and "landmark" cases as rated by
14
Congressional Quarterly's Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court. Their
data showed that "[t]he UJustices are rarely influenced by stare decisis."15 Indeed, they found "beyond doubt ... that the modern Supreme Courts, heavily criticized for their activism, did not invent or

Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAw & Soc'y REv. 113, 116 (2002) (outlining the attitudinal model).
8
SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL, supra note 7, at 80 ("UJudges may pick and choose among
precedents to find those that accord with their policy preferences, while simultaneously asserting that these are also the ones that best accord with the facts of the case at hand.").
9
!d. at 46.
10
!d. at 292.
II /d.
12

See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 111-12 (1977) (arguing that judges will

try to connect the justifications they provide for original decisions with decisions other judges

have made in the past). For similar views on the Court's respect for precedent, see Ronald
Kahn, lnlelpretive Norms and Supreme Courl Decision-Making: The Rehnquist Courl on Privacy and
Religion, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONAUST APPROACHES 177, 18082 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (claiming, inter alia, that theJustices defer to precedent); C. Herman Pritchett, The Development of Judicial Research, in FRONTIERS OF
JUDICIAL RESEARCH 42 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969) (declaring that
"UJ udges make choices, but they are not the 'free' choices of congressmen.").
" SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL, supra note 7, at 296.
14
!d. at 295.
15
!d. at 298.
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even perfect preferential behavior; it has been with us since Washing16
ton packed the Court with Federalists." The few instances in which
Justices based their decisions on precedent are irrelevant because
they are
more likely to be found in cases of the lowest salience: ordinary cases
compared with landmark cases and, among ordinary cases, statutory cases
over constitutional cases and modern economic cases over modern civil
liberties cases. The influence of precedent appears to be quite minor,
17
but it does not appear to be completely idiosyncratic.

Indeed, Segal and Spaeth claim, "not one UJustice on the Rehnquist
Court exercised deference to precedent by voting to uphold both lib. prece d ents. ,!8
era1 an d conservative
A second camp of social scientists, known as rational choice or
positive political theorists, claim that Supreme Court Justices base
19
their decisions primarily on their strategic objectives.
Rational
choice theorists claim that Justices are not constrained by judicial
precedent but rather manipulate it (and, for that matter, all other legal materials) to maximize their personal, policy, and institutional
preferences. Some rational choice theorists claim that, for instance,
Justices manipulate the law including precedent to maximize or vindicate their particular judicial philosophies. A common critique of
rational choice theory is, however, that it is unscientific, because
nothing it asserts can be demonstrated as false; every decision is rational because it can be explained as maximizing some Justices' selfor institutional interests. Even when Justices seem to make a decision
against their institutional or personal interests, it can be explained as
a strategic move in the never-ending battle between the Court and
other governmental institutions for dominance of policymaking. Rational choice theorists figure that every outcome must have been desirable (and that preferences can be inferred from every outcome),
or else the Supreme Court would have decided its cases differently.

16

Id. at 300.
!d. at 306.
18
Id. at 310.
19
See, e.g., COURTS, JUDGES, AND POLITICS 16 (Walter F. Murphy et al. eds., 5th ed. 2002) (describing a contemporary strand of rational choice theory in judicial decision making); LEE
EPSTEIN &JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 22-72 (1998) (arguing that Justices are
strategic policy makers who balance their policy goals with the preferences of other Justices);
FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFfiNG LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME 3256 (2000) (asserting that at the heart of the process of building majority opinions are policyseeking Justices constrained by the positions taken by other Justices).
17
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B. The Major Critiques ofAttitudinal and
Rational Choice Models of the Court

Some law professors (including the author of this Article) and
some social scientists have leveled a number of critiques of the attitudinal and rational choice models. First, the attitudinal and rational
choice models attack a model of the law that simply does not exist.
Attitudinalists' and rational choice theorists' descriptions of the legal
model do not correspond to the conceptions of the law held by lawyers, judges, and law professors. Legal scholars do not purport to
have constructed a formal model of legal reasoning, much less a scientific one. Indeed, legal scholars refuse to construct such a model,
because they do not believe legal reasoning is a scientific endeavor or
that the law is a scientific discipline.
The refusal to construct a scientific model is not unusual among
legal scholars. As Jack Goldsmith and Adrian Vermeule observe,
legal scholarship frequently pursues doctrinal, interpretive,
and normative purposes rather than empirical ones. Legal
scholars often are just playing a different game than the empiricists play, which means that no amount of insistence on the
empiricists' rules can indict legal scholarship--any more than
strict adherence to the rules of baseball supports an indictment
20
of cricket. "

Other "fact-based" fields, such as presidential studies and anthropology, employ similar empirical methods.
Second, the ubiquity of precedent presents a problem, particularly for the attitudinal model. The fact is that the most cited source
in constitutional adjudication is precedent. The Court may decide
some cases without reference to other sources such as original understanding, but it never decides a case without citing at least one precedent in support of its decision. Even when Justices challenge some
prior decision(s), they most often do so in part on the ground that
other precedents ought to control.
Rational choice theorists Lee Epstein and Jack Knight attach a
great deal of importance to the fact that precedent is ubiquitous in
constitutional adjudication. From that fact, they infer that "precedent can serve as a constraint on UJu~tices acting on their personal
21
policy preferences." Although judges and Justices might prefer to
ignore precedent in favor of their preferred policies, they are constrained by the utility of precedent in fostering social stability and judicial legitimacy. Others might react negatively if the Court did not

20

Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Venneule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI.
L. REv. 153, 153-54 (2002).
21
Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM.J. POL. Sci. 1018, 1021 (1996).
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follow its own precedent. In support of the significance of precedent
in judicial decision making, Epstein and Knight pointed to the ubiquity of citations to precedent not only in published judicial opinions,
but also in the arguments of litigants and the private discussions of
the Justices. Segal and Spaeth respond that ubiquity is not influence
and suggest the evidence demonstrates that the Justices felt little social pressure to adhere to precedents. 22
Third, rational choice theorists and particularly attitudinalists operate from a flawed premise. They suppose mistakenly that Justices
should follow precedents from which they dissented. The same obligation that lower court judges have to obey Supreme Court precedent does not, however, extend to the Court's dissenters; dissenting
Justices are not considered subordinate in any way to their colleagues
and thus have no obligation to accept their colleagues' positions.
There is no norm that obligates, or requires, Supreme CourtJustices
to defer to precedents to which they dissented. The Court allows dissent, and leaves the Justice with the discretion to determine the extent to which they will each adhere to, or refuse to follow, particular
decisions to which they dissented.
Fourth, social scientists discount the fact that the Supreme Court's
docket consists of hard cases. While the Court does not consider
every conceivable hard case, it does tend to hear only the cases in
which no source and certainly no single decision (or set of decisions)
points to a clear, indisputable answer. In the close cases that do get
to the Court, ideology arguably plays a significant role in shaping the
Justices' attitudes toward, or manipulation of, legal materials. Yet,
the pertinent ideology is not necessarily the Justices' personal attitudes about social policy. It is judicial philosophy or ideology, which
entails a perspective on the Court's role in the constitutional order. 23
The Justices' basic understandings of the Court's function and of the
proper method for interpreting the Constitution provide their respective operating premises and even the default principles on which
they rely in deciding cases and controversies. For instance, a Justice
might start each case with the presumption that the states retain ex-

22

See Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Norms, Dragons, and Stare Decisis: A Response, 40 AM.
]. PoL. SCI. 1064, 1075 (1996) (citing motivated reasoning as a possible explanation for the
ubiquity of the use of precedents). Interestingly, this response hardly ends the debate over the
significance of the ubiquity of precedent in the Court's constitutional opinions. While such
ubiquity does not necessarily demonstrate the precise influence precedent has over the path of
constitutional law, it does reflect a major function of precedent besides constraining the
Court-namely, precedent's function as a major modality of constitutional argumentation. See
infra Part IV.B.l.
2

' See generaUy Should Ideology Matter?: Judicial Nominations 2001: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001) (examining
the judicial nominations process by way of a special hearing) [hereinafter Hearing].
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elusive authorities over any realms in which the Constitution does not
grant clear or unambiguous authority to the national government. A
different Justice might approach a case with the inclination to defer
to the Congress to the fullest extent in a realm over which the Congress has been the constitutional authority. Other Justices might approach cases with fixed prioritization of sources. Some might consider the text, structure, and original understanding as the first places
to look in deciding cases, and when those sources are unclear then
consult second-order sources, such as historical practices and Supreme Court precedent. Others might prefer different second-order
prioritizations. Legal scholars then measure the quality of an opinion
based on its author's fidelity to his or her stated philosophical preferences or prioritizations of possible sources of constitutional meaning.
Fifth, rational choice theorists and particularly attitudinalists have
24
trouble reconciling their models with unanimous opinions. Attidunalists exclude such opinions from their databases, because they believe these opinions lack the friction necessary for pressuring Justices
to rely on exogenous factors. Unanimity is, however, hard to square
with a model that suggests the Justices never, or almost never, make
decisions based on legal variables. Even worse for this model is the
fact that many unanimous and nearly unanimous opinions involve
politically salient issues on which the Justices transcend their supposed ideological differences to reach agreements about constitutionallaw.25
Sixth, both the rational choice and attitudinal models vainly try to
quantify subjective preferences and phenomena. While there are
clearly some objective facts in constitutional law (for example, the

24

See SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL supra note 7, at 295 (omitting unanimously decided
cases from their study).
25

See, e.g., Eldred v. Aschroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003) (upholding, seven to two, Congress's
repeated extensions of the rights of copyright ownership in spite of constitutional language allowing Congress to do so for "limited terms"); Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 142-43 (2000)
(upholding unanimously Congress's power to bar states from disclosing or selling personal information required for driver's licenses); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 510-11 (1999) (holding,
seven to two, that California's residency restrictions on welfare benefits violate the Privileges
and Immunities Clause); Clinton v.Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705-06 (1997) (holding unanimously
that sitting presidents generally are not entitled to immunity from civil lawsuits based on their
unofficial misconduct); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 518-19 (1996) (mling, seven to
one, that Virginia Military Academy's policy of excluding women as students violated equal protection); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 237-38 (1993) (agreeing, seven to two, that the
Court lacks the power to review the constitutionality of the procedures employed by the Senate
in judicial impeachment trials); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659-60 (1988) (upholding,
seven to one Qustice Scalia took no part in the decision), the constitutionality of the independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
685, 713 (1974) (holding unanimously that presidents are not entitled to an absolute executive
privilege that would have allowed them unilateral discretion over whether to comply with otherwise lawful subpoenas).
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constitutional text, the winners and losers of lawsuits, and the Justices' and their nominating presidents' respective political parties)
many other factors are largely if not wholly subjective, including the
characterization of a Justice's interpretive methodology or ideology.
Reducing these to quantitative terms, much less to the rigors of scientific measurement, is futile. Richard Posner has condemned academic law as "soft" and inhospitable to the methods of a "hard" field,
such as physics, in which theorists reason to "divergent conclusions
26
from shared premises."
Both attitudinalists and rational choice
theorists search in vain for such premises. Ironically, legal scholars'
lack of consensus on explanations for the Court's decisions or criteria
for evaluating them is a problem more for social scientists than for
legal scholars.
The search for objective verifications of judicial ideologies illustrates the dangers of quantitative analysis of the Justices' fidelity to
precedent. For instance, the attitudinalists Segal and Spaeth rely on
editorials from four major newspapers and Justices' votes as lower
court judges to identifY the ideologies of the Justices. Yet, it is unclear why newspaper editorials should be taken as neutral on this
matter. It is possible (and many people believe) newspapers have
ideological biases, so that their agendas inform the ideological designations they make. Moreover, the goal should not just be to find an
external source for defining aJustice's ideology, but to find an external source on whose authority most experts can agree. If there are
no experts or they cannot agree on a source, the futility of the research is all the more apparent. In addition, the reliance on the Justices' votes when they were lower court judges is problematic because
many Supreme Court nominees have never served, or served only
27
briefly, as lower courtjudges. Nor do attitudinalists account for the
fact that state and federal judges have had different caseloads and
exposures to the questions they are likely to face on the Court. At the
very least, they need to account for these differences in determining
the relevance of past votes to possible future voting on the Court. Assessing Justices' likely behavior based on their votes as lower federal
court judges is dubious, because as lower court judges they were
28
obliged to follow Supreme Court precedents that as Justices they are
now free to question.

26

RiCHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL
OF PRESIDENT CLINTON 240 ( 1999).
27
See SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL, supra note 7, at 182 (observing that "93 of the 147
nominees [to the Court) (63%) have occupied judicial positions" prior to their appointments).
28
Cf Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courls Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L.
REv. 817,867-79 (1994) (calling into question, but ultimately affirming, the obligation of lower
courts to adhere to Supreme Court rulings where Congress has stripped the Court of its revisory
jurisdiction).
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Alternatively, rational choice theorists Lee Epstein and Gary King
suggest that an appropriate proxy for measuring a judge's ideology is
29
the ideologies of sponsoring senators. As Richard Revesz has shown,
this proxy is flawed, because only district court appointees have sponsoring senators, while appellate judges tend only occasionally to have
sponsors except for those appointed in the District of Columbia who
have none. 50 Supreme Court nominees are even.less likely than appellate judges to owe their appointments to a single senator.
Seventh, rational choice theorists tend to assume that the only interest Justices are interested in maximizing is influence over policy
making. Yet, the Justices have many interests they may wish to maximize, not the least of which is their respective judicial philosophies.
The conventional assumption of economics that individuals seek to
maximize wealth is largely inapplicable to federal judges, whose sala51
ries are fixed and tenure is secure. AJustice cannot get a better salary by doing a better job as a Justice. AJustice may, however, try to
maximize other interests, including preserving leisure time, desire for
prestige, promoting the public interest, avoiding reversal, and enhancing reputation. Richard Posner identifies a number of other
possible interests Justices might try to maximize:
personal dislike of a lawyer or litigant, gratitude to ·the appointing authorities, desire for advancement, irritation with or even a desire to undermine a judicial colleague or subordinate, willingness to trade votes,
desire to be on good terms with colleagues, not wanting to disagree with
people one likes or respects, fear for personal safety, fear of ridicule, reluctance to offend one's spouse or close friends, and racial or class soli•
52
'
danty.

Yet Justices might seek to maximize another interest: their sense of
53
duty. They might seek, as Ronald Dworkin suggests, to make the
best decision in light of the relevant legal materials. These different
interests suggest the possibility that the search for a single, universal
maxim is futile.

29

Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 83-84 (2002) (citing
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D. C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717
(1997)).

"" See Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 169, 180
(2002) ("Nobody exercises senatorial courtesy with respect to appointments to the D.C. Cir-

cuit.").
31
See U.S. CONST. art. III,§ 1 (providing that federal judges are to "receive for their Services,
a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office").
32
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 130 (1995).
33
See DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 82-90 (arguing that judges make civil case decisions on
grounds of principle, not policy).
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Eighth, attitudinalists concede the relevance of "context," or the
facts of a given case, to judicial decisions.s4 The implications of the
concession are huge. By granting that "context" matters, attitudinalists admit the relevance of precedent as a constraint on Justices, because the particular facts of a case are important for providing the
grounds on which Justices distinguish and analogize prior decisions.
Perhaps the most serious problem with the attitudinal and rational choice models is, however, that neither fully explains constitutional change in the short- and long-terms. To begin with, the attitudinal model is based on the presumption that individual Justices have
fixed ideological preferences when they begin their respective tenures. Fixed preferences can be easily measured. If, however, Justices'
preferences shift, there would be no tangible measure of their ideologies against which to assess their subsequent decisions. Unfortunately, there is not much, if any, reliable data confirming that Justices
have fixed, unalterable preferences at the outset of their respective
appointments. It is especially hard to establish the fact if the Justices
deny they have any such preferences.
Consider the case of John Marshall. Segal and Spaeth, for instance, accept the misconception of Marshall as dominating his Court
intellectually to further the Federalist party's policy preferences.s5
They fail to acknowledge, much less appreciate, the fact that Marshall
delivered nearly all of his constitutional opinions for a Court composed of a hand-picked Jeffersonian majority. Most of the Justices
with whom Marshall served were chosen because of their antipathy
towards Federalist policies and sympathy towards the Jeffersonian
6
constitutional vision.s Thus, the Court, with Marshall as Chief Justice, repudiated Federalist preferences that the Constitution be construed rigorously with any ambiguities in its language resolved according to the "rule of choosing the meaning that best comported
with the objects, or purposes, of the Constitution as stated in the Preamble";s' that our Constitution is not one of only enumerated powers
but rather vests the Congress with "a general lawmaking authority for
all the objects of the government that the Preamble of the Constitution states";gg that the "United States formed a single nation as to 'all

54

See SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL, supra note 7, at 319 ("Facts obviously affect the deci·
sions of the Supreme Court ... .").
" See id. at 117 ("Unquestionably, John Marshall dominated his Court as no other Justice
has.").
36
During Marshall's tenure as Chief Justice, Republican appointees filled ten of the eleven
vacancies arising on the Court.
" William Winslow Crosskey, Mr. ChiefJustice MarshaU, in MR. JUSTICE 5 (Allison Dunham &
Philip B. Kurland eds., rev. ed. 1964).
"" /d. at 12.
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39

commercial regulations'"; and that the common law was part of the
law of the United States and thus allowed for Supreme Court supremacy over the state courts with respect to all questions of state law
and common law. 40 The attitudinal model cannot explain why Marshall abdicated these strongly held Federalist views as ChiefJustice.
Moreover, the attitudinal model cannot explain why some Justices' attitudes apparendy shift. It is not uncommon for people, even
legal scholars, to suppose that some Justices may have become more
"liberal" or more "conservative" over time. If Justices' ideological
preferences change, the attitudinal model has to attribute the
changes to exogenous factors. Yet the attitudinal model posits none
of the specific changes mentioned by the authors or the general phenomenon of shifting judicial preferences.
An even more serious problem for the rational choice and the attitudinal models is that neither can explain why (or deal effectively
with the fact that) the ideological categories to which they each assignJustices shift over time. Neither model can account for the phenomenon of ideological drift by which a view generally associated
with one political faction is over time appropriated by or becomes as41
sociated with a different one. Thus, aggressive judicial review might
in one period appear to be liberal, while in another it might appear
to be conservative. The fact that such alterations occur is beyond
doubt, even assuming particular Justices' attitudes are fixed.
Two prime examples are John Marshall and Felix Frankfurter.
Marshall was known throughout much of his career, particularly on
the bench, as overseeing a Court that became a "fortress of conservatism,"42 because the decisions he joined expanded national power at
the expense of state sovereignty and upheld private property rights at
4
the expense of social and economic reform. ChiefJustice Taney exemplified the liberals of his day, because of his respect for popular
44
democracy and states' governmental and social reforms. It is only

39

!d. at 18.
The Court rejected this view in Wheaton v. Peters. 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 657 (1834).
41
See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Rhetoric ofJudicial Critique: From judicial Restraint to the Virtual
BiU of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS.J. 585, 637-38 (2002) (observing the changing "central
interests" over the Court;s history).
·
42
AR.THURM.SCHLESINGER,JR., THEAGEOFJACKSON 322 (1945).
43
See CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 349-50 (1935) ("The popularity of john Marshall ... and the prestige acquired by the Supreme Court during his regime, resulted largely
from the fact that he wrote into constitutional law the beliefs and prejudices of a class, the class,
incidentally, from whose records and in terms of whose judgments most of the period of the
history has been written. Outside that class he and his court were anything but popular ... .").
44
See Carl Brent Swisher, Mr. Chief justice Taney, in MR. JUSTICE, supra note 37, at 35, 57
("[H]e brought to the Supreme Court a preoccupation with local welfare .... He believed in
regionalism within the national pattern ... .").
40
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because of ideological drift that contemporary liberals find something in common with Marshall and not Taney.
In contrast, Justice Felix Frankfurter was the strongest advocate
for judicial restraint during his twenty-two-year tenure on the Court.
Praised by liberals for his staunch defense of judicial restraint in
evaluating progressive economic regulations through his first decade
on the Court, Frankfurter was upset to find that in the late 1940s and
early 1950s liberals were denouncing him.
Now, when he advocated judicial restraint, he was attacked by those very
liberals [who had once praised him]. In his earlier years, pillars of the
legal community like Henry Stimson, Emory Buckner, and Charles
Burlingham praised him. Now, they were either dead or silent.... [l]n
the Truman years, there was little White House contact. Frankfurter had
never believed he was 'the single most influential man' in Washington
but sometimes he had enjoyed the notoriety. Now there was no more notoriety; he was only one of nine, and one under increasing criticism from
45
those once his friends.

While the categories with which social scientists describe the
Court are not fixed, the same cannot be said for constitutional doctrine generally. The attitudinal model cannot fully explain stability in
constitutional doctrine. While it is tempting to suppose (as many social scientists do) that Justices are appointed to further the interests
of the governing political coalition, the latter does not always get the
results it wants. Indeed, there are many areas in which judicial closure is achieved, in spite of the fact that many Justices might personally disagree with the position(s) reached. 46 A striking, recent example is the Court's seven to two decision in Dickerson v. United States, in
an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, which reaffirmed 47 Miranda v.
48
Arizona in spite of a longstanding conservative effort (in which the
49
Chief had sometimes joined ) to dismantle Miranda.
A final problem with the attitudinal and rational choice models is
that neither addresses, much less fully assesses the implications of,
45

LEONARD BAKER, BRANDEIS AND FRANKFuRTER: A DUAL BIOGRAPHY 456 ( 1984).

46

These decisions include incorporating most of the Bill of Rights into the Due Process of
the Fourteenth Amendment, for example, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 749 (1965); upholding the constitutionality of legal tender in the Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870);
upholding the constitutionality of congressional regulation of private economic activity, for example, Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981); upholding
abortion rights for more than a decade with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); and upholding the constitutional foundations of the New
Deal in Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 ( 1942) and the Great Society with Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
47
46
49

530
384

u.s. 428, 432 (2000).
u.s. 436 (1966).

See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (holding that the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule may be relaxed in light of good faith reliance on search warrants issued by detached and neutral magistrates).
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the phenomenon of institutional path dependency.
While both
models proclaim the absence of path dependency in constitutional
law, political scientist Keith Whittington stresses that
[i]nstitutions are relatively persistent, and thus both carry fmward in
time past political decisions and mediate the effects of new political decisions. The creation of institutions closes off options by making it more
costly to reverse course, by differentially distributing resources, and by tying interests and identities to the status quo .... On the other hand, the
persistence of institutions across time can foster political crises and
change as they enter radically changed social environments or abrade
51
discordant institutions.

Institutional path dependency presents less of a problem for rational
choice theorists, who can argue that it merely defines the options
available to the Justices at any given moment. But neither of the
dominant social science models of the Court adequately addresses
the link between constitutional design and social or political change.

C. The Forecasting Study
The preceding criticisms of the two dominant social science models for analyzing the Court are by no means all that could be said
about either. Impressive comparative analysis of predictions of outcomes and individual votes in a recent forecasting study done by two
law professors and two social scientists support some important claims
of attitudinalists and rational choice theorists. 52 The forecasting study
employed two methods for construing data on the Court's decisions.
One was a statistical model that forecasted outcomes based on six
general case characteristics: the circuit from which the cases originated, the issue areas of the cases, the types of petitioners, the types
of respondents, the ideological direction of the lower court rulings,
and whether the petitioner argued that the law or practice being
challenged was unconstitutional. The other method used a set of independent predictions from a group of 83 legal experts. ~ The statistical model predicted 75% of the Court's affirm/reverse results correctly, while the experts (operating in panels of three) got only
5

50

SeeTHE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS

1-2 (Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton eds., 1999) (remarking on the absence of institutional
considerations in behavioralist studies); Keith E. Whittington, Once Mare Into the Breach: PostBehaviorali.st Approaches to judicial Politics, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 601, 617 (2000) (reviewing
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton &
Howard Gillman eds., 1999) (praising the relative increase in attention being paid to institutional influences).
51
Whittington, supra note 50, at 616 (citations omitted).
52
Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150 (2004).
53
/d. at 1168.
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59.1% affirm/reverse results correct. 54 The legal experts predicted
67.9% of individual votes correcdy, while the social science model
55
predicted 66.7% correcdy.
The forecasting study is not without some potentially serious problems. First, the group that best forecasted the Court's opinions was
attorneys. They did much better than any other group or the models
in predicting outcomes of, or individual votes in, particular cases:
they predicted 92% of the Court's affirm/reverse results correcdy,
6
while legal scholars predicted only 53% of the results correctly. 5 The
authors of the forecasting study dismiss the relative success of the attorneys on the ground that they constituted a statistically insignificant
57
sample-12 out of the 83 legal experts consulted.
This outcome
suggests to me, however, the need to undertake other studies to determine whether and why attorneys may be able to predict best the
outcomes of cases. It might be useful to examine more closely the
factors that attorneys took into account in formulating their predictions of the Court's rulings. It is possible that they may simply pay
much closer attention to concurring and dissenting opinions than do
other legal experts. It is also possible they base their predictions on
their studies of the Justices' respective attitudes or strategic objectives.
Second, one could question whether the legal experts chosen
might not have been the best available, whether some panels were
better than others, or whether some factor(s) might explain why this
Term the experts performed less well than the model at predicting
outcomes. The authors of the study speculate that legal scholars
might have had trouble in clarifying which factors mattered most,
given that in the aggregate survey respondents ranked twenty-three of
the twenty-six possible factors "very important" to making predictions.58 Such trouble does not necessarily support the forecasting
study; it supports instead an appreciation for the complexity of legal
reasoning. The success of the attorneys suggests further the possibility that legal specialists might be better qualified and more successful
than anyone else in making predictions. So, it probably makes sense
to consult a bankruptcy specialist rather than a constitutional scholar
on the likely outcomes of, or individual votes, in bankruptcy cases
and to consult experts on criminal procedure on search-and-seizure
cases rather than specialists in other areas of constitutional law, such
as the First Amendment.

54
55
56
57
58

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

at
at
at
at
at

1155.
1172-73.
1177-78.
1178.
1185.
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Third, there is another credible explanation for the results of the
forecasting study other than those recognized by its authors. It is that
different models might be appropriate for explaining different Justices. The Justices, in other words, might each follow different models. Different models might explain or apply to different Justices. So
it is conceivable that some Justices vote their attitudes, others vote to
maximize their strategic objectives, some employ conventional legal
analysis, and still others some combinations of these. More data is
needed to clarifY which models best explain or apply to which Justices.
For instance, more data might help to clarifY the extent to which
path dependency is evident with respect to particular Justices. It is
common for Justices to avoid refusing to follow the Court's doctrine
altogether in only a few areas. Each Justice tends to dissent persistently in only a select number of areas. It would be illuminating to
know to what extent Justices pay close attention to their past votes
and opinions and thus constrain themselves to follow the patterns of
their own particular decision making.
The fact that the forecasting study leaves some significant questions unanswered does not, however, undermine its utility. Presumably, if constitutional precedents have path dependency, then those
with special legal training ought to be able to spot the choices, or
outcomes, mandated or foreclosed by the Court's doctrine. In other
words, legal experts ought to be superior in predicting from legal
doctrine the likely direction in which the Court will move. Legal experts might have been better able than the statistical model to predict
the range of choices before the Court in any given case, but, after the
study of the 2002 Term, legal scholars will have more difficulty in
claiming that their special training uniquely provides them with superior insights into the particular paths of decision making in which the
Court will go. The less than perfect prediction rate of legal experts,
coupled with their scoring lower than the social science model in predicting outcomes, suggests at the very least a prima facie claim that
the law lacks one of the essential properties of path dependencynamely, predictability. The next section examines the extent to
which precedent lacks predictability and other properties essential to
path dependency.

II. THE REQUISITE PROPERTIES OF PATH DEPENDENCY
A judicial precedent imposes path dependency in constitutional
adjudication if it has at least five properties. Indeed, it imposes
meaningful path dependency only if it has all of the requisite properties. This Part briefly examines each of these.
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A. Path Dependency Requires Permanence

The first essential element of path dependency is permanence.
Permanence refers to a particular judicial decision's enduring resolution of some disputed constitutional issue(s). A judicial decision
cannot be said to impose path dependency if it does not alter the options before the Court in some enduring way(s). Permanence requires the closure of a question of constitutional meaning for all
time.
There are, however, a large number of decisions in constitutional
law that did not permanently or finally settle particular controversies.
The Court has expressly overruled more than 130 of its prior decisions.59 While the Court has achieved closure with respect to anumber of constitutional issues (that it has not revisited in quite a long
time, and shows no signs of revisiting), it has left unsettled many
other constitutional issues. For instance, the Supreme Court shows
no inclination whatsoever to revisit a number of landmark decisions,
including those establishing incorporation of most of the Bill of
60
Rights in the Fourteenth Amendment, its broad reading of the Nec61
essary and Proper Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland, its decision to
62
uphold the constitutionality of legal tender, or its decision to reco~
nize corporations as persons for purposes of the Due Process Clause. 3
These are some examples of precedents that have become "entrenched," or so widely accepted by the Court, the government, and
society generally that they have become practically immune to modification by the Court. Entrenchment entails, inter alia, substantial
64
governmental and social reliance. Yet, some lines of decision, such
as those on incorporation were hardly linear and did not follow a
straight or inexorable path to their present state of entrenchment.
Many other areas of constitutional law have shifted, some more than
once, over the years. For confirmation, one need look no further
59

See MICHAEL]. GERHARDT, THE PRISM OF PRECEDENT (forthcoming) (manuscript on file
with author).
60
See, e.g., Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self
Preseroation, 39 ALA L. REv. 103, 113 n.25 (1987) (stating that" [i]ncorporation ... is now settled
law").
61
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). While the Court has not subsequently tinkered with the
portion of the Court's opinion in McCulloch on the Necessary and Proper Clause, I hasten to
add that it has not taken a consistent position on the issue of intergovernmental taX immunity
first raised in McCulloch.
62
The Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870); see also Michael]. Gerhardt, The
Rnle of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 88-89
(1991) (discussing reliance on the Legal Tender Cases as a source of immunity from being over·
turned).
"' Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
64
See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 431 (suggesting that reliance protects precedent from
being overruled).
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than every constitutional law casebook, each of which provides numerous examples of areas in which the Court's decisions have defied
permanence and instead been marked by seemingly perennial twists
65
and turns.
Even some areas of constitutional law that appear settled or the
product of path dependency might not be. A case in point is the
66
Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Richard Fallon observes
that the Rehnquist Court, in the course of reviving constitutional federalism, failed to overrule any significant Commerce Clause precedents that uphold congressional power to regulate commercial activities. This failure, he suggests, reflects the path dependency of such
precedents. 67 Yet, as Fallon acknowledges, these precedents have only
stabilized for about six decades. Prior to their having been decided
in the mid to late 1930s, a different albeit more confusing set of
precedents had governed the scope of Congress's Commerce Clause
authority. The Court eventually moved away from those precedents,
thereby restricting their path dependency. The current set of precedents pertaining to congressional power to regulate commercial activities can claim some path dependency but cannot yet claim permanence.
Moreover, in the more than 130 constitutional cases in which the
68
Court has explicitly overruled prior decisions, the plurality is Commerce Clause cases. Even so, Professor Fallon identifies the constitutionality of congressional regulation of commercial activity as one of
the few issues arising under the Commerce Clause that has been settled for a significant period of time. Even though Fallon claims that
path dependency explains the doctrine on congressional regulation
of private economic activity, the Court has arguably signaled in recent
opinions its intention to fine tune or revise its understanding of what
constitutes a commercial as opposed to a non-commercial activity. 69
65

These areas include, but are not limited to First Amendment freedom of speech, free exercise of religion, and separation of church and state; the scope of the Fourth Amendment's
search and seizure guarantee; substantive due process and equal protection under both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; case or controversy requirements for federal jurisdiction;
the ,privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and separation of powers.
See Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Thearies of Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. L.
REv. 155, 229 (1997) (arguing that "(w]ith recent cases tending to reaffirm the Court's holding
in Lopez, and with more cases to follow, notions that the Supreme Court has 'settled' the issue of
congressional Commerce Clause power are no longer valid").
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429, 432 (2002) ("Although the Court has imposed limits on Congress's
general regulatory powers, its decisions in that domain have displayed a cautious tentativeness.
Notably, the Court has not overruled a single case upholding congressional power to regulate
commercial activities.").
68
See GERHARDT, supra note 59, at Table I (listing all of the overruled Supreme Court cases).
69
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding that a gender-motivated
violent crime is not an economic activity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (holding
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This fine-tuning requires the Justices to tinker with precedents on
such far-ranging topics as environmental and criminal law. The extent of path dependency in Commerce Clause cases thus remains to
be seen.
B. Path Dependency Requires Sequentialism

The second essential property required for path dependency is
sequentialism. Sequentialism means the order in which the Court
decides cases makes a difference to their outcomes. Sequentialism
presupposes that what came before has some definitive or measurable
effect(s) on what follows. The problem is that it is impossible to
prove sequentialism as a general phenomenon within constitutional
adjudication. It is pure speculation ·whether the Court would have
ruled differently if it were to have decided a series of cases in a different sequence than it did.
The Court's privacy decisions illustrate the difficulty of proving
sequentialism in constitutional adjudication. A common assumption
is that the sequence of the Court's decisions on privacy led inexorably
70
to Roe v. Wade. Many assume that had the Court decided Roe prior
71
to, say, Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court might have had more trouble deciding Roe in the manner in which it did. This assumption is
mistaken. First, consider the implications of the fact that there is no
consensus on the precedents that might qualify as the Court's socalled privacy decisions. Legal scholars, if not the Justices themselves,
hardly agree on the particular decisions that are relevant to Roe's
formulation or that led inexorably to. Roe or, for that matter, any
other privacy decisions. Path dependency presumes that prior decisions not only set the stage for Roe but led inexorably to it. This was
not the case. The path of the Court's privacy decisions, to the extent
there has been a discernible one, is far from clear and highly contentious. While some might claim the path begins with the Court's
73
1920s decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska72 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the

that the possession of guns in school zones is not an economic activity); see also Michael J
Gerhardt, On Revolution and Wetlands Regulation, 90 GEO. LJ 2143, 2160-66 (2002) (describing,
inter alia, the questions left unanswered in the Court's recent Commerce Clause decisions).
70
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that state criminal abortion laws violate the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against state action the right of privacy,
including a woman's qualified right to terminate her pregnancy).
71
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding that a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives violates married couples' right to marital privacy and is thereby unconstitutional).
72
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down a state law that prohibited teaching non-English languages to any child in the eighth grade or below).
" 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that an Oregon law compelling school children to attend
school within their district of residence was an unconstitutional interference with parents' liberty to direct their children's education).
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connections between those cases and Roe are dubious, because they
did not directly involve a person's autonomy over his or her body,
much less sexual activity. While others might argue the path of the
74
privacy opinions begins with Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
Skinner was an equal protection case, not a due process one. If, however, one were to think that the path of privacy decisions begins with
Griswold, Griswold hardly leads inexorably to Rne. Most of the Justices
in Griswold either explicitly distinguished the context of abortion
75
from the one before the Court in Griswold, or later distinguished
76
their vote in Roe from their vote in Griswold. Griswold is only one of
the many cases cited in Roe," none of which Roe cites as compelling its
result. Nor did the decision in Roe lead the Court in any subsequent
case to recognize or uphold a substantive due process claim. Indeed,
Roe did not preclude the Court from rejecting the substantive due
78
process claims in Bowers v. Hardwick. Nor did a majority of the Court
79
in Lawrence v. Texas follow the lead of Bowers. In short, not a single
privacy decision appears to have followed inexorably from an earlier
one.
Nor is it possible to see how reversing the path of the Court's privacy decisions would necessarily alter outcomes. The Court rarely
takes cases in which the outcomes are clearly dictated by a single
precedent or set of precedents. Even in cases in which the fate of a
particular precedent is at issue, the Court rarely bases its decision on
a single, earlier decision. Further, one might suppose that had the
Court decided Rne before Griswold, the fallout from Roe would have
discouraged the Court from recognizing substantive due process
claims in other cases such as Griswold. Besides being purely speculative, this may not be true. Yale Law School Professor Jed Rubenfeld
has suggested that Roe but not Griswold was correctly decided because
the former, and not the latter, involved the state's forcing a woman to
make a lifestyle choice completely incompatible with her constitutional right to make such a choice unfettered by governmental inter-

74

316 U.S. 535 (1942) (finding that the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
75
381 U.S. at 485-87 (noting that the opinion is confined to the right to privacy within marriage).
76
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (stating that "[t]he situation ... is inherently different from marital intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education, with which Eisenstadt and Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, and Pierce and
Meyerwere respectively concerned").
77
See id. at 152 (citing a litany of cases dealing with the right to personal privacy drawn from
many different Amendments).
78
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); see also infra text accompanying notes 81-85.
79
539 U.S. 558 (2003) (finding that Texas criminal laws banning consensual sodomy violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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80

ference. He argues that Roe and Griswold are distinguishable from
each other on the merits. As long as cases are distinguishable from
each other, they are disconnected. If they are disconnected, then the
sequence in which the Court decided them should not have affected-or did not affect-their outcomes. Distinguishing one decision from another means that the decisions do not depend on each
other.
It follows, as I have suggested, that the Supreme Court's recent
opinion in Lawrence does not follow inexorably from Roe, or for that
matter from any other opinions of the Court. In Lawrence, the Justices could have declared that overturning the Texas anti-sodomy
statute had been foreclosed by Bowers, the position maintained in the
81
dissent of Justice Scalia.
That would constitute some evidence of
path dependency. Indeed, prior to Lawrence, the Court had refused
to extend the notion of privacy recognized in Roe to contexts other
than abortion, including the right to die and homosexual sodomy. 82
While it is true that the Court upheld the equal protection chal83
lenge in Romer v. Evans, Evans hardly followed inexorably from the
Court's prior decisions. Evans itself deviated from a series of prior
opinions upholding state constitutional referenda and overturned for
the first time ever on federal constitutional grounds a law disadvantaging gays and lesbians. Moreover, Evans argues in favor of the
Court's deciding in Lawrence not on due process grounds but rather
on equal protection grounds, as suggested by Justice O'Connor in
84
her concurrence in Lawrence. Indeed, Justice O'Connor's concur80

See

JED RUBENFELD,

FREEDOM AND TIME:

A

THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-

244-45 (2001) ("Marriage may be sacred, but the idea it occupies a domain of
'private life' unregulable by law is a fantasy.").
81
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585-605 (Scalia,]., dissenting).
82
See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 807-08 (1997) (unanimously rejecting the argument that
New York's ban on physician-assisted suicide violates the Equal Protection Clause because the
state allowed competent persons to refuse lifesaving medical treatment); Washington v. Clucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) ("[T]he asserted 'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not
a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.n); Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 280 (1990) (holding that a state may constitutionally impose higher
evidentiary requirements in the matter of terminating treatment for incompetent patients);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) ("[W]e think it evident that none of the rights
announced in [Roe] bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals
to engage in acts of sodomy .... "). Interestingly, Vacco and Glucksburg led then-Professor, nowJudge Michael McConnell to believe that the Court had repudiated the notion that the federal
courts "have authority to resolve contentious questions of social policy on the basis of their own
normative judgments." Michael W. McConnell, The Right to Die and the Jurisprudence of Tradition,
1997 UTAH L. REv. 665, 666.
"'517 U.S. 620, 623-25 (1996) (holding unconstitutional an amendment to the Colorado
Constitution that prohibited state government action designed to protect homosexuals from
discrimination).
84
539 U.S. at 580 ("We have been most likely to apply rational basis review to hold a law unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, where as here, the challenged legislation inGoVERNMENT
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renee in Lawrence dramatically underscores the limited path dependency of Bowers, in which she had joined the majority's opinion. 85

C. Path Dependency Requires Consistency
The third property required for path dependency is consistency.
Consistency requires that a current decision fits logically or coherently into a sequence of cases. It requires that a decision can be reasonably reconciled with the Court's prior decisions on the same subject.
Consistency is both an obvious and extremely elusive condition of
path dependency. On the one hand,Justices can satisfy the demands
of consistency relatively easily in areas in which there are few prior
cases, such as the Second Amendment. In such areas, there may not
yet be a clear or settled framework through which the Justices could
analyze the constitutionality of some gun control legislation. Even if
there were a framework in place, its elements might be sufficiently
capacious to allow the Justices a good deal of maneuverability to fit
particular judicial decisions coherently together. For instance, in
United States v. Lopez,86 Chief Justice Rehnquist inferred from the
Court's Commerce Clause decisions from 1937 through 1995 a threepart test for measuring the constitutionality of a congressional regulation of private activity enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause.
With this framework in place, he then demonstrated how the GunFree School Zones Act87 at issue in Lopez did not satisfy any of the elements or conditions of that test. The ChiefJustice even went so far as
to reconcile some of the Court's most controversial Commerce
88
Clause decisions with the test. He could not reconcile the Gun-Free
School Zones Act with the other cases in which the Court upheld
Commerce Clause enactments because the Act at issue involved
merely carrying a firearm into school and thus not any "economic" or
hi bits personal relationships."). Some might believe the outcome in Bowers was the product of
path dependency brought about by the increasing disenchantment of some Justices with substantive due process. Yet this belief is hard to square with the recognition of a fundamental dynamic of constitutional adjudication that the meaning of a precedent is determined less by
those who created it than by those who subsequently define it. The series of substantive due
process cases prior to Bowers could have emboldened rather than frightened many Justices into
recognizing an expanded right of privacy. After all, Roe and Griswold were part of that series of
decisions, not to mention the Court's cases upholding incorporation of the Fourteenth
Amendment via the Due Process Clause. In any event, the pre-Bowers cases on substantive due
process did not constrain or compel a particular choice in Bowers by a majority of the Justices.
85
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 186.
86
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
87
18 u.s.c. § 922(q)(1990).
88
See id. at 560 (reconciling with the test such decisions as Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filhum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Darby v. United States,
312 U.S. 100 (1941); and NLRB v.]ones & Laughlin Steel Curp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) ).
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"commercial" activity. The Act thus involved activity that could be
reasonably distinguished from the activity regulated in legislation
previously upheld by the Court.
On the other hand, consistency may be extremely hard to achieve
or maintain in areas in which the Court has rendered a large number
of decisions. The problem may be that even if a current decision is
consistent with some past decisions it may not be coherently reconciled with all prior decisions on the same subject. Free Exercise and
Establishment Clause precedents illustrate this problem. In its recent
89
decision in Locke v. Davey, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
these two clauses are in "tension," and it is not surprising to find as a
result that many of its precedents in these two areas are also in "tension." In Locke, the Court upheld, against a Free Exercise challenge, a
Washington state law that had awarded merit scholarships to college
students, but had excluded students pursuing degrees in "devotional
theology." On behalf of the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist read
the Court's prior decisions as having enough "play in the joints" to
90
allow the state of Washington to enact the law at issue in the case.
Indeed, the Court found Locke to be analogous to its recent decision
91
in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, which upheld a school voucher program
available to certain public and private schools (including parochial
schools) in the Cleveland area. But the Court says litde in response
92
to Justice Scalia's argument in dissent that Locke is actually more
93
analogous to Church of Lukumi Babalou Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, in
which the Court had declared that "[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral ... must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny"94 and that "the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law
not discriminate on its face." 95 While the Court in Locke did not use
heightened scrutiny, the Church of Lukumi decision on which Justice
Scalia relied did use it.
But it is also hard to square Justice Scalia's reliance on the latter
because it does not fit with his earlier opinion in yet another case,
Employment Division v. Smith, 96 in which he insisted that the Court did
not need to use heightened scrutiny to examine the constitutionality
of a generally applicable, neutral law that may impose some burdens
on particular religious practices. Smith in tum is hard to square with
"" 540 u.s. 712 (2004).
ld. at 718.
91
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
92
See Locke, 540 U.S. at 726 (Scalia,]., dissenting) (finding Lukumi to be "irreconcilable with
Locke, which sustains a public benefits program that facially discriminates against religion").
" 503 u.s. 520 (1993)
94
503 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (quoted in Locke, 540 U.S. at 726 (Scalia,]., dissenting)).
95
!d. at 533 (quoted in Locke, 540 U.S. at 726 (Scalia,]., dissenting)).
96
494 U.S. 872,882-85 (1990) (discussing the reasons for rejecting heightened scrutiny).
90
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earlier Free Exercise precedents in which the Court did use heightened scrutiny to examine the constitutionality of a law that had the
effect of significantly burdening a religious practice even if the law
were generally and neutrally worded. 97
These cases illustrate a related problem with ensuring consistency
in constitutional adjudication. The difficulty is that a particular decision's meaning or significance often depends on how subsequent justices use or characterize it. And it is not unusual for Justices to take
liberties in characterizing prior decisions. For instance, in Branden98
burg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court developed a highly protective test
for political speech, which it claimed to have derived from prior freedom of speech cases. This, however, was not true. The test in Brandenburg required courts examining laws regulating advocacy to commit lawless action to determine whether "such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to pro99
duce such action." The cases from which the Court supposedly took
this test, however, never articulated such a test. Instead, these cases
suggested a "clear and present danger" test, which the Brandenburg
Court did not discuss in any meaningful detail. 100 The latter phrase
does not even appear in Brandenburg.
101
Similarly, a majority in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia overruled the Court's prior decision reached in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC 02 ostensibly on the ground that the latter could not be reconciled with the Court's prior decisions on affirmative action-the use
of race-based classifications supposedly to benefit minorities. 103 The
problem with this characterization is that there had only been one
97

See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) ("Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake ... we must searchingly examine the interests the state seeks to promote ... ."); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("We must ... consider whether
some compelling state interest justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First
Amendment right.").
98
395 u.s. 444 (1969).
99
!d. at 447.
100
See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (considering the application of a
"clear and present danger" analysis in determining the standard needed to convict Communists
for advocating and teaching the duty to overthrow the government of the United States by force
and violence, in violation of the Smith Act); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 505 (1951)
(examining the standard needed to convict Communists for conspiring to advocate the overthrow of the government of the United States by force and violence, in violation of the Smith
Act, by assessing in part whether the speech was a "clear and present danger"); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627 (1919) (affirming the standard for evaluating conspiracy to
violate provisions of the Espionage Act of Congress, in the case of Defendants publishing disloyal material about the form of government in the United States during the First World War).
101
515 u.s. 200 (1995).
102
497 u.s. 547 (1990).
103
See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 225-27 (holding that Metro Broadcasting rejected longstanding
jurisprudence requiring congruence of standards for evaluating federal and state racial classification).
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prior decision, reached only six years before, in which the Court had
104
struck down an affirmative action program.
Every other precedent,
105
including Metro Broadcasting, that had squarely dealt with a racebased scheme for hiring or awarding government contracts had gone
the other way. Prior precedents could thus be quite reasonably read,
as Justice Stevens did in dissent, as upholding exactly the opposite
outcome as the one reached in Adarand. 106

D. Path Dependency Requires Compulsion
The fourth property required for path dependency is compulsion.
Compulsion entails forcing Justices to reach, or to forego, some
choices or decisions and favor others they might personally prefer
not to make. Yet, there are a number of precedents that do not appear to have compelled the Justices to reach certain results.
Consider, for instance, the path of the Supreme Court's voting
107
rights decisions, beginning with Baker v. Carr, in which it held challenges to racial ge?.andering to be justiciable, and its divisive opin1 8
ion in Bush v. Gore, in which it found Florida's manual recount procedures to be unconstitutional. A conventional critique of Bush v.
Gore is that it deviated from the path of the Court's voting rights decisions, in which the Court had generally subjected to heightened scrutiny only those governmental actions or decisions that impeded the
voting rights of racial minorities, particularly African Americans. 109
Alternatively, some have argued that in Bush v. Gore the Supreme
Court should have treated then-Governor Bush's equal protection

104

City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989) (finding that the city of
Richmond's Minority Business Utilization Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
105
See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 491-92 (1980) (upholding federal legislation
requiring ten percent of federal funding for local public works projects be set aside for minority
applicants); Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (reversing an
injunction that would prevent the University from ever considering race in admissions procedures). It is noteworthy that Croson was the first so-called affirmative action case in which the
Court rendered a majority opinion; in the other cases, the majority had been so fractured that it
was unable to agree on a single opinion for the Court. The absence of a majority opinion on
the question of affirmative action for more than a decade undoubtedly helped to make the law
on affirmative action more, rather than less, confusing.
106
SeeAdarand, 515 U.S. at 256-57 (Stevens,]., dissenting) (finding thatAdarandwas "an unjustified departure from setded law").
107
369 U.S. 186 (1962).
108
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
109
See, e.g., Markenzy Lapointe, Bush v. Gore: Equal Protection Turned on its Head, Perhaps fur a
Good Though Unintended Reason, 2 WYO. L. REv. 435, 479 (2002) (arguing, inter alia, that "theresult cannot be justified by any of the Court's prior equal protection decisions").
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claims either as nonjusticiable or as not supporting heightened judi110
cial review.
The problems with these criticisms of Bush v. Gore should be obvious. First, no cases clearly mandated or compelled the Court to recognize then-Governor Bush's claim as nonjusticiable. Baker arguably
did the opposite by recognizing the constitutionality of judicial review
over governmental decision making affecting voting rights. Baker,
however, is a classic case demonstrating the non-path dependency of
precedent because it rejected the prior formulation of the political
question doctrine in Colegrove v. Green.m
Second, Baker initiated a path of decision making, but the path it
initiated has hardly been linear, predictable, or perfectly coherent.
Baker upheld judicial review of racial gerrymandering, but this ruling
did not clarify the constitutionality of political gerrymandering,
which has raised different questions and produced a less than coher112
ent body of law. Earlier this year, in Vieth v. Jubelirer the Court fell
one vote short of overturning its 1986 decision in Davis v. Bandemer, m
in which the Court had allowed judicial review of political gerrymandering. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia, speaking for a plurality of Jus114
tices in Vieth, declared Davis "wrongly decided" and urged its overruling in order to make way for a clear ruling from the Court that the
Constitution did not provide "a judicially enforceable limit on the political considerations that the states and Congress may take into ac,115
. . .
count wh en d tstncung.
Third, the Court's voting rights decisions hardly lend themselves
to a single reading. It is possible but not inexorable to read them as
having been largely, if not wholly, about protecting minority voting
rights from unfair or discriminatory treatment. One could, however,
read them differently, as did seven Justices, to strike down a scheme
for allowing recounts in a contested election without some clear test

110

See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The FaU of the Political Question Doctrine
and the Rise ofJudicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237, 300 (2002) (stating that the point of
the political question doctrine is that some issues should be left to the political branches and
not the federal judiciary).
111
328 U.S. 549 (1946) (holding that the Court lacked the power to inteiVene on election
district reapportionment issues).
112
124 S. Ct. 1769 (2004).
113
478 u.s. 109 (1986).
1
Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1778.
"
m /d. at 1792. Justice Scalia stressed Davis required overruling because "[e]ighteen years of
essentially pointless litigation have persuaded [a plurality] that [Davis v.] Bandemer is incapable
of principled application." !d. In a separate concurrence in Vr.eth, Justice Anthony Kennedy
resisted overruling Davis because he would not "foreclose all possibility ofjudicial review if some
limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the Constitution
in some redistricting cases." /d. at 1793 (Kennedy,]., concurring in the judgment).

Apr. 2005]

THE LIMITED PATH DEPENDENCY OF PRECEDENT

933

for determining which votes to count. 116 The chances for mischief
within such a scheme were enormous. The prior case law could be
read as disallowing any electoral scheme with a high potential for
117
mischief against a candidate or minority voters.
The case law made
Bush's claim conceivable but not inevitable.
E. Path Dependency Requires Predictability

The final property required for path dependency is predictability.
Path dependency is predicated on the likelihood that past choices
make forecasting future or subsequent ones easier. Predictability requires that the choices the Justices make create expectations about
the path of constitutional adjudication and that these expectations
are largely justified and realized.
To some extent, the path of constitutional adjudication is predictable. For instance, once the Court reaffirmed Roe in Planned Parent118
hood v. Casey, no one expected that in the next abortion rights case
the Court took that it would refrain from revisiting the merits of Roe.
119
Similarly, once the Court decided Nixon v. United States, one could
have reasonably expected that it would probably not entertain other
challenges to Senate impeachment trial procedures. Once Nixon
held judicial challenges to Senate impeachment trial procedures to
be nonjusticiable, the decision would strongly discourage similar
challenges and relieve the Court from adjudicating similar questions
120
in the future.
In still other areas, the path dependency of precedent appears
relatively strong if not predictable. A striking example is the Court's
121
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence.
One can trace one path of

116

At issue in Bush v. Gore were the meanings and significance of a number of prior voting
rights decisions. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (declaring the
state poll tax unconstitutional); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (holding unconstitutional
uneven apportionment of congressional districts in Georgia); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(finding justiciable a cause of action involving state reapportionment decisions).
117
See, e.g., Matthew J. Festa, Note, The Origins and Constitutionality of State Unit Voting in the
Electoral College, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2099, 2140 (2001) (observing that "seven Justices agreed that
the Florida recount raised a valid equal protection problem").
118
505 u.s. 833 (1992).
119
506 u.s. 224 (1993).
120
The only impeachment proceeding to run its full course through the House and the Senate after Walter Nixon's was the impeachment and trial of President William Jefferson Clinton.
President Clinton considered the suggestion, but ultimately declined to initiate any judicial
challenge to his impeachment by the House. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF
STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999).
121
The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[t)he Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
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Eleventh Amendment decisions back to at least the 1890 decision in
122
Hans v. Louisiana.
There, the Court ruled that the Eleventh
Amendment barred federal lawsuits against a state by its own citizens,
in addition to lawsuits by citizens of other states. In spite of acknowledging serious questions about the merits of this ruling, particularly
123
its conflict with the plain language of the Amendment itself, several
contemporary Justices have not only insisted that it is too late in the
124
day to reconsider Hans but also joined together to extend it.
Notwithstanding, the predictability of constitutional adjudication
should not be overstated. The most si~ificant implication of the
1
previously mentioned forecasting study becomes apparent in the
area of predictability. Path dependency requires that outcomes, as
well as individual votes, are predictable, because they supposedly follow both logically and inexorably as a consequence from a prior sequence of decisions. None of the groups surveyed in the forecasting
study perfectly predicted the outcomes, or individual votes, in the
126
cases from the 2002 Term. Indeed, each group but one fell short of
Segal's and Spaeth's rate of success-seventy-seven percent-in predicting outcomes. 127 The outcomes of the Court's cases might have
been consistent with prior precedents, but consistency is not the same
as predictability. The question is the extent to which the outcomes,
or individual votes, were foreseeable. The failure to predict outcomes and individual votes flawlessly suggests that they were not
compelled by prior decisions.
One might counter that the forecasting study did not establish the
impossibility of accurately predicting outcomes of Supreme Court
cases. At best, the study did not rule out predictability as a requirement for path dependency. Nor did the survey assess the degree of
certitude of the experts' guesswork or their predictions of the range
of possible outcomes in given cases.

134 u.s. 1 (1890).
See Christina Bohannan, Beyond Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity: State Waivt'T.l', Private Contracts, and Federal Incentives, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273, 281 (2002) (noting that the Court's holding
in Hans is "contrary to the plain language of the Eleventh Amendment").
124
See Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 229 n.2 (1989) (declining "this most recent invitation
to overrule [its] opinion in Hans").
125
See supra Part I. C.
126
See Ruger et al., supra note 52, at 1151-52 (noting that a machine did "significantly better
at predicting [case] outcomes than did the [academic legal] experts").
127
SEGAL & SPAETH, AlTITUDINAL, supra note 7, at 319 ("The model predicts 77 percent of
the Court's cases correctly ... ."). I hasten to add that a seventy-seven percent success rate in
predicting outcomes is not necessarily that good. Under most grading systems, seventy-seven
percent is either a B or a C. In contrast, the ninety-two percent success rate of attorneys in the
forecasting study is either a very high B or a low A. For the significance of the differences in
these rates of success, see supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
122

123
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Nevertheless, some of the Court's most famous-or infamouslines of decisions have defied prediction. For instance, immediately
after Griswold, no one on the Supreme Court or in legal academia
predicted it would lead inexorably to a case such as Roe. In Griswold,
the m~ority set forth five theories for recognizing the privacy claim
in the case; 128 and no one could have known or predicted which of
any of these a majority might have followed in a subsequent case involving a privacy claim much less a claim to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy. Nor after the Court reaffirmed Roe could anyone have
predicted with certainty which abortion regulations would be found
to be unconstitutional under the new "undue burden" standard set
129
forth in Casey.
Prior to the Court's historic decision in Brown v.
130
Board of Education mandating the end of segregation in public
schools, no one predicted that constitutional doctrine at the time
made such a decision possible. As David Strauss of the University of
Chicago Law School has explained, Brown did not set forth a clear
principle of equal protection. Instead, he argues, Brown can be read
as settinB forth one of at least five different principles of equal protection.1 No one after Brown could have been sure which of these
principles, if any, the Court might follow in subsequent cases. Nor,
for that matter, was it even clear after Brown whether or to what extent the Court intended to mandate the end of segregation outside of
the context of public education.
Predictability also seems to be lacking in at least some Commerce
Clause cases. In Lopez, 132 the Court's striking the Gun-Free School
Zones Act was its first decision in almost six decades to overturn on
Commerce Clause grounds a congressional regulation of private
conduct. In doing so, the Court refused to defer to Congress's determination of a reasonable link betWeen its regulation and the activ133
ity it was trying to regulate.
Moreover, after the Supreme Court
held in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority134 that the
political safeguards states had in the federal political process obviated
the need for judicial review of federal regulation of the states under
128

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 4 79, 484 ( 1965 )(considering the "zones of privacy" implicated in the penumbras cast by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments).
129
Cf Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (striking down a state statute criminalizing
performance of partial-birth abortions because the law lacked a health exception and thereby
placed an undue burden on a woman's right to choose to have an abortion).
130
347 u.s. 483 (1954).
131
See David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 935,
940-44 (1989) (identifying those principles as "lack of impartiality," "subordination," "stigma,"
"second-class citizenship," and "encouragement of prejudice").
132
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
"' See id. at 567 (declining to continue the history of automatic deference to Congress in rational basis analysis).
134
469 u.s. 528, 551 (1985).
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the Commerce Clause, no one could be sure how long Garcia would
135
be good law. Garcia had overruled another decision issued only
nine 6ears before, National League of Cities v. Usery, which had over36
137
ruled
another precedent.
Given that then:Justice Rehnquist
138
threatened in dissent in Garcia to secure its overruling, its future
was very much in doubt from the outset. It was no surprise that the
decision seemed to have lacked any path dependency given that it
was partially overruled in the very next case to raise a question about
the scope of congressional authority to regulate state activity under
139
the Commerce Clause.
Garcia gave no hint, and thus no one at the
time it was decided could have predicted, that the bases on which the
Court would recognize congressional authority under the Commerce
Clause would be further limited by the Eleventh Amendment in Flor140
ida v. Seminole Tribe.
In addition, prior to Election Day 2000, not a single voting rights
expert in the United States had predicted the ultimate outcome of
141
Bush v. Gore.
Nor did any experts declare that a decision like Bush
v. Gore was even possible. Nor, for that matter, is any expert sure
whether, or to what extent, Bush v. Gore will apply outside the context
of presidential elections to such problems as disparities in voting
technology. 142 If one were to believe the Court, the case would have
no effect. Mter all, the Court itself declared that its decision was intended to govern only the dispute between candidates Bush and

1
"

See id. at 557 ("National League of Cities v. Usery is overruled.") (citation omitted).
426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) ("We are ... persuaded that Wirtz must be overruled).
137
See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (stating that under the Commerce Clause the
Fair Labor Standards Act could be applied to state-operated hospitals and schools).
138
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (finding that it is not "incumbent on
those of us in dissent to spell out further the fine points of a principle that will, I am confident,
in time again command the support of a majority of this Court").
""' See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Congress cannot compel
states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program).
140
517 U.S. 44, 53 (1996) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment prevent[s] Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against states for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation
enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause.").
141
531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
142
See Paul M. Schwartz, Voting Technology and Democracy, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 625, 657-74 (2002)
(criticizing the opinion for ignoring disparities in voting technologies). Moreover, the obvious
difficulties with predicting Bush's impact on voting rights law were apparent in the days leading
up to the 2004 presidential election. Experts were predicting all sorts of dire legal scenarios,
none of which came to pass. Compare Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances .. ."), with Steven]. Mulroy, Lemonade from Lemons: Can Advocates Convert
Bush v. Gore into a Vehicle for Reform?, 9 GEO. J. ON POVERlY L. & POL 'v 357, 357 (2002) ("[A]
number of voting rights advocates have tried to use the Bush decision to push for long overdue
electoral reform.").
136
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Gore. 14g It declared, in other words, that its decision would not have
any path dependency.
Bush v. Gore and other cases have demonstrated the ease with
which one can identify the absence of path dependency in constitutional adjudication. One need only demonstrate how a Supreme
Court precedent lacks one or more of the essential properties required for path dependency. It is much harder to explain why, when,
and how some cases generate path dependency or achieve closure
while other cases lack at least one of the essential attributes of path
dependency. The next Part lays the groundwork for explaining these
differences.

III. THE LIMITED PATH DEPENDENCY OF PRECEDENT IN
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

This Part suggests that Supreme Court precedent cannot possibly
play the role that social scientists (and some legal scholars) insist that
it will. Social scientists expect that if particular decisions of the Court
are really "law" then they must impose relatively robust path dependency on the doctrine of constitutional law. The absence of such path
dependency then leads these social scientists to conclude that precedents do not matter (or at least only matter to the extent they can be
manipulated by the Justices to facilitate their desired strategic objectives). Ideologies or personal preferences thus play a significant role
in deciding the path of constitutional law. Yet, there are at least eight
related factors endogenous to the process of constitutional adjudication that demonstrate both how and why some constitutional precedents but not others generate at least some path dependency. These
factors include: (1) constitutional design; (2) the unique nature of
constitutional adjudication; (3) how the Court frames its judgments;
( 4) the different kinds, or degrees, of entrenchment in constitutional
doctrine; (5) changes in the Court's composition; (6) the dynamics
of the Court as a multi-membered institution that makes decisions by
majority vote; (7) the absence of formal rules for construing or overruling precedents; and (8) the X factor-the term I use to refer to
the mysterious reasons that preclude judicial closure of some disputed area(s) of constitutional law. The operation of and interaction
among these factors in constitutional adjudication undercut the
boldest claims of social scientists about the complete absence of path
dependency in constitutional law. They provide some support for the
limited path dependency in constitutional adjudication.

H> See Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for
the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.").
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A. Constitutional Design and Legal Indeterminacy

The indeterminacy of the law bothers many constitutional scholars, particularly in the social sciences, because it arguably prevents
the Constitution from being mechanically applied; however, the indeterminacy of the law is widely accepted among legal scholars. Legal scholars generally agree further on the reasons for the indeterminacy of the law. The first is the nature of the Constitution. A written
constitution, like other laws reduced to writing, must be abstract; it
must speak in "broad outlines" and generalities, as Chief Justice Marshall famously suggested. 144 The abstractness of a written constitution
limits its ability to guide concrete decisions taken in its name, and in145
creases the likelihood of unpredictability in its construction.
The abstractness of the American Constitution is evident in its
broad, non self-defining terms. No one has yet comprehensively
identified the full extent to which its terms are not self-defining. Nor
do legal scholars agree on precisely how widespread the ambiguity is
in our Constitution. There are, however, more than enough vague,
open-ended terms-as well as troublesome questions raised by the silence and design of the Constitution-to make the legal indeterminacy of the Constitution a real problem. The range of vague, ambiguous, non-self-defining terms within the Constitution is
146
daunting.
These terms are not self-defining, but instead subject to
144

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819) (stating that a constitution's
"nature ... requires[] that only its great outlines should be marked .... ").
145
For a discussion of how the indeterminacy of the law facilitates its unpredictability, see
Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 549,
579-84 (1993).
146
For a small sampling of such phrases and terms, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (vesting
the Congress with the authority "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes"); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (giving Congress the authority
"[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers"; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed."); id.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ... ."); id. art. II, § 4 ("The President, Vice-President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery,
or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."); id. art. IV,§ 4 ("The United States shall guarantee
to every State in this Union a Republican form of Government ... ."); id. amend. I ("Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... "); id. amend. II ("A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."); id. amend. V
("No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ... ");
id. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted."); id. amend. IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."); id.
amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.").
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several plausible interpretations. The Constitution provides no guidance on how its terms ought to be interpreted or on which interpretation is superior.
Second, a number of practical problems exacerbate the indeterminacy of constitutional law. The Constitution delegates substantial
authority to those charged with administering, making, and interpreting the law. The Framers and Ratifiers were not able to anticipate
every contingency, they failed to reach consensus on more specific
language, and they agreed on general terms for different, often complex reasons. As Columbia Law School Professor Michael Dorf explains, the difficulty of achieving consensus on more specific language in the Constitution "is particularly problematic for
constitutional interpretation. Given profound disagreement, any
foundational set of procedures or principles sufficiently abstract to
secure consensus and thereby work its way into a popularly chosen
constitution will be too abstract to resolve the most acute subse147
quently arising constitutional controversies."
The text of the Constitution is, however, not the only source of
constitutional meaning that is open-ended, lacks consensus on rules
for its construction, and is subject to multiple interpretations. For instance, the structure of the Constitution raises inferences, but the
Constitution does not dictate which inferences ought to be controlling. In a classic dispute that has existed at least as long as the Constitution, some people support construing the Constitution as setting
forth the full range of areas in which the branches may share power,
while others argue that the Constitution limits only how much power
may be shared by the heads of each branch but not how much may
be shared by officials operating below the apexes. In another longstanding (and ultimately bloodier) dispute, authorities have disagreed over the areas in which the federal government is supreme to
the states as well as the scope of state sovereignty protected by the
Constitution. The open-ended terms of the Constitution, as well as
the inferences raised by the design of the Constitution, lend themselves to several plausible interpretations; however, the Constitution
provides no guidance on how it ought to be interpreted, much less
on which one of several plausible interpretations is superior or ought
to be adopted by the Court.

147

Michael C. Dorf, Legal Intkterminacy and Constitutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 875, 884
(2003); see generally id. at 889-909 (describing several theories seeking to alleviate the indeterminacy problem in constitutional norms).

940

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 7:4

Similarly, original understanding is not subject to a single, au148
thoritative construction (or interpretive approach) .
Scholars and
others disagree over the original understanding of original understanding; whose understandings are relevant for determining original
understanding; how the plain meaning of the Constitution ought to
be determined; how the public or common understanding of the
Constitution at the time of ratification ought to be determined; at
what level of generality original understanding ought to be defined;
and how many Framers or Ratifiers need to have agreed on an understanding in order to attribute that understanding to the Framers or
Ratifiers as a whole. These questions are difficult to answer because
there simply are no rules for originalists to follow in divining original
. 149
un d erstan d mg.
My purpose in raising the indeterminacy of sources of constitutional meaning is not to express agreement with the attitudinal complaint that the indeterminacy of the law precludes the legal model
15
from scientific verification. ° For attitudinalists, the indeterminacy of
the law impedes principled interpretation altogether. I have already
suggested their notion of the legal model as not bearing any resemblance to how the law actually functions. Moreover, a major problem
with their claim is their failure to empirically support their claim that
151
all law is as indeterminate as their own standards demand.
Some152
times the text of the Constitution is relatively clear, but the ambiguity or lack of clarity in the Constitution does not necessarily preclude
the possibility of principled interpretation altogether.
Third, the Court's principal job is not to remove the ambiguities,
or vagueness, within the Constitution. The Court's primary duty is to
decide concrete cases or controversies. 153 As a matter of design, the
Court is not necessarily well suited to determining, once and for all,
the definitive meaning of the Constitution. For instance, the Justices
might have difficulty in agreeing not only on how to resolve the case
before them but also on what else they ought to do. Undoubtedly,

148

See generally DANIELA. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002) (arguing that no one unified
theory explains constitutional law, despite attempts to formulate such a theory).
149
See generally H. Jefferson Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REv. 659 (1987) (arguing
that the originalist interpreter himself shades the "original" interpretation).
150
See supra Part lA.
151
See Michael J. Gerhardt, Attitudes About Attitudes 101 MICH. L. REv. 1733, 1750--51 (2003)
(reviewing SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL, supra note 7) (noting that Segal and Spaeth's model
predicts accurately only seventy-seven percent of Supreme Court decisions).
152
A few minor examples are that we have one President of the United States, one Supreme
Court, and the Congress is composed of two chambers-a House of Representatives and a Senate.
153
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity ... [and] to Controversies ... .").
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the Justices will have difficulty in choosing from and prionttzing
sources, and thereby setding as a group upon a preferred interpretation of the Constitution. Because no law clearly directs the Court on
how to choose among these competing understandings, the Justices
have difficulty in explaining how the law rather than their own inclinations, leads them to adopt one plausible interpretation rather than
another. Nor is this, by any stretch of the imagination, the only difficulty confronting the Justices. Their difficulties in bringing further
clarity to the law are significant, and the remainder of this Part explores the more significant (and enduring) problems in detail.
B. The Significance of the Distinction Between Constitutional
and Common Law Adjudication

Thus far, we have yet to address a critical failure of the dominant
social science models of the Supreme Court: they misapprehend a
basic dynamic in constitutional adjudication. Both attitudinalists and
rational choice theorists have the wrong paradigm in mind when they
think of the Supreme Court or attempt to describe the process of
constitutional adjudication. They presume mistakenly that constitutional adjudication ought to operate in precisely the same manner as
does common law judging. The paradigm they have in mind for
judging is, in other words, the common law system; however, the dynamics in constitutional adjudication and common law judging are
quite different and those differences, have significant implications for
path dependency in each system.
Within the American legal tradition it is the common law-not
constitutional adjudication-that provides the basic paradigm for legal analysis, and a fundamental tenet of the common law is path dependency. It is this paradigm that many social scientists and even
some law professors have in mind when they talk about path dependency in the law. Yale Law School Professor Oona Hathaway defines
path dependency in common law adjudication as "a causal relationship between stages in a temporal sequence, with each stage strongly
154
influencing the direction of the following stage."
This is almost
precisely the same causal relationship that many legal scholars presume exists in constitutional adjudication. Even prominent legal
scholars such as Frank Easterbrook, Richard Posner, and Richard
Fallon, have acknowledged that path dependency, to at least some
meaningful degree, in constitutional adjudication is similar if not

154

Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a
Common Law System, 86 IOWAL. REv. 601,604 (2001).
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identical to path dependency in the common law.
Other scholars
go further not only to treat constitutional adjudication as akin to
common law judging but also to treat the path dependency in consti156
tutional adjudication as akin to that in the common law.
It should go without saying, however, that precedent functions differently in common law and constitutional adjudication. To begin
with, the structure of our legal order reflects these differences. The
structural differences between constitutional adjudication and judicial resolution of common law and statutory issues dictate a different
status for precedent in each context. In a common law system,
precedents are the exclusive source of legal authority. By definition,
common law cases are those in which a legislature or higher authority
has not yet spoken (at least explicitly) to the issues. While it is true
that in common law cases the judges may be trying to resolve particular disputes in light of some abstract principles of the law, they are
common law cases precisely because these abstract notions have not
been codified. In the common law system, cases thus are the primary
constituents. What follows is that path dependency then becomes a
basic expectation in the common law system. While cases are not the

155

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 366 (1992)
(criticizing the argument that-because of the phenomenon of path dependency-"the meaning of the Constitution varies with the order in which cases reach the Court"); Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The "Conseroative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
429, 434-35 (2002) (describing how the Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions reflect the conventional conception of path dependency); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and
Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 573, 585-86 (2000) (acknowledging that because of path dependency the "structure of common law doctrine (broadly
understood as doctrine forged in the process of deciding cases, whether or not they technically
are common law cases) seems on the whole pretty efficient"); see also Amy Coney Barrett, Stare
Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. lOll, 1023 (2003) (acknowledging, without further
discussion, the phenomenon of path dependency in constitutional law); Barry Friedman &
Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. I, 9-33 (1998) (employing the
conventional conception of path dependency to describe the process of constitutional adjudication);Jonathan Turley, Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance
in a Madisonian Democracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 649, 655 (2002) (acknowledging, without further discussion, the phenomenon of path dependency in the Court's opinions on military authority). But see Fallon, supra, at 436 (urging "capacious conception of path dependence [as]
the idea that as the Court proceeds along a doctrinal path, both it and the attentive public assess what the Justices may properly do next in light of past experience"); Posner, supra, at 586
(recommending conceiving of the law as "a servant of social need, a conception which severs
the law from any inherent dependence on its past").
156

See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 5, at 4 ("[B]ecause the Supreme Court in deciding constitutional cases has acted like a common law court ... those five-hundred-<>dd volumes of Supreme
Court Reports are the principle source of constitutional law, of constitutional doctrine.");
Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89
. HARV. L. REv. 1,3 (1975) (analyzing the Supreme Court's 1974 Term to illustrate the use of
common law reasoning in constitutional cases); David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1996) (arguing in favor of constitutional interpretation based
on the common law).
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primary or sole constituent of litigation over the meaning or application of a statute, statutory and common law cases have one essential
feature in common: a legislature may overrule or displace a court's
decision on the meaning of either the common law or a statute. Because of this common feature, judges have tended to defer to earlier
common law or statutory decisions so as to give legislatures a fixed
target toward which they may legislate.
There is, however, less need for such deference in constitutional
adjudication. The dynamic in constitutional adjudication is fundamentally different from that in common law judging. No one seriously disputes that in constitutional adjudication the primary con157
stituent is the Constitution.
There is nothing analogous to the
158
Constitution in the American common law system.
The Constitution provides the framework for decision in contrast to the common
law in which the cases-the precedents, if you will-are the principal
framework. Thus, precedent is a primary medium in the common
law while precedent is, as a practical matter, not necessarily the primary one in constitutional adjudication. It is clearly not the only one
in constitutional adjudication. The choice in a common law case is
almost always defined by prior cases; one has to choose which prior
case is most like the one before the court. In contrast, the choice in
constitutional adjudication is often, but not always, between prior
cases. In choosing between them, however, the Justices pay attention
to what fidelity to the Constitution commands. The fact that our written Constitution makes it very difficult for democratic authorities to
overturn the Court's constitutional decisions compels the Court to
treat fidelity to precedent as a concern, but not necessarily the primary one in constitutional adjudication.
Moreover, constitutional history reflects a growing awareness
among the Framers regarding the uniqueness of constitutional adjudication. To the extent that the Framers and Ratifiers openly discussed how precedent would function in constitutional adjudication,
they initially appear to have believed it would be similar to how it op159
erated in common law cases. By the mid to late nineteenth century,

157

Some people might dispute the clarity of the text of the Constitution, but no one seriously
questions the status of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land.
158
To be sure, for the English judges with whom the Framers were quite familiar, the unwritten Constitution provided a backdrop to litigation. In the revolutionary era, lots of common
law talk informed constitutional interpretation even before any of the colonists had a written
constitution. In a sense, we inherited a common law mode of constitutional argumentation
from the British. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
159
See Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the
Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REv. 647, 662-66 (1999) (smveying the Framers' commentary on
precedent).
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160

Supreme Court Justices changed their minds.
Mter decades of experience, the Justices realized that constitutional cases pose a different dynamic than common law ones and thus precedent came to
function quite differently in the two systems. Because common law
and statutory precedents could be easily overturned by legislatures,
Justices generally seem to have concluded that these precedents
should be given substantial deference so that the law would have substantial degrees of stability, predictability, and consistency until such
time as lawmakers decided it needed to be changed. In contrast, the
impossibility of overturning the Court's mistaken constitutional interpretation(s) except by the extraordinary means of amending the
Constitution pressured the Court over the years to give less deference
to its constitutional decisions than to its statutory ones. 161 It gives its
constitutional precedents relatively less deference to avoid the risk of
allowing its mistakes to become permanent fixtures in constitutional
law. Thus, the Justices developed the modem doctrine of stare decisis, which allows the Court to give some but not absolute deference
to its prior decisions. This is essentially a prudential doctrine, which
enables the Justices to balance the need to revisit some decisions in
order to avoid writing their mistakes permanently into the Constitution and to uphold some erroneous constitutional interpretations for
the sake of such institutional values as fairness, consistency, reliability,
predictability, stability, and finality.
The Justices seem to have further recognized the now generally
accepted fact that in our legal order, different kinds of precedents
perform different functions. Common law precedents reflect the
162
principle(s) judges or Justices try to vindicate.
In contrast, some
statutes are commonly thought to give courts the authority to fill any
gaps in order to clarify the broad or ambiguous language within
163
them; legislatures generally enact statutes with the likelihood of
their being subject to subsequent judicial review in mind. Consequently, there is an ongoing relationship-or, some call it a "dialogue"-between courts and legislatures that is largely absent in constitutional adjudication. When construing statutes, courts place a
160
161

/d. at 661.

See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 426 ("For a long time judges have said that statutes are
different from common law and constitutional law.").
162
See, e.g., Haag v. State, 591 So. 2d 614, 618 (Fla. 1992) (holding that "[i]t is a rule that
precedent must be followed except when departure is necessary to vindicate other principles of
law or to remedy continued injustice") (citation omitted).
163
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (stating very generally a private right of action for the
deprivation of rights by government actors); Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000) (stating
broadly the illegality of trusts in restraint of interstate trade or commerce and of monopolies of
any part of interstate trade or commerce); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 533, 544 (1983) ("[S]tatute books are full of laws, of which the Sherman Act is a
good example, that effectively authorize courts to create new lines of common law.").
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premium on not second guessing themselves. The reluctance to second guess serves several objectives, including maintaining the respect
or good will of the other partner(s) in the dialogue and making it
easier for legislatures to correct the Court's interpretation(s) by not
changing them erratically. In constitutional adjudication, courts do
not generally view precedents as evidence of the law. They view them
as being synonymous with the law. As a practical matter, precedents
achieve supremacy within the law because the Constitution is structured to allow for their displacement only through the narrow means
164
of constitutional amendments or overturning by the Court. In the
process of constitutional adjudication, precedents may be subject to
reconsideration on the basis of whether they comport with the Constitution or perhaps other sources such as original understanding.
Nevertheless, they retain their status as law by the Court's, if not
other institutions' willingness to stand by them unless or until they
have been revised. 165
Finally, there is a striking difference in the rates of overruling
constitutional and common law precedents. If there were similar degrees of path dependency of precedent in constitutional and common law adjudication, then the rates of overruling in each system
ought to be similar. Yet, the rates are radically different. During the
nineteenth century the Supreme Court overruled fewer than twenty
constitutional precedents, but it overruled more than 120 in subsequent years. 166 It is tempting to infer from these numbers that the
Court had greater respect for precedent in the nineteenth century.
One should, however, resist the temptation to believe that the
Court no longer respects precedent as much as it once did. First, it
was much easier to distinguish precedents in the first hundred years
of the Republic than it has become in subsequent years. Early in the
history of constitutional adjudication, the Court usually wrote on a
blank or nearly blank slate. There were fewer, sometimes no, prior
decisions on the issues that came before the Court. Even when there
were some prior decisions in particular areas of constitutional law, it
was not difficult for subsequent courts to distinguish or narrow them.
As precedents have increased in number, distinguishing them has be-

164

See U.S. CONST. art. V (prescribing the means for formally amending the Constitution of
the United States).
165
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864 (1992) (asserting that in constitutional adjudication, "a decision to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above
the belief that a prior case was wrongly decided").
166
In the nineteenth century, the Court overruled only seventeen precedents. See LEE
EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM 175-89 (1996) (listing all Supreme Court
cases that have been overruled). By April 1, 2004, the Court had explicitly overruled a total of
133 constitutional precedents. GERHARDT, supra note 59 (manuscript at tbl. 1 on file with author).
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come more difficult and potential conflicts have grown. With greater
potential for conflict, the Justices confront greater pressure not to
distinguish but to overrule conflicting precedent(s).
Second, as Thomas Lee suggests, the Justices recognized over time
that constitutional adjudication was not analogous to common law
167
decision making.
The soundest speculation is that this realization
did not fully take shape until some time in the latter quarter of the
nineteenth century. 168 No one knows for sure why it took so long for
this realization to take hold, why it took hold at all, or why the Framers did not come to this realization more quickly. One searches in
vain for explanations within the leading treatises or commentaries of
the era. All that can be safely said is that once the realization took
hold, the Justices increasingly acknowledged the possibility of error in
constitutional adjudication. With this acknowledgment came a corresponding realization now shared by every Justice on the need in constitutional adjudication to balance their individual views on the merits of particular decisions with various institutional considerations,
such as the need for stability or governmental reliance.
C. The Significance of Rules and Standards

The Justices' training and duties narrow their options for packaging their decisions. Generally, they frame their judgments as rules or
standards. Rules and standards constrain the Court's decision making differently, and these differences illuminate how precedent has
limited constraint on the Court's decisions.
169
By design, rules constrain choices more than do standards.
Rules constitute broad, inflexible principles that provide clear notice
to those to whom they apply, and that allow minimal discretion from
those charged with implementing or enforcing them. A speed limit is
a prime example of a rule. Any driver who exceeds the speed limit is
violating the law. The law allows for no exceptions. The only discretion permitted by the law is measuring the speed at which someone
has been driving and then matching that speed against the maximum
allowed to determine compliance.
The more absolutist the rule set forth by the Supreme Court in a
given area, the more strongly it imposes path dependency on constitutional law. Interestingly, the Court frames relatively few judgments
as rules. Good examples are the Court's holdings that Section Five of

167

See Lee, supra note 159, at 712-28 (discussing the change from the Marshall Court to Justice Brandeis's approach in the Court's view of constitutional adjudication).
168
See id. at 718--22 (chronicling this turn of events).
169
On differences between rules and standards, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Jus·
tices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22 ( 1992).
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the Fourteenth Amendment does not authorize the Congress to regu170
late private activity and that the Commerce Clause forbids the Con171
gress to commandeer the States. Another good example is the rule
that Justice Scalia proposes in racial discrimination cases. His rule
would forbid almost all racial preferences. 172 If the Court were to
adopt his suggested rule, it would significantly constrain the path of
the Court's subsequent rulings on racial discrimination. Indeed,
such constraint is justice Scalia's objective.
In contrast, standards set forth criteria against which governmen173
tal action is measured.
Compliance with a standard entails discretion because a standard's implementation requires a decision maker
to interpret the criteria in order to determine whether the criteria
have been met. A classic example of a standard is a parent's will leaving his money to his children as long as they eat healthily. Someone
must adjudicate what constitutes healthy eating and whether the food
consumed fits within the applicable criterion. Standards abound in
constitutional law. A few examples include the balancing tests the
Court employs for determining the reasonableness of searches or sei170

See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621 (2000) ( [T]he Fourtheenth Amendment,
by its very terms, prohibits only state action .... 'That Amendment erects no shield against
merely private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.'") (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 u.s. 1, 13 (1948)).
171
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) ("While Congress has substantial
powers to govern the Nation directly, including in areas of intimate concern to the States, the
Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the
States to govern according to Congress' instructions."). Two other examples are the Court's
holdings that the Eleventh Amendment forbids the Congress from requiring the states to pay
damages in judicial proceedings brought against them and that the police may not interrogate
people in their custody without providing Miranda warnings. See supra text accompanying notes
121-24, 47-48. Congress may, however, abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in
statutes that provide clearly for such abrogation. See supra note 118. Moreover, the Justices disagree over the clarity with which the Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity,
while there are so many exceptions to the rule announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) that they are widely regarded as virtually swallowing the rule. See, e.g., Susan Klein,
Miranda Deconstitutionalized: When the Selflncrimination Clause and the Civil Rights Act CoUide, 143
U. PA. L. REv. 417 (1994) (arguing that developments on Fifth Amendment law encourage the
violation of Miranda rights); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal justice and the 1996-97 Supreme Court
Term, 23 U. DAYfON L. REv. 29, 31 (1997) ("[T]he Court has allowed so many exceptions that
Miranda survives only as a hollow symbol of the Warren Court." (quoting DAVID M. O'BRIEN,
STORM CENTER: THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT: FIRST PRINCIPLES 1 (1997));
Note, Breathing New Life into Prosecutorial Vindictiveness Doctrine, 114 HAR.v. L. REv. 2074, 2093
(2001) ("[T]he Court has imposed so many exceptions and qualifications to the Miranda rule
that a growing number of confessions are admissible ... .").
172
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia,]., concurring in part, dissenting
in part) ("The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of race ... .");
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 521 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) (arguing that "only a social emergency rising to the level of imminent danger to life
and limb" justifies racial classification at the state and local level).
173
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 22 NOVA L. REV. 741, 75358 (1998) (demonstrating the application of constitutional standards).
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174

zures, the propriety of some congressional encroachments on the
powers of other branches, and the Court's varying levels of scrutiny
for discrimination in cases not involving racial discrimination. Even
the kind of heightened scrutiny adopted by the majority in affirma175
tive action cases such as City of Richmond v. ]A. Croson Co., Adarand
177
176
Constructors, Inc. v. Peiia, and Grutter v. Bollinger, is a standard. It
does not operate mechanically like a rule, but it requires discretion
on the part of adjudicators to determine if the government has dem178
onstrated a compellingjustification for a disputed practice.
Though the Supreme Court rarely addresses the significance of
the difference between rules and standards, it did so in Crawford v.
119
Washington in 2004. The case involved the constitutionality of a
conviction based in part on the admission into evidence of the statement of a woman who later refused to testify against her husband
based on the marital privilege. Prior precedent had allowed such
admissions as long as the evidence was "reliable." The Court overturned the conviction. In a unanimous opinion by Justice Scalia, the
Court discussed the importance of framing its judgment as a rule
rather than as a standard. Justice Scalia condemned the practice of
employing standards, which allowed unpredictable, manipulative bal180
ancing by the Justices. Justice Scalia defended the Court's deciding
181
the case on the basis of an absolute rule because the Court could
apply it more easily, other courts and authors could follow (and be
bound by) it more easily, and it comported with the Confrontation
Clause's apparently flat requirement that in every criminal case de-

174

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that reasonableness of a search or seizure can be determined by "'balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasions which
the search [or seizure] entails'" (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523,536-37 (1967))
(alteration in original)).
175
488 U.S. at 473 (1989) ("Even if the level of equal protection scrutiny could be said to vary
according to the ability of different groups to defend their interests in the representative process, heightened scrutiny would still be appropriate in the circumstances of this case .... ").
176
515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[A]II racial classifications ... must be analyzed by a reviewing
court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they
are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests.").
177
539 U.S. at 343 (2003) (upholding a narrowly tailored affirmative action program in a law
school admissions program).
178
Just how strenuous, or strict, the Court's standard should be is what divides the majority
Justices in all the affirmative action cases.
179
124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004).
180
See id. at 1373 ("By replacing constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests,
we do violence to their design. Vague standards are manipulable ... .").
181
/d. at 1370 ("[T]he [Confrontation] Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather then a substantive guarantee .... The Clause thus reflects a
judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence, but about how reliability can be
best determined.").
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182

fendants are entitled to confront adverse witnesses.
Accordingly,
the Court overturned its precedent.
To date, no one has assembled, much less analyzed, data on standards and rules. The Court's judgments can be categorized in terms
of the number of rules it has formulated; the breakdown of its rules
into subject areas, and in terms of the rules' relative clarity; the number of standards (likely to be enormous); and the breakdown of standards into subject matter and clarity. These data will clarifY patterns
in the Court's decision making, including the areas in which the
Court frames its most restrictive judgments and those in which it
frames its least restrictive. The research will also clarifY how many
clearly stated judgments have failed to constrain or lead to predictable outcomes and how many resist categorization (or easy application). For instance, David Strauss has explained that Brown v. Board of
183
Education did not announce a clear principle of equal protection,
but rather can be read as setting forth one of at least five different
184
principles.
Similarly, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the majority an185
nounced several different theories supporting the outcome.
Research on how many other decisions declare unclear, ambiguous, or
multiple rationales would illuminate the precedents, as claimed by
Dworkin, 186 allowing "weak" and "strong" discretion.
Further research is also needed on determining the stability of
standards and rules. Over time, a judicially-created rule or standard
may not be path dependent. At least one reason is obvious: The
meaning of a precedent in constitutional law ultimately depends less
on what the Justices who created it thought it meant than on the
meaning assigned to the precedent by subsequent Justices. For in187
stance, the Justices who decided Korematsu v. United States and Brown
did not frame either decision with affirmative action in mind. Yet, in
Adarand and Croson, a majority of Justices relied on Korematsu for the
proposition that all race-based classifications must be subjected to
strict scrutiny. 188 It did not matter that Brown had not even clarified
182

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions ... the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to be confronted with the wimesses against him."); 124 S. Ct. at 1374 ("Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicum of reliability sufficient to satisfY constitutional
demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.").
183
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
184
See Strauss, supra note 131, passim.
185
381 U.S. 479, 483, 487, 500, 503 (1965) (using "penumbral" rights, the Ninth Amendment, substantive due process, and mere rationality to overturn a state ban on contraceptive
sales).
186
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
187
323 u.s. 214 (1944).
188
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 215-16 (1995) (stating that Korer
matsu's prounouncement on the immediately suspect nature of curtailing a racial group's rights
applies to the federal government as well as to the states.); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
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the level of scrutiny it had employed, or that Korematsu plainly involved a race-based classification directed against a relatively powerless minority. What mattered was how Justices in the present and the
future read the prior decisions in Brown and Korematsu. Path dependency turns out to depend in part on both how a particular majority has packaged a decision and how subsequent Justices construe
the packaging of their predecessors.
D. The Constitutional Significance of Entrenchment

At least as a descriptive matter, the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions have become entrenched, or deeply engrained within
our legal system, in at least three significant forms. Both individually
and collectively, these forms pose serious challenges to the dominant
social science models of the Court, particularly the attitudinal model.
The first form in which constitutional law becomes entrenched
consists of foundational institutional practices. These are particular
patterns or instances of decision making of the third branch (and
other governmental institutions) that have become so deeply entrenched within our society that they may be undone only through
extremely radical, unprecedented acts of political and judicial will. A
prime example of a foundational institutional practice is judicial review. Over the course of two hundred years, judicial review has become a fixture in our constitutional order. Moreover, the scope of
judicial review has grown not shrunk. While academics and political
leaders sometimes urge abandoning the practice of judicial review al89
together or at least seriously curbing the Court's jurisdiction/ their
calls remain unfulfilled. Nor is there any likelihood, at least in the
foreseeable future, that those calls would be heeded. There simply
are no signs of a serious political or social movement to abandon judicial review or even to restrict it over politically and socially divisive
subjects.

488 U.S.469, 501 (1989) ("The history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind
judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncemenents of necessity has no place in
equal protection analysis).
189
See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GoMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECUNE 96 (1996) ("The Court ... undertakes to decide hot button issues that are,
strictly speaking, none of its business."); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPUlAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (arguing that the public, not the judiciary,
should have ultimate control over interpretation of the Constitution); MARK V. TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 154-76 (1999) (considering the jurisprudential benefits of abandoning judicial review). The Republican platform on which President
George W. Bush successfully ran for reelection denounced "activist" judges and strongly endorsed radical measures that would strip all Article III courts, including the Supreme Court, to
hear any constitutional claims regarding marriage, public acknowledgments of God, and the
Ten Commandments.
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A second form of entrenchment in constitutional law is foundational doctrine. Foundational doctrine refers to the Supreme Court
decisions that govern, clarify, and undergird the Court's standard of
review, or approach to, certain general categories, kinds, and classes
of constitutional disputes. A prime example of this form of entrenchment is the Supreme Court's incorporation doctrine, which
provides the basis for the Court's review of state action allegedly violating most of the Bill of Rights. The bulk of First and Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence has been forged in cases involving the
constitutionality of state, rather than federal, action. Incorporation
makes judicial review of those cases possible. It does not dictate how
the Court ought to resolve particular claims of state violations of most
of the individual rights guarantees in the Bill of Rights, but it does
provide the basis for judicial review of the pertinent claims. Other
examples of foundational doctrine are the Court's standing and political question doctrines. Neither doctrine compels the Court to do
anything in particular with respect to certain constitutional claims,
but they provide a foundation and framework for the Court to use in
deciding who may bring constitutional claims in Article III courts and
what kinds of claims they may litigate there.
The third form of deeply entrenched constitutional law in our society consists of particular constitutional decisions that are well settled and practically immune to reversal. An obvious example of one
such decision, to which I have previously alluded, is the Supreme
190
Court's decision upholding the constitutionality of paper money.
Whatever its merits, the possibility of overturning the decision is nil.
Overturning the decision is simply unthinkable. No one seriously
suggests the Court ought to ever revisit it, not even legal scholars who
generally believe erroneous decisions should not be entitled to any
191
judicial deference.
The extraordinary chaos provoked by its overturning has long led the Court (and anyone who would even think of
challenging it) to allow the decision to remain standing.
Any effort to explain how the Justices decide cases must account
for the entrenchment of constitutional law in each of these forms.
One possible explanation is that these forms of entrenchment reflect
the network effects of different judicial practices and decisions. Once
other institutions invested in, or relied upon, particular judicial practices and decisions, they became more ingrained into our legal sys190
191

See infra text accompanying note 209.

See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE PO UTI CAL SEDUCfiON OF THE LAW
158 (1990) ("The previous decision may be clearly incorrect but nevertheless have become so
embedded in the life of the nation ... so fundamental to the private and public expectations of
citizens and institutions, that the result should not be changed now."); Raoul Berger, Original
Intent and Boris Bittker, 66 IND. LJ. 723, 753-54 (1991) (citing George Washington's farewell address for the idea that even precedent ought not be easily overruled).
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tern. The more ingrained a particular judicial practice or decision is
192
the more difficult it is to undo. As layers become deeply embedded
and encrusted, the more immune they become to judicial tinkering
or excavation. Of course, why some rather than other, judicial decisions and practices become ingrained (at least to the extent of becoming effectively immune to overturning) remains a difficult question. Because these may be network effects, it might be useful to
examine the network within which the Justices operate more closely.
In particular, certain features of constitutional adjudication may be
pertinent to the phenomenon of entrenchment. I turn next to perhaps the most obvious of these.
E. The

Si~ificance

of Changes in the Court's Composition

A change in personnel on the Supreme Court is unquestionably
the main trigger to a shift in precedent. It has been extremely rare
for Justices to join in overruling a prior decision that they wrote or
joined. In only four cases has a Court with no change in membership
193
overruled itself.
In every other case in which the Court has explicitly overruled itself, the composition of the Court has been different
from what it had been in the precedent being overruled. In particular, of the more than 130 cases overruled by the Court, seven involved
a Court with one new Justice, seven involved a Court with two new
Justices, nine involved a Court with three new Justices, fourteen involved a Court with four new Justices, seven involved a Court with five
new Justices, fifteen involved a Court with six new Justices, eighteen
involved a Court with seven new Justices, eleven involved a Court with
eight new Justices, and seventy involved a Court with nine different
194
Justices.
Interestingly, these figures suggest that, at least with respect to overruling, a Supreme Court decision probably has its
strongest claim to generating path dependency immediately after it
has been created. Its path dependency becomes more unpredictable
over time, depending on the various factors discussed in this Section.
The fact that the most significant, explicit lack of deference to
Supreme Court precedent coincides with the arrivals of new Justices
192

Barry Friedman and Scott Smith have referred to this phenomenon as our "sedimentary
constitution," in which different doctrines have been built up over time one atop the other, just
like different layers of sediment. See Barry Friedman & Scott Smith, Til£ Sedimentary Constitution,
147 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 36 (1998) (describing the metaphor).
193
State Dep't. of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Zarate, 407 U.S. 918 (1972) and Sterrett v. Mothers' & Children's Rights Org., 409 U.S. 809 (1972), uverruled by Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651
(1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), uverruled by Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S.
600 (1974); Harshman v. Bates County, 92 U.S. 569 (1875), overruled by County of Cass v.Johnston, 95 U.S. 360 (1877); Rose v. Himeley, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241 (1808), uverruled by Hudson v.
Guestier, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 281 (1810).
194
GERHARDT, supra note 59 (manuscript on file with author).
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on the Supreme Court is not surprising. The Constitution allows only
two ways to undo the Court's mistaken constitutional interpretations.
The first is by constitutional amendment, while the other is to convince the Court that it erred. There is no question as to which of
these is easier to accomplish. To be sure, it is difficult to convince the
Justices who rendered an opinion that their opinion was wrong. As
the statistics above indicate, this method is unlikely to work. Justices
might resist overturning cases they joined in deciding for many reasons. One is to protect scarce judicial resources. Standing by their
decisions simply allows the Court to build doctrine and to spend time
on other cases and areas of the law. Another reason is the Justices'
reluctance to admit they have made mistakes. Such admissions might
make the Justices appear to be indecisive or incompetent.
It may, however, be easier to persuade Justices that the Court
erred in opinions in which they did not participate. Indeed, it is possible new Justices might be more inclined to reconsider precedent.
Many presidents appoint Justices with the hopes and expectations
195
that they would vote to overrule particular decisions or doctrines.
Life tenure allows Justices to serve for a substantial amount of time
on the Court, but they cannot serve forever. Vacancies on the Court
provide presidents and senators with their best and only chances to
directly shape the composition and direction of the Court.
Every president has recognized the significance of a vacancy on
the Court, and in almost every presidential campaign the candidates
have made assurances, if not pledges, with respect to the kinds of Justices they would nominate. For instance, Richard Nixon campaigned
against the Warren Court's activism, particularly its decisions favoring
196
criminal defendants and curbing states' rights.
He vowed that if
elected he would agpoint "strict constructionists" who would be
1
tough on criminals.
Nixon's appointees helped to close some of
the loopholes created or recognized by the Warren Court to help
criminal defendants. 198 Subsequently, Presidents Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush both campaigned against liberal judicial activism
to stifle school prayer and other majoritarian preferences, singled out
195

Of course, another method is to pack the Court. Packing the Court requires, however,
the Congress to expand the size of the Court, something the Congress has not done since 1869.
See infra text accompanying note 335.
196
See JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON
APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT 16 (2001) (discussing Nixon's search for a
strict constructionist Justice).
197
/d. at 15.
198
See Jessica Natali, Note, Criminal Procedure-The Supreme Court Gives Parole Officers Carte
Blanche to Invade Parolees' Fourth Amendment Privacy Rights-Pennsylvania Board of Probation and
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998); 73 TEMP. L. REV. 451, 452 (2000) ("The post-Warren Court
introduced the 'deterrence theory' and gradually began to retrench the rights of criminal defendants.").
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Roe for especially virulent criticism, and vowed to appoint Justices
199
who would, inter alia, overrule Roe and be tougher on criminals.
Their appointees helped to make overturning convictions and abor200
tion regulations more difficult. More recently, President George W.
Bush won re-election based in part on his vows to appoint Justices like
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, and the platform on which he
ran denounced the "activist" judges deciding Roe v. Wade, removing
school prayer and the Ten Commandments from public life and
scho?l~, striking down laws crimi~alizin ~ homosexual sodomy, and
21
reqmnng a state to accept gay mamages.
Newly appointed Justices are likely to arrive on the Supreme
Court with several possible attitudes regarding precedent. Some new
Justices are not likely to feel any personal investment, or stake, in decisions in which they did not participate. Altematively, newly appointed Justices might defer to earlier decisions because they want to
show the same degree of respect for those decisions as they would
hope theirs would get from their successors. Yet another possibility is
that newly appointed Justices might recognize the need to respect
precedent as a means to protect the Supreme Court institutionally
from attacks for inadequately respecting the rule of law. Newly appointed Justices might also believe that the Court's status will be enhanced if they undo its mistakes and therefore improve the quality of
the Court's output. And, of course, an entirely new set of possibilities
might arise if the vacancy being filled were that of the Chief Justice.
The person who acts as Chief Justice may feel different institutional
pressures than Associate Justices. They may feel greater pressures, for
instance, to forge majorities, to maintain cordial relations on the
Court, to facilitate greater stability on the Court (and its decisions),
to promote respect for the Court that bears their name, or to pay
more attention to how the public perceives the Court.
While these are only some of the possible attitudes newly appointed Justices might have, a Justice's attitudes toward precedent
might not be fixed. It is always possible that the interaction on the
Court might shape a new Justice's attitudes about precedent or about
the Court itself. It is even possible that the interaction among the
Justices might produce unforeseeable or unexpected outcomes. As

199

See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Pressure of Precedent: A Critique of the Conseroative Approaches to
Stare Decisis in Abortion Cases, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 67, 67 n.2 (1993) (citing Reagan's and

Bush's positions on abortion).
200
See Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R Hensley, Unfulfilled Aspirations: The Court Packing
Efforts of Presidents Reagan and Bush, 57 ALB. L. REv. 1111, 1122 (1994) ("The Supreme Court
approved governmental regulations affecting women's choices about abortion that would never
have been approved by the justices comprising the majority in Rne v. Wade.").
201
See The Republicans: The Convention in New York, the Platform on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 30, 2004, at A8 (reprinting text of the Republican platform).
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the next Section shows, the impact that Justices have on the Court
and their abilities to control the path of constitutional adjudication
are limited or unpredictable at best.
F. Rational Choice Theory

The path dependency of a particular judicial decision depends in
part on the size and jurisdiction of the court creating it. A single
judge on an inferior court will not decide cases in the same manner
(or be subject to the same pressures or norms) as a threejudge panel
or the nine-member Supreme Court of the United States. A federal
district jud~e, for instance, has relatively litde discretion in handling
2
precedent.
She is bound by a direcdy superior court's precedents;
they impose an order-indeed, they often contain directions--on
203
what she must do.
If a district judge were deciding a question on
which the federal appeals court for her circuit had not yet ruled, she
would have the discretion to follow whichever reasoning she found to
204
be the most persuasive. As for her own rulings, a judge is bound to
the practical extent to which she strives for consistency and coher2os
ence.
The dynamics of the nation's highest appellate court-the Supreme Court-are unlike those of any other court. A common, but
misleading image of the Court is that of a single Justice or a monolithic institution. It is neither. Adrian Vermeule has emphasized that
the Court really is a "they" and not an "it." 206 Nor do the Court's
precedents relate to its decision making as they do to other courts.
Whereas the Supreme Court's precedents are binding on inferior
courts, its judgments are not, by definition and design, subject to review by any other tribunal. The Court's precedents apply horizontally
to each of the Justices, or as persuasive authority from an equal rather
than a superior authority. Rational choice theory posits that under

202

See Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political Burdens and the
CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1028 (1996) (arguing that "[!]ower courts are generally
obligated to interpret and apply existing Supreme Court precedents faithfully, having little discretion to determine that old precedent has lost its binding force").
20
' See Caminker, supra note 28, at 818 ("[L]ongstanding doctrine dictates that a court is always bound to follow a precedent established by a court 'superior' to it.").
204
See Don E. Williams Co. v. Comm 'r of Internal Revenue, 429 U.S. 569, 573 ( 1977) (observing that because the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had not yet ruled on an issue, the Tax
Court was free to decline to follow decisions of the Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits).
205
Caminker, supra note 28, at 853 ("(I]nternal consistency strengthens external credibility.").
206
Adrian Vermeule, The judiciary is a They, Not an It: Two Fallacies of Interpretive Theory and the
Fallacy of Division, 14]. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549 (2005) (pointing to the underlying assumptions about the judiciary's collective character that render generally accepted views on statutory
interpretation tenuous).
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such circumstances in which decisions are made by majority vote and
not subject to review by a higher authority, the Court will not act as a
single person would. Instead, it will produce inconsistent, unpredictable, and even irrational decisions because its members have different orderings and intensities of preferences and because of the ensu207
ing phenomenon of cycling.
Rational choice theory suggests that
the Justices will not share similar orderings, or intensities, of preference regarding precedent. They will differ in how they prioritize
precedent, and they will differ in how strongly they each feel about
the institutional benefits and costs of fidelity to precedent. These differences ensure that the Court will often produce outcomes that are
not the primary preferences of each of the Justices in the majority.
Its reasoning and holdings will thus tend to be inconsistent and thus
lack an essential element of path dependency. Periodic changes in
the composition of the Court exacerbate the potential inconsistencies
in outcomes because new members will introduce into the decision
making process new or different orderings, or intensities, of preferences from those held by their colleagues.
It is, however, not impossible for members of a multi-membered
institution sometimes to share similar orderings of preference. One
can expect, for instance, Justices to agree, if ever asked, not to over208
209
rule either Brown v. Board of Education or the Legal Tender Cases.
We also know that the Court will not be asked (at least for the foreseeable future) to reconsider either of those cases. At the very least,
we can expect the Court to be asked to consider more difficult, more
divisive questions and not whether it ought to stand by a precedent as
well-settled as Brown.
Presidents (and their advisers) have yearned to control the Justices' individual or collective orderings of preferences. This desire
has led them to try to control those orderings, if only at the margins,
by choosing Supreme Court nominees based on their likely ideologies.210 Ideologies supposedly constrict or preclude preferences.
They presumably restrict how judges approach certain questions, re207

See MAxWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF
SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 46 (2000) ("Cycling arises when, for any given outcome, another has majority support in a direct binary comparison .... [W]hen a [voting paradox] rule is
employed, no outcome is stable. For this reason, we can conceive of [voting paradox] rules as
possessing the characteristic feature of unlimited majority veto ... ."); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Ways of Criticizing the Courl, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802,815-17 (1982) (giving a hypothetical example
of how cycling operates in judicial decision making) .
... 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
209
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 553-54 (1870), overruling Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
603 (1869) (finding constitutional the federal law that made interest-bearing United States
notes legal tender in payment of debts previously contracted).
210
See generally Hearing, supra note 23, at 1-2 (explaining the relevance of ideology to federal
judicial selection).
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gardless of the facts in particular cases. Hence, presidents will often
choose nominees with the ideologies-or commitments to approaching constitutional issues in particular ways-they would prefer to
drive the Court's jurisprudence. The more vacancies a president can
fill the greater control he can hope to have over the Court's decision
making, particularly if his appointees share certain pre-commitments
on the issues likely to come before the Court. Consequently, it can
hardly be a surprise that the presidents who have filled the most vacancies have had the most influence over the course of the Court's
decision making: George Washington with eleven, Andrew Jackson
with six, Abraham Lincoln with five, William Howard Taft with six,
and Franklin Roosevelt with nine appointments. 211 These presidents
each preferred to choose nominees based on their likely judicial ideologies.
The major problem with presidents' efforts to pack the Court,
other than the practical ones of ensuring a number of vacancies and
a hospitable Senate, is that sometimes presidents guess wrong. Sometimes presidents, or their advisers, simply fail to accurately predict the
212
path of the Court's docket. No president who appointed at least six
Justices ever lived long enough to see his appointees eventually fracture over unexpected issues that came before the Court. 213 Over time,
the Justices fractured over the rulings in particular cases and how to
interpret, or apply, the precedents they had created.
G. The Absence of Rules for Interpreting Precedents

The absence of any formal rules for the Court to follow in construing its decisions further undermines the path dependency of
precedent in constitutional adjudication. The Court has no rules for
determining the breadth or narrowness of a particular ruling, the degree of deference a Justice ought to give a prior decision, the requisite conditions for determining error in constitutional law or for
overruling constitutional precedents, the proper way to prioritize
sources of decision, or the best method of reading prior cases, including the appropriate level of generality at which to state the principles
set forth within precedents.

211

See MICHAEL j. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 99-100 (rev. ed. 2003) (discussing the greater likelihood of achieving
long term goals by appointing several justices).
212
On the unpredictability of Supreme Court appointments, see generally HENRY J.
ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 69-70 (3d ed. 1992).
"' See id. at 51-52 tbl. 1. (indicating the following presidents appointed six or more justices:
George Washington with ten; Andrew Jackson with six; William H. Taft with six; and Franklin D.
Roosevelt with nine).
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If we genuinely want precedents to have path dependency, we
should be prepared to change the conditions under which they are
made and interpreted. Rational choice theory suggests that one way
to preclude or inhibit the Court from producing inconsistent (and
thus not path dependent) precedents is through structural alterations to the Court's decision making process. These changes could
include requiring a supermajority vote of the Justices or the passage
of a minimal amount of time before formally reconsidering one of its
rulings.
It is no accident that the Court has never had such rules (or never
will, in all likelihood). The Court has avoided, or refused, such rules
for several reasons. The first is structural. The supermajority requirement for an overruling would undoubtedly transform the dynamics on the Court in particularly undesirable ways. It would, for
instance, allow a minority to prevent a simple majority from resolving
a particular constitutional claim as long as there were a potential for
its decision to weaken a precedent. The requirement would no
doubt make changes in constitutional doctrine more diHicult than
214
they already are.
Moreover, heightening the requirements for the Court to overrule
itself will conflict with the independence of the Justices. Most, if not
all, are likely to want for themselves and therefore for each other, the
complete, unfettered discretion to rule as they see fit in a given case.
The current system allows each an equal opportunity to influence
outcomes, but the supermajority requirement would give simple majorities a distinct advantage in preserving their decisions.
Second, the Court would be forced to abdicate its constitutional
duty to decide cases or controversies if it were prohibited from reviewing the scope of some prior decisions. During a period in which
the Court lacks a supermajority disposed to overrule a contested prior
decision, a majority might be precluded from reaching any decisions
that might be construed as narrowing and therefore effectively overruling any precedents. Litigants who perceive that they might benefit
from such hesitancy would rush to have their claims adjudicated in
the interim. Furthermore, the supermajority requirement might
pressure a majority to avoid being candid about its attitudes towards a
precedent for fear that their candor might preclude them from reviewing a case in which the fate of precedent is at risk.
Third, requiring a supermajority vote for the Court to overrule itself might allow errors in constitutional interpretation to be preserved indefinitely or needlessly. No matter how compelling the rea214

See generally ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALI1Y AND
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989) (examining structural evolution in Supreme Court
doctrine).
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sons may be for overruling a precedent, no overruling could be
achieved without the requisite minimum number of votes. If those
votes were not forthcoming, whatever harm that the erroneously decided precedent has caused would remain in effect.
Even if the Justices were to craft rules to guide their decision making on precedent, the rules may not constrain the Justices' preferences. Adrian Vermeule's notion of a "veil rule" nicely captures this
215
dimension of constitutional adjudication.
He is interested in demonstrating the difficulty of the Court's developing rules of decision
making that will genuinely constrain how it decides cases. To illustrate his point, he suggests that if the Justices were to adopt a rule beforehand to govern their decision making in constitutional casesthe one realm in which they are completely free from legislative correction-the knowledge that they would have to live or comply with
this rule would lead them to avoid rules that would unduly restrict
their discretion and instead develop rules that allow themselves a lot
216
of wiggle room.
In other words, they would develop a rule that
does not preclude them from achieving their preferences. He thus
suggests that while the Justices might have developed the basic rule of
limited deference to precedent as a veil rule designed presumably to
tie their hands in constitutional adjudication, it does no such thing.
It does not constrain outcomes in part because the parties are free to
construe past cases as broadly or as narrowly as they wish depending
on whether they want to follow or distinguish them. Even if there
were rules for constructing or construing precedents, there is no way
to ensure uniform application of them. It is unlikely the Justices
would unanimously or consistently agree on such basic things as how
to apply the rules and how to implement or revise them.
The likely impossibility of implementing any rules on the Court
for constructing or construing its prior decisions is maddening to
many students and observers of the Court. Even more maddening
for many people is the fact that predicting long-term change in constitutional law is harder to explain and to control than short-term
change.
H. The X-Factor

More than two-hundred years after ratification of the Constitution, we still have many more questions than answers about how enduring shifts in constitutional understanding and law occur. The enduring constitutional changes to which I refer are not just formal
215

Adrian Venneule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, Ill YALE LJ. 399, 399 (2001)
(explaining the use of the veil rule to suppress self-interested behavior).
21• Id.
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constitutional amendments. Article V sets forth relatively difficult
217
procedures for formal amendments to the Constitution.
Hence, in
spite of support from President George W. Bush, a constitutional
218
amendment prohibiting gay marriage is quite unlikely to succeed.
This is not a comment on the merits of the proposal. Instead, it is an
acknowledgment of the unlikelihood-of which I suspect even the
President and his supporters are aware-that at least two-thirds of
each chamber of Congress and three-fourths of the states would support an amendment prohibiting, or impeding, gay marriage. The
odds are always against supermajorities in the Congress and among
the states for formally amending the Constitution. Less formal
changes in constitutional law, such as shifts in the Court's doctrine or
popular understandings of the Constitution, are easier to achieve
than formal amendments. No one, for instance, predicted the boldness of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in declaring that
the state's constitution prohibited denying marriage to two people of
the same gender, much less that three members of the majority
219
would have been justices appointed by Republican governqrs.
I refer to the unpredictable elements of enduring shifts in constitutional understandings and doctrine as the X-factor. Social scientists
are more comfortable and adept than legal scholars at examining the
possible connections between doctrine and social, political, and eco22
nomic developments. ° For instance, social scientists have demon-

217

See U.S. CONST. art. V (requiring two-thirds of each house of Congress to propose amendments and three-fourths of the state legislatures to ratify them).
218
See Cass R. Sunstein, President Versus Precedent: Bush s Reckless Bid for an Amendment Defzes an
Oval Office Tradition, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2004, at B13 (explaining how President Bush's deviation from previously successful efforts to amend the Constitution likely dooms his proposed
amendment to ban gay marriage).
219
See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) ("[B]arring an
individual from the protections, benefits, and obligations of civil marriage solely because that
person would marry a person of the same sex violates the Massachusetts Constitution.").
220
Among legal scholars, Bruce Ackerman has proposed the most ambitious theory of effecting enduring constitutional changes in the absence of formal amendments satisfYing the tough
requirements of Article V of the Constitution. Ackerman claims that there are five stages
through which national political leaders work in conjunction with the American public to alter
constitutional law (and fundamental constitutional understandings) without complying with the
procedures set forth in Article V of the Constitution. See, e.g., Michael]. Klarman, Constitutional
Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN.
L. REV. 759, 768 (1992) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991)
and criticizing Ackerman's promotion of non-Article V amendments); Sanford Levinson, Transformation in American Constitutionalism, Transitions, 108 YALE LJ. 2215, 2235 (1999) (arguing that
Ackerman's theory provides too little guidance); Suzanna Sherry, The Ghost of Liberalism Past,
105 HARV. L. REV. 918, 924-30 (1992) (reviewing BRUCE ACKERMAN, 1 WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS (1991)) (criticizing Ackerman's theory as relying on simplistic historical analysis). See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 4-5 (1998). Ackerman's critique has provoked intense criticisms. Richard Posner critiques Ackerman's scheme
for determining constitutional moments thus:
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strated how interest groups (and other organizations) have helped to
frame the Court's agenda. 221 Another interesting study indicates a
pattern in· which the Court tends to favor the side with the larger
222
number of amicus briefs filed on its behalf.
This pattern surfaced
223
in Grutter v. Bollinger, in which most amicus briefs supported the
University of Michigan Law School's admissions program. The same
pattern held in Dickerson v. United Statei 24 in which the vast majority of
police departments and other law enforcement organizations asked
the Court to reaffirm Miranda. 225 But neither Dickerson nor Grutter involved an enduring shift in doctrine; Dickerson reaffirmed Miranda,
while Grutter reaffirmed the test that the Court used since 1976 for
determining the constitutionality of higher education admissions
programs.
The relationship of certain factors to enduring shifts in constitutional doctrine has yet to be clarified. It remains a promising field of
research in constitutional law. For instance, some political scientists
and a growing number of legal scholars have argued that the Supreme Court tracks majoritarian sentiments. 226 Yet, no one has yet
explained how we, or Supreme Court Justices, ought to determine
majoritarian preferences on the questions that have come before the
Court. Moreover, scholars have yet to show how well justices measure
majoritarian preferences, which constitutional opinions track or diverge from majoritarian preferences, which opinions reaffirm or replace doctrine, and in which of these cases judicial closure is or is not

[Ackerman's] thesis is wrong and even dangerous. Wrong because the history of constitutional law since 1868 cannot be explained as the effort of judges to interpret and preserve moments of revolutionary consciousness. Dangerous because it invites judges to
treat the popular will as a form of higher law en tiding them to disregard ordinary concepts of legality.
RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 228 (1995); see also Michael W. McConnell, The Forgotten
Constitutional Moment, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 115, 142-43 (1994) ("But I fear that the criteria
for constitutional moments [will] become so malleable that almost any significant popular
movement addressed to a constitutional issue will suffice.").
221
See, e.g., H.W. PERRY JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 127 (1991) (arguing that certain highly respected interest groups have better
success in the certiorari process); Lee Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the R.ehnquist Court
Era, 9 J.L. & POL. 639 (1993) (examining the frequency, goals, kinds, issues, and efficacy of interest group litigation).
222
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme
Court, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 743 (2000) (studying cases from 1946-1995 that triggered twenty or
more amicus briefs).
223
539 U.S. 306, 371 (2003) (Thomas,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (contesting the maJority's use of the amicus briefs in their opinions).
224
530 U.S. 428 (2000).
225
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
226
See, e.g., Kevin L. Yingling, Note, justifying the judiciary: A Majoritarian Response to the Countermajoritarian Problem, 15 J.L. & POL. 81, 91 (1999) (suggesting "the Court's countermajoritarian
ability has been vasdy overstated").
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achieved. The data would help to clarity the kinds of cases in which
shifts occur and are enduring. If shifts were to occur largely in cases
not tracking majoritarian preferences, then one might expect some
kind of backlash. At the very least, it might be illuminating to measure whether shifts contrary to majoritarian preferences are enduring
or not. A related question involves the extent to which the support of
national political leaders is essential for constitutional changes to be
enduring. A number of scholars have argued that such support was
227
essential for Brown and its progeny in order for Brown's promise to
228
begin to be realized, and that the constitutional foundations for the
New Deal have been settled for several decades in part because all
three branches fell squarely into line behind it.
Almost seven decades after the Court's apparent abdication in
1937229 of meaningful review of progressive economic regulations,
scholars still argue over whether it was a consequence of the pressure
that President Roosevelt's infamous Court-packing plan had applied
on the Court, a genuine change of mind for some Justices, no radical
230
shift in Commerce Clause doctrine, or other factors.
In any event,
the difficulties scholars have had in reaching consensus on the constitutional significance of the events of 1937 derives in part from several
factors that complicate analysis of the Court.
The first and most basic factor is the impossibility of proving a
negative. Proving categorically that a particular factor or set of factors, had no effect on or relevance to an outcome is impossible,
though we can use our common sense to calculate the odds. For instance, I am unable to prove the sun will rise tomorrow morning, but
the odds, based on past experience (and our knowledge of astrophysics) favor it. Moreover, some events might be so removed in time and
space from the event we are studying that we can exclude, or at least
227

Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 189, at 145 (1999) ("The Court's decision in Brown might
best be understood as enforcing a national political view against a regionally dominant one that
happened to have excessive power in Congress."); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1996) ("Brown is better understood as the
product of a civil rights movement spawned by World War II than as the principal cause of the
1960s civil rights movement."); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Bringing Politics Back In, 95 Nw. U. L. REv.
309 (2000) (reviewing LUCAS A. POWE,JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLffiCS (2000)
and criticizing Powe for placing too much emphasis on Brown's influence over the Civil Rights
Movement); see also Barry Friedman, The Counter-Majoritarian Problem and the Pathology of Constitutional Scholarship, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 933 (2001) (discussing the impact of social norms on judicial decision making).
229
See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (ruling that the National Labor Relations Act was a constitutional use of the Commerce power, thereby turning away from
previous rejection of New Deal legislation).
""' The debates over Professor Ackerman's controversial theory of constitutional change reflect the differences of academic opinion over the constitutional events of 1937. See supra note
220.
228
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substantially discount, their relevance on the bases of logic and human experience. Within the boundaries of our experience and logic,
we search for relatively plausible influences on certain outcomes.
The second complication in searching for the elusive X-factor is
figuring out the significance of the Justices' choices about what to reveal and not to reveal in their opinions. This complication calls attention to the question of the relative importance of the Court's legal
reasoning. Poking holes in the Court's reasoning hardly proves it was
irrelevant to the outcome, or to the votes, in particular cases. Nor
does supposing a different explanation for the outcomes or votes establish its relevance. For instance, one explanation for Bush v.
231
Gore, -the need for the Court to have averted a constitutional crisis232-does not appear in any of the opinions. No doubt, this explanation is consistent with the outcome, as is the possible disdain some
Justices might have had for Congress or other political authorities to
settle the dispute between Bush and Gore. This explanation provides
the motivation for finding an equal protection violation in the case,
but it does not constitute proof of one. Moreover, the Justices had to
make a showing as a group that there was such a violation of the Constitution; the group dynamics within the Court are not irrelevant to
the choices that Justices must make in both reaching decisions and
formulating how to express them. Explaining how coalitions are
reached and maintained, as well as the choices made in opinion writing, are perennially fruitful sources of inquiry in constitutional theory.
A third factor is the Court's unique status as the most secretive,
least understood of America's governmental institutions. Almost everything we know about the Supreme Court is based on its public
statements and actions. It is rare for information about what occurs
on the Court to become public in the absence of the release, or publication, of the Court's records (including the Justices' personal papers). One reason for the great fanfare surrounding the publication
of a Justice's private papers is because it fills a void about the influences on a particular Justice's deliberations, apart from the briefs in
cases, the Justice's background, and interaction with clerks and colleagues. Focusing on individual performance on the Court helps to
illuminate a particular vote or career on the Court, but it comes at a
price. It reinforces our proclivity for stressing individuality on an institution that never takes final action through individual action (except, of course, through the delegations of opinion-writing responsi-

231
232

531

u.s. 98 (2000).

Judge Richard Posner favors this approach. See RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE
DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001) (viewing the decision in terms of judicial pragmatism").

964

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 7:4

bility or through temporary stays granted by the Justices in their capacities as circuit Justices). A critical question that focusing on individual performances on the Court cannot answer is whether the
Court can ever be said to be a significant actor or institution apart
from aggregating the individual actions of its members. Focusing on
the extent to which precedent constrains the Court usually risks becoming a preoccupation with the attitudes, or strategies, of individual
Justices and thus risks overlooking how precedent influences constitutional law, besides constraining what the Court does in a particular
case. The next Part suggests a different vantage point from which to
better understand the multiple functions of precedent in constitutional law.
IV. NEW INSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MULTIPLE FuNCTIONS OF
PRECEDENT

To comprehensively account for the limited path dependency of
precedent, a shift in perspective is in order. This shift must treat the
Court as an institution rather than as the aggregation of the individual Justices' votes. An emerging, new perspective on the Court focuses on this institutional aspect. This approach operates under various names, such as post-positivism, the new institutionalism, and/ or
historical institutionalism. 233
Hereafter, I will refer to it interchangeably as post-positivism or institutionalism, although such
scholarship is relatively new and scholars may share some but not
many beliefs about how the Court functions. This Part initially describes the post-positivist or institutionalist perspective on the Court
and its critique of the competing attitudinal and rational choice
models. I then show how this perspective helps to enrich our understanding of how precedent functions in constitutional law.
A. Beyond the Attitudinal and Rational Choice Methods
The post-positivist or institutionalist perspective differs from the
attitudinal and rational choice models in several important respects.
First, post-positivists are not troubled by the indeterminacy of the law.
Instead, they believe, as Howard Gillman has explained, 'judging in
234
good faith' is all we can expect of judges."
Indeed, post-positivists

253

See SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL, supra note 7, at 432 ("[P]ostpositivist legalists now argue that all that can be expected of judges is that judges believe that they follow legal principles."); SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING, supra note 3.
234
Howard Gillman, VW!at's Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the 'Legal Model' of
Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 486 (2001) (quoting STEVEN J. BURTON,
JUDGING IN GoOD FAITH 44 (1992)); see also SEGAL & SPAETH, ATTITUDINAL, supra note 7, at 48
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have amassed considerable empirical data to support their conception of judges and Justices as trying to "make the best decision possible in light of [their] general training and sense of professional obli5
gation." Critics of this perspective disclaim it as not only impossible
to falsifY but as possibly an outcome of motivated reasoning-the
process by which people find reasons to explain outcomes or behavior to which they are already committed.
This critique fails, however, to grapple with many, if not all, of the
most significant insights and research of institutionalists. Institutionalists recognize that understanding the Court requires doing more
than merely aggregating the individual votes of the Justices. They
also appreciate the implications of the specific institutional context in
which Supreme Court Justices operate. Fundamental to their project
is recognizing that the institutional context in which Justices operate
has substantive effects (for instance, by imposing certain norms),
while attitudinalists and rational choice theorists suggest that the
Court largely, if not wholly, operates as a cipher for the Justices' individual preferences. While rational choice theory suggests that the
different orderings and intensities of preference among the individual Justices might produce inconsistent outcomes, institutionalists
seek to illuminate patterns in the Court's decision making that can be
fairly attributable to the Court as such. The institutionalist objective
is to determine the operative norms of constitutional adjudication,
including the Court's distinctive practices.
Post-positivists have gathered an impressive amount of empirical
support for their claim that structure shapes judicial decision making.
Though not strictly falsifiable, the evidence can be assessed on the
bases of logic, coherence, experience, and history.
One of the leading post-positivists, Howard Gillman has comprehensively summarized significant post-positivist research. 2g6 Some of
the research focuses on showing how legal variables explain and
shape how constitutional doctrine has evolved, including the Court's
due process and commerce clause decisions from the late nineteenth
century to the New. Deal era, 237 the Warren Court's failure to constitu-

n.12 ("To postpositive legalists, the only required influence of law is a subjective influence that
resides within the Justice's own mind.").
235
Gillman, supra note 234, at 486.
236

See id. at 490-91 (providing examples of empirical studies that seem to undermine behavioralist claims).
237

ld. at 490 (citing BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCfURE
OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:
THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE (1993) ).
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tionalize welfare rights, ~ and the developments of modern free
239
240
speech and death penalty jurisprudence. Other research focuses
on demonstrating how the judicial process shapes practices and
choices within constitutional adjudication, including "the use of
precedent by lawyers in case briefs and by Justices in conference discussions, where discussion of legal materials cannot be merely a mat241
ter of eublic relations";
"precedential effects on other [lower]
42
courts"; 'judicial practices, such as writing concurring and dissenting opinions (forms of expressive behavior that are not about policymaking), inviting legislative overrides, and patterns of case selec243
tion during the cert-granting process";
and how "distinctive
jurisprudential categories or doctrines have influenced voting and
244
opinion writing on the Supreme Court."
At the very least, postpositivist research has undermined the claim that the post-positivist
model is nothing more than motivated reasoning (or impossible to
disprove). As Gillman explains, this research has "[a]ll [been] written by scholars who were mindful of the debates in the literature
about legal versus personal influences on decision making, and all attempted to show how the judges' expressed beliefs and patterns of
behavior could only be explained with reference to distinctive legal
245
norms."
Moreover, this research counters the attempts by attitudinalists, rational choice theorists, or others to rule out the relevance of
legal variables and the legal process to judicial decision making. 246
2

2

"' Id. at 490 (citing EUZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT,
WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997); RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996)).
239
I d. at 490 (citing MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY
OF CNIL LIBERTARIANISM ( 1991)).
240
Id. at 490 (citing LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F. KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL
CHANGE: ABORTION AND THE DEATH PENAL1Y (1992) ).
241
I d. at 480 (citing Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI.

1018 (1996) ).
242
Id. at 481 (citing John Gruhl, The Supreme Court's Impact on the Law of Libel: Compliance by
Lower Federal Courts, 33 W. POL. Q. 502, 504 (1980); Donald R. Songer et al., The Hierarchy ofjustice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI.
673 ( 1994); Donald R. Songer, The Impact of the Supreme Court on Trends in Economic Policy Making
in the United States Courts of Appeals, 49 J. POL. 830 (1987)).
243
I d. at 481 (citing Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 251, 305-09 (1997) ).
244
Id. at 481 (citing JOHN BRIGHAM, CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE: AN INTERPRETATION OF
JUDICIAL DECISIONS (1978); BUSSIERE, supra note 238; CUSHMAN, supra note 237).
245
Id. at 491.
246

Gillman concludes that
the major difference [between their empirical work and Spaeth's and Segal's] seems to
be that Spaeth and Segal create what some legalists would consider a fairly artificial standard for what should count as a legal frame of mind (gravitate toward precedents from
which you dissented) while these other scholars made it a focused object of their research to understand and reconstruct the actual legal standards under which these
judges were operating.
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B. Precedent's Multiple Functions

In this Section, I demonstrate the utility of the institutionalist perspective for illuminating the multiple functions of precedent, or the
Court's prior decisions, besides as a constraint on the Court in constitutional law. Attitudinalists and rational choice theorists tend to overlook or discount these functions, even though these functions enrich
our understanding of how the law influences judicial and other authorities' constitutional decision making.
1. Precedent as a Modality of Argumentation
The first, most common function of precedent is as a modality of
constitutional argumentation. In a classic treatise, Philip Bobbitt describes precedent as one of the six conventional modalities of constitutional argumentation. The other five are text, history, structure,
ethos, and pragmatism (or consequences). Bobbitt suggests that
none of these modalities can establish its primacy based on its own
terms, for it would merely be engaged in circular reasoning. Instead,
Bobbitt maintains, the strongest arguments in constitutional law are
based on combinations of the best possible arguments made within
247
each of the classic modalities.
Although attitudinalists and rational choice theorists of course
recognize that precedent functions as a modality of argument, they
do not attach much, if any, independent significance to that function.
They are able to discount precedent, even as a modality of argumentation, because they define it narrowly as merely the outcome of a
particular case. Yet, precedent is much more than that. To be sure,
it is the ruling of a particular case. Whenever lawyers are confronted
with a legal question, their first thought is almost always about precedent-they consider what the Court has had to say about their issue.
The popularity, or prominence, of precedent as a modality of argumentation in constitutional law is evident from the fact that the Justices rely on precedent far more than they do on any other source of
constitutional meaning. Indeed, there is not a single case in which
the Supreme Court has failed to cite at least a single precedent as a
source of authority for its decision. The same cannot be said for
248
other sources, such as original understanding.
The litigants and

!d. at 492.
247
See Philip C. Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1303 (1989) (explaining that
modalities "are not true in themselves, but provide criteria by which we can determine whether
statements about the American Constitution are true"); see also PHILIP C. BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) (describing the six modalities
under which a constitutional argument may be made).
248
See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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Justices know that they cannot make a decision without coordinating
it with precedent and they employ precedent-based arguments because other Justices will understand them and will respond to them.
A basic question the Justices will also invariably ask in the course of
making a constitutional decision is what kind of precedent they will
make. Precedent serves as a modality of argumentation for the parties in every constitutional dispute. Sometimes, it is the only source
of authority emploxed by the parties and the Court. A prime exam2 9
ple is Bush v. Gore, in which the Court's voting rights decisions were
the only sources cited and debated by the Justices. The decision
turned on the construction of precedent.
Serving as a modality of argumentation requires more than merely
serving as a source for a particular argument. It also entails providing
some legal legitimacy for constitutional argumentation, including
sources of authority, interpretive methodologies, and constitutional
conceptions. Precedent thus serves as a forum, or testing ground, for
each of these things, and how the Court handles these things in constructing precedents significantly shapes constitutional argumentation within and outside of the judicial process. For instance, the
Court defers to original understanding in some disputes but not in
250
others.
In some cases, the Court employs intratextual analysisclarifYing the meaning of a constitutional term by examining how it
has been used throughout the Constitution. 251 In still other cases, the
Court clarifies the relevance of historical practices and tradition. 252
Closely related to the significance of precedent as a modality of
argumentation is the function performed by prior decisions as a con531 u.s. 98 (2000).
Compare U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,806-15 (1995) (looking to the
Framers' intent in holding that a provision of the Arkansas Constitution that imposes term limits for members of Congress violates the Federal Constitution), with Brown v. Bd. of Ed. 347
U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (stating that "[the Court] cannot tum the clock back to 1868 when the
Amendment was adopted" in holding that racial segregation in public schools violates the equal
protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment).
251
See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REv. 747, 749-76 (1999) (discussing use
of intratextualism by the Court in Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. 316 (1819), Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816); and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
137 (1803).
252
See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("History and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the end point of the substantive due process inquiry."); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (according
fundamental rights status to interests "deeply rooted in history and tradition"); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (suggesting, inter alia, that tradition supports a right of
privacy broad enough to include a woman's right to choose); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783,
790 (1983) (using historical practices to illuminate the meaning of the Establishment Clause
and the intent of the drafters); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (discussing the necessity of "continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of
history [and] solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.... ").
249

250
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ceptual framework for understanding constitutional law. Ronald
Dworkin has famously conceived of precedent as a heuristic for judicial action as well as a genuine constraint on judicial discretion. 253
From this perspective, precedent provides an interpretive framework
for understanding the world and an authoritative structure defining
which judicial actions are appropriate. Precedent serves, in other
words, as a short-hand for understanding and even characterizing judicial decision making. For instance, some cases-Dred Scott v. Sand255
256
ford,254 Lochner v. New York, Brown v. Board of Education, and Roe v.
257
Wade -are universally synonymous with judicial activism. Some
cases, again including Dred Scott, illustrate the risks of ori~nalism.
9
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Marylantf" and the
260
Court's famous fourth footnote in United States v. Carotene Products
are significant for, inter alia, employing a methodology for constitutional interpretation-representation-reinforcement-that is basic to
understanding many modern federalism and equal protection
261
cases.
258

2. Precedent as Binding Authority
The legitimacy of a precedent-a prior decision's force as binding
or persuasive authority-depends on at least three, interrelated factors. The first is the constituencies to which a prior decision either
applies or has appeal. There are five potential constituencies, including the parties to a case or controversy, other actors confronting similar but not identical legal questions, lawyers and other jurists, the
general public, and political leaders and institutions. Among these
groups, the ones most tightly bound by a particular constitutional de-

2
'"

See generally RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 225-38 (1986) (incorporating a conception
of precedent into his notion of law as integrity); DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 110-15 (describing
precedent as a "gravitational force" that constrains judgments).
254
60 U.S. 393 (1856) (granting appellate courts the discretion to consider issues not specifically before the court).
255
198 U.S. 45 (1905) (interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as guaranteeing a freedom
to contract).
256
349 U.S. 294 (holding that racial discrimination in public schools is unconstitutional).
257
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (ruling that there is a constitutionally protected right to privacy and
to choose abortion).
258
See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 CONST.
COMMENT. 37 (1993) (arguing that Dred Scott "carries a warning" for critics of Casey and Roe).
259
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (holding that Congress has the power to establish a bank).
260
304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) (addressing the scope of judicial review of the constitutionality of an act of Congress).
261
See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 715
(1985) (arguing that Carolene Products established a lasting premise of judicial interpretation).
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CISion are the parties who litigated it. 262 Otherwise, a prior decision is
persuasive authority whose relevance depends on the extent to which
the circumstances in which it was made are similar to those in other
263
cases.
Disputes that are identical to those involved in decided cases
will have strong incentives to settle, unless the litigants bringing the
action or considering appeals have reason to believe the Court might
change its mind. The more closely analogous a dispute to one that
has been decided the more likely it will either settle or not make its
way to the Supreme Court because lower courts will simply follow
_what they regard as binding or authoritative vertical precedent.
The second factor is context. The impact, or binding authority of
a Supreme Court ruling, may depend on the purpose for which it is
being used. In the previous Section, I suggested precedent may constitute an important validation of other sources of constitutional
meaning, constitutional arguments, or particular interpretive methodologies. Such validation need not be limited to actions within the
judicial process, for judicial precedents can give respectability, or a
stamp of approval, to constitutional arguments or perspectives lending a prestige these arguments may not otherwise have. Thus, a judicial decision may be instrumental not just to a court but to other authorities as validating the use of a particular interpretive method,
such as original understanding, rather than one not yet approved or
employed specifically in constitutional adjudication, such as Bruce
264
Ackerman's provocative theory of constitutional moments.
Judges and Justices are hardly the only authorities that validate
constitutional arguments or perspectives. Indeed, the validations of
judicial precedents often depend on the support they generate or receive within the political branches. Political legitimacy entails approval of particular judicial decisions by national political authorities.265 A judicial decision does not have political legitimacy merely
because it claims to have it.

262

See generaUy HENRY CAMPBEll. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS §
81 (1912) ("[T]he rule of res judicata prevents the parties ... from maintaining a new and different suit upon the same cause of action ... or from raising the same issues which were settled
for them by a former judgment.").
263
See id. §§ 1, 15 (discussing the relationship between degrees of factual similarity in cases
and their precedential value).
264
ACKERMAN, supra note 220, at 4-5 ("This country's Constitution focuses with special intensity on the rare moments when transformative movements earn broad and deep support for
their initiatives. Once a reform movement survives its period of trial, the Constitution tries to
assure that its initiatives have an enduring place in future political life.").
265
Cf. Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and ~
sponses, 80 N.C. L. REv. 773, 784 (2002) ("Judicial supremacy requires deference by other government officials to the constitutional dictates of the Court, even when other government officials think that the Court is substantively wrong about the meaning of the Constitution ... .").
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The extent to which a judicial precedent achieves political legitimacy depends on three interrelated factors. First, a judicial decision's legitimacy depends on social acquiescence. Generally, the
American people may have come to accept a particular judicial decision as a rule of law in our society. Second, it has to receive the genuine, enduring commitment of political institutions to the principle(s)
set forth within it. To the extent that the Court's decision in Brown
can be fairly described as a success, it depended on critical support
from presidents and the Congress over time. Third, persuasion is instrumental to the social and political acceptance of a particular judicial decision. Here, I do not mean that judicial decisions can only
achieve political legitimacy if their reasoning is so strong as to convince opponents that they have been correctly decided. Instead, I
mean that judicial decisions need to be grounded in sufficiently persuasive reasoning, argumentation, or even imagery as to cultivate,
maintain, or win the support of successor Courts and the leadership
of other institutions.
A third factor is how different constituencies construe the relevance of a judicial decision. As we have seen, the absence of rules for
creating or interpreting precedent effectively leaves subsequent in266
terpreters to determine its significance.
Opportunities for determining the meanings of judicial decisions abound, including in each
instance of constitutional adjudication and every time the Court or
other authorities are called upon to consider either following or distinguishing some judicial precedent(s). A particular judicial decision
cannot, at least as a practical matter, easily retain the meaning its
creators assigned to it but instead is perennially vulnerable to being
reinterpreted once it falls within the jurisdiction of other authorities.
Hence, a judicial decision that touches upon a similar, perhaps identical, question of constitutional meaning is relevant only to the extent
that the other branches claim it to be.

3. Setting the Supreme Court's Agenda
Another important function of precedent is framing the Court's
agenda. Precedent does so in at least two ways. The first is to frame
the Justices' choices of which constitutional matters not to hear. The
Justices' respect for precedent is perhaps most ~vident in these
choices. While the Justices' decisions to deny certiorari are considered not to have any formal legal significance, refusals to hear cases
may nevertheless be significant for providing insights into the Jus-

266

See supra notes 169-88 and accompanying text.
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267

tices' priorities.
The Court's refusal since 1939 to grant certiorari
68
in a case involving a Second Amendmene issue might discourage
269
litigation to enforce the Second Amendment,
though as litigation
over its scope percolates in the lower courts, pressure undoubtedly
270
increases on the Court to hear a Second Amendment claim.
Until
the Court agrees to hear a Second Amendment claim, its silence is
bound to provoke speculation; perhaps the Court wants the matter to
percolate for a while longer in the lower courts, perhaps many if not
most Justices wish to avoid the question for as long as possible, and
maybe some Justices prefer to deal with other constitutional issues relating to gun control before ever getting to the Second Amendment.
The Court's prior decisions also frame its choices of which matters
to hear. Patterns or trends in the Court's certiorari decisions reveal
its agenda. They may also reveal the areas of constitutional law that
the Justices might be interested in trying to clarify or in which they
may be disposed to reconsider certain precedents. For instance, from
1994 to the present, federalism has been the area in which the
271
Rehnquist Court has granted the most petitions for certiorari. This
trend contrasts sharply with the Rehnquist Court's first eight years
during which it granted certiorari most frequently in cases involving
social issues, such as abortion and school prayer. 272
In setting its agenda, the Court inevitably signals its certiorari patterns to litigants, lower courts, and other authorities. It also may en267

This deliberation is framed by litigants' choices of which cases to try to bring before the
Coun. While there may be many issues on which a justice would like to rule, she is bound by
the fact that the Court is able to decide only matters brought to it through the certiorari process
and by the Coun's rule providing that the approval of at least four Justices is needed to grant
petitions for certiorari.
268
See U.S. CONST. amend. II (providing that "[a] well-regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed").
269
See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (determining that the Second
Amendment did not guarantee a citizen's right to possess a "shotgun having a barrel of less
than eighteen inches in length" because that weapon had not been shown to be "ordinary military equipment" that "could contribute to the common defense").
270
See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1280, 1284 (lOth Cir. 2004) (holding that
the Assimilative Crimes Act, which prohibits carrying a loaded firearm "in a vehicle or on a public street" does not violate the Second Amendment), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 88 (2004); Nordyke
v. King, 319 F.3d 1185, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (affirming the constitutionality of a county ordinance prohibiting firearm displays at county fairs), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 60 (2004); Silveira v.
Lockyer, 328 F.3d 567, 578 (9th Cir. 2003) (denying a petition for a rehearing en bane of the
decision to uphold California's Assault Weapons Control Act), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 803 (2003);
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that Second Amendment rights are subject to reasonable restrictions), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2435 (2004).
271
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 4 7
ST. LouiS U. LJ. 569, 570 (2003) (describing the dominant theme of the "second" Rehnquist
Court, which began in October 1994, as "constitutional federalism").
272
See id. at 569-70 (contraSting the "first" Rehnquist Court's tendency to hear controversial
social issues with the "second" Rehnquist Coun's federalism theme).
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courage further litigation in some areas, particularly when its opinions are vaguely worded, narrowly reasoned, and under-theorized. It
may sometimes strongly discourage further litigation, at least before it
rules on the same or similar questions, as was plainly the case with
Nixon v. United States in which the Court unanimously declared challenges to removal proceedings in the Senate are nonjusticiable. 273
4. The Structural Functions of Precedent
Precedent performs several important structural functions. First,
precedent imposes order on the legal system. At its most basic,
precedent settles disputes between parties (including the other
branches), frames judicial and other agendas (in response to what
the Court has done), and clarifies the rules of the game for what litigants need to do in order to prevail in constitutional adjudication.
Besides framing legal analysis of a constitutional question, precedent
helps to illuminate the constitutional underpinnings of particular
statutes or actions, fashions doctrine (or the accumulated rulings or
judgments that constitute the pertinent law within particular domains
274
of human or governmental endeavor) , influences the Justices' different constitutional outlooks, affects how the legal system works, and
determines how disputes get settled.
Second, the Court's prior decisions illuminate and shape constitutional structure. Precedent demonstrates the Court's place in the
American golitical and legal order as well as the scope of the Court's
authority. 2 Precedent influences the relationship between the Court
2

"' 506 U.S. 224 (1993); see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 109 (declaring "our consideration
is limited to the present circumstances for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.") The Court's declaration is widely understood as
an attempt to preclude its opinion from generating any path dependency. Ironically it will
avoid having path dependency only if the opinion itself has path dependency, that is, if the
Court adheres rigidly to its own directive.
274
The continuity that Charles Fried describes as an essential attribute of constitutional doctrine is not an essential aspect of the decisions within particular domains of constitutional law,
for "precedent is only a presumption. If constitutional doctrine is not to become rigid, driven
by the path-dependence of common law adjudication, there must be room for distinguishing,
narrowing, and abandoning precedent altogether. The dissent contains the germ of such
changes of direction." FRIED, supra note 5, at 11-12. I differ with Fried in that I believe, as I
have suggested throughout this Article, that the s<><alled "germ of ... changes of direction" is
not confined to dissenting opinions but rather is a function of a number of different factors.
Fried ultimately appears disposed to agree with the limited path dependency of precedent, for
he concedes later on the same page that "doctrine and precedent constrain more or less
loosely." !d. at 12. This is my point exactly. In the final analysis, constraint based on precedent
cannot be presumed in constitutional adjudication for a number of reasons, not the least of
which is what a person defines as the relevant precedent(s) or law on the question before the
Court or other lawful decision maker.
275
See, e.g., Ronald C. Kahn, Presidential Power and the Appointments Process: Structuralism, Legal
Scholarship, and the New Histurical Institutionalism, 47 CAsE W. RES. L. REV. 1419, 144~9 (1997)
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and other governmental branches or institutions. Precedent also
clarifies the extent and limits of the Court's authority.
Third, precedent serves as an oudet for airing differences of opinion about constitutional matters and for resolving disputes as peace276
ably as possible.
The point is not just that opinions reflect the differences among the Justices but that the Justices know they may
express their differences in their opinions if necessary. Thus, prior
decisions that do not contain clear rulings or majority opinions nevertheless provide an oudet for differences of opinion that cannot be
accommodated in a single opinion as in cases dealing with such socially divisive issues as the rights of biological parents in Michael H. v.
Gerald D. 271 and the right to die in Washington v. Glucksburg. 278 At the
same time, some of the Court's opinions might inflame political con279
troversies, such as the disastrous opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
which un<Juestionably helped to lead to the terrible bloodshed in the
80
Civil War, while some other opinions arguabl{ setded heated controversies without bloodshed, as in Bush v. Gore. 28
Moreover, precedent may take the pressure off other branches.
In some cases, precedent allows the Court to dispose of issues that the
other branches would prefer not to decide, or to provide cover for
decisions or actions with which the other branches might have expected and could otherwise have learned to live. For instance, once
the Court had struck down a state statute prohibiting flag burning for
282
violating the First Amendment, Congress quickly passed a federal
anti-flag burning statute that most members could have expected to
283
have been similarly struck down by the Court.
It is possible many
members of Congress, who may have thought it was politically impor-

(examining how historical institutionalists view the Supreme Court with respect to other political actors).
276
See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (considering the abortion issue); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (examining the issue of marital privacy for
the use contraception); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (dealing
with the reach of executive authority).
m 491 U.S. 110 (1990) (plurality opinion) (finding no substantive due process right of a
natural father to establish his paternity).
278
521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that Washington's ban on physician-assisted suicide did not
violate substantive due process, with only five justices supporting the majority opinion).
279
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (denying freedom to a slave, even though he had traveled
to a free state).
280
See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Crisis and Constitutionalism, 63 MONT. L. REv. 277, 296
n.65 (2002) (noting that Dred Scott precipitated a crisis because Lincoln and the Congress refused to accept the ruling as legitimate).
281
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
282
See Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (overturning a Texas flag desecration statute).
"" See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (striking down the federal Flag Protection Act of 1989 in part because of the fact that the federal law could not be distinguished from
the Texas statute struck the previous year).
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tant to denounce publicly flag burning, privately accepted (perhaps
with relief) the inevitability of the Court's striking down the statute in
question. Conversely, members of Congress voted for a federal hate
284
crimes statute with the almost certain knowledge it was consistent
with the Court's decision upholding an almost identical state statute.2s5
Fourth, the Court facilitates what social scientist James Scott de286
scribes as "projects of legibility."
Scott argues that the government
cannot regulate-or manipulate-something unless the government
can see it. Legibility is the process through which the government,
often working with the Court (or other governmental institutions),
makes something visible in order to facilitate its governmental regulation. Ken Kersch demonstrates, for instance, how precedent can fa287
cilitate the states' achievement of the law's regulatory imperatives.
This was particularly true, he suggests, in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries during which the interaction among the national political and legal elites over the content of constitutional doctrine on privacy was indispensable to the project of constructing the
scope of the Congress's Commerce Clause power.
Moreover, precedent might not facilitate seeing but rather clarifYing the point be~ond which the government may not look. United
2
States v. Morrison is a good example of this phenomenon. In Morrison, the Court explained that the civil remedies provision of the Violence Against Women Act was defective in part because Section Five
of the Fourteenth Amendment empowered the Congress to regulate
289
only state activity.
The Court's ruling clarified that the Congress's
authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
reach any private activity. This ruling is also telling, particularly with
respect to the power of precedent, because it is entirely consistent
with the Court's 1883 decision in the Civil Rights Cases, 290 in which the
Court held precisely the same thing. Morrison thus closely follows the

284

Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994).
See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487--88 (1993) (finding that the Wisconsin hate
crimes statute did not violate the First Amendment's prohibition of punishment for a person's
beliefs).
286
JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN
CONDITION HAVE FAILED 9 (1998). Scott explains how governments have systematically designed projects intended "to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic state
functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion," and that the legibility of such
projects has been "a central problem in statecraft." ld. at 2.
287
See Ken I. Kersch, The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and the New American
State, 16 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 61, 67 (2002) (describing the project of legibility for constitutional rights to privacy).
286
529 u.s. 598 (2000).
289
ld. at 619-21.
290
109 u.s. 3 (1883).
285

976

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 7:4

Civil Rights Cases in holding that congressional power does not extend
to private activity. In addition, the Court in Morrison ruled that the
Commerce Clause empowered the Congress to regulate private economic activity, but that the activity at issue in Morrison did not qualify
as economic activity. 291 Consequently, the Court held that the Commerce Clause did not authorize the Congress to manipulate private,
non-economic activity. In short, Morrison clarified the realm into
which the federal government may not intrude by wielding either its
Commerce Clause power or its authority under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Fifth, precedent exposes the operations of the Supreme Court to
the public, the legal community, and the world. Granted, we expect
judges and Justices to turn to sources through which they can better
or more appropriately understand the Constitution; however, Supreme Court precedents also function as lenses through which people can better understand the Court's role within our constitutional
order. Indeed, precedent perhaps more than any other source performs bipolar operations in which it serves not only as a medium
through which the Court views other sources, its own authority and
the authority of the other branches but also as the starting point or
basis for how others view the Court.
Furthermore, precedent helps to foster stability in constitutional
law in a few ways. First, even though precedent generally lacks strong
dependency, it serves as a fundamental unit of exchange in constitutional adjudication. Indeed, it is the primary, if not only, source of
constitutional meaning that lawyers are formally trained to analyze.
Particular questions of constitutional meaning might have resisted
closure or be in a state of flux, but in constitutional adjudication all
participants can expect that precedents are the fundamental medium
of exchange. Discourse about constitutional law is impossible without
reference to precedent.
Second, judicial closure contributes to stability in constitutional
law. Firmly settled separation of powers precedents help to define
basic governmental organization and relationships; 292 other prece293
dents have provided the foundation of modern administrative law

291

See 529 U.S. at 613.
See generaUy Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 431-32 (maintaining that some precedents can
have immutable structural effects on governmental operations); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare
Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 723, 730-34, 749-52 (1988) (demonstrating how precedents have shaped governmental strUcture).
29
' See, e.g., Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that absent a
finding of clear congressional intent, courts should defer to agency interpretation of organic
statutes); Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (holding that even
in an informal adjudication, an agency must give an adequate explanation and supply a sufficient factual record to permit a reviewing court to determine if the agency has engaged in rea292
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294

and environmental regulation; and still other precedents involving
individual liberties allow citizens to organize their lives better. 295

5. Dialogue
Among legal scholars, a longstanding, 'popular characterization of
the function of precedent has been facilitating a national dialogue
296
about the meaning of the Constitution. The participants in the dialogue are varied and include Justices and judges, the leaders of other
governmental institutions, interest groups, the media, and the public.
Precedent helps frame, inform, and facilitate a dialogue among and
within the branches on constitutional questions.
In performing this function, precedent does not necessarily foreclose or compel outcomes but rather helps to clarify the range of possible outcomes in particular disputes. No Justice is free, at least as a
practical matter, to simply disregard all existing precedent that is arguably relevant to a particular decision. At the very least, Justices
must reconcile their preferred methodological approaches (or commitments) with precedent. In formulating this balance, the Justices
must therefore engage in a dialogue not just with themselves but also
with their colleagues (and even their predecessors) and oftentimes
with the leaders of other branches.
The extent to which prior judicial decisions foster discourse is
consistent with the limited path dependency of precedent. A dialogue does not have to be linear or predictable in order to constitute
a dialogue. The discourse among interested parties may be about the
Supreme Court's errors, the problems with particular decisions, and

soned decision making); Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (upholding a
statute restricting the power of the president to remove heads of non-executive agencies).
294
See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)
(holding that agency ordered moratoria on development are not per se Fifth Amendment takings); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (defining categorical regulatory takings and creating an exception for regulations rooted in background principles of law); Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (interpreting the Endangered Species Act as prohibiting further construction of a multi-million dollar dam in order to prese1>1e an endangered species). See generally Gerhardt, supra note 69 (detailing the Court's reliance on existing rather than
revolutionary constitutional doctrine to shape the course of environmental regulations).
295
See generally Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 1107
(1995) (employing numerous precedents to illustrate the importance of the reliance interest of
those who follow precedent for the preservation and promotion of the rule of law).
296
See generally NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 28 (2004)
("Judicial supremacy finds no support in our legal development. The Court recognizes time
and again that constitutional values are hammered out as part of a broader dialogue."); LOUIS
FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES (1988) (observing several examples of forces external to
the courts that influence constitutional interpretation); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and judicial
Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 668-70 (1993) (explaining how the courts synthesize society's
views and tum them back to society for further discourse).
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the relative scope of each branch's authority to address particular
problems. Nor does a constitutional dialogue have to be friendly; it
can be heated and even involve strongly worded condemnations of
each other's constitutional judgments. Moreover, judicial closure
seems antithetical to discourse; it signifies the end of debate, rather
than its perpetuation or maintenance. The more flux, the richer the
dialogue.

6. The Supreme Court as Moral Educator
A notion of precedent once popular among academics was that it
served the important function of educatin~ the public and other governmental actors about the Constitution. 29 For some, precedent was
instrumental to such education; it was the principal means by which
the Court spoke to others, including the public, about the Constitution. While other institutions produced commentaries of one sort or
another on the meaning of the Constitution, none could match the
Court for the quality of its reasoned elaboration about constitutional
meaning. The leaders of other institutions simply lacked the time,
training, and resources to produce any constitutional commentary
nearly as thoughtful as the Court's. Moreover, the special training of
Supreme Court Justices, coupled with their insulation from political
pressure or retaliation, ensured that the Court's pronouncements on
the Constitution would be the least informed or affected by the partisan self-interests of its members. To the contrary, the institutional
virtues of the Supreme Court imbued its pronouncements on the
Constitution with a special, moral authority no other governmental
298
institution could match.
Within the past few years, the ideal of the Court as moral educator
has crumbled. For one thing, the notion of the Court as educator
was hard to square with our democratic system of government. It
presumptively treated popular discourse about the Constitution with
disdain, and granted an exalted status to Supreme Courtjustices that
reinforced their elitist status in American society. Moreover, as the
Court increasingly issued controversial opinions, it was no longer
clear that the Court did a better job than ()ther institutions or even
299
the public in constructing the Constitution.
In addition, the notion
297

See, e.g., Eugene Rostow, The Democratic Character ofJudicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193,
208 (1952) (providing a well-known defense of the Court as educator on constitutional questions). See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67
N.Y.U. L. REv. 961 (1992) (commenting on the literature on the Court as educator).
298
See Rostow, supra note 297, at 208 ("The prestige of the Supreme Court as an institution
is high ... and the members of the Court speak with a powerful voice.").
299
See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, supra note 189, at 104-08 (1999) (discussing Nixon as presenting an argument for self enforcement of constitutional values).
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of the Court as educator encouraged Justices to expand on constitutional issues, while a number of scholars, including Alexander Bickel,
30
favored reticence or less discourse as a virtue. ° Consequently, admiration for the Court as an educator has fallen into disfavor, even
though its precedents continue to provide perhaps a more visible and
extensive discussion of constitutional meaning than any that the
301
other branches provide.

7. The Historical Functions ofPrecedent
Supreme Court decisions perform at least two historical functions.
First, the Court's constitutional opinions often are intertwined with
historical events to such an extent that it is not possible to understand
those events without considering the degree to which the Court's
opinions contributed to their development. Perhaps the most famous example of this function is Dred Scott v. Sandford, 302 "which divided the Court and the nation" over the extent to which the Constitution resolved the moral, political, social, and legal dilemma posed
303
by slavery. Dred Scott set the stage for the Civil War and was a major
target of the Reconstruction amendments. Dred Scott is important to
the Justices and others "as the precedent overturned by the Reconstruction Amendments and as an important symbol for the consequences of the Court's reliance on questionable historical analysis
304
and interference with socially divisive issues."
A more recent example of a particular decision of the Court as intertwined with an historical event is Bush v. Gore. 305 The decision did
not merely settle a dispute. The dispute over who was entitled to
claim Florida's electoral votes in the presidential election cannot be
understood without reference to the Court's decision in resolving

300

See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS 111-83 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing several devices of judicial restraint); see also
CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CAsE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 3--6

(1999) (describing the merits of judicial minimalism, or "saying no more than necessary to justify the outcome"); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword, Leaving Things Undecided, The Supreme Court 1995
Term, 110 HARv. L. REv. 4, 48 (1996) (obseiVing that the narrowness of Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion "left the democratic process ample room to maneuver" and was "an effort to promote
both democracy and deliberation").
"'" Obviously, each of the other branches issue public commentaries on the Constitution.
They do so through a much wider variety of means than do the Justices, and they are much
freer than Justices with respect to the people whom they may consult in formulating constitutional judgments.
""' 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
""" See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60
CEO. WASH. L. REv. 68,84 (1991).
,.,. ld.
""' 531

u.s. 98 (2000).
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that dispute. That is, the story of the post-electoral dispute of 2000
306
cannot be told without including the Court as a central player.
Particular judicial decisions can also reflect the attitudes of a particular historical period. For instance, the development of the civil
rights movement in this country was intertwined with a long list of
cases in which the Justices' attitudes on race not only evolved independently but also paralleled or mirrored those of the era in which
307
they lived.
The second historical function performed by precedent is that it
can constitute a chronicle of constitutional history for the Court and
others. Because the Court is a critical interpreter of and player in
historical events, its decisions preserve, illuminate, and provide a per308
spective on the nation's social, political, and legal traditions.
The
Court defines the relevant past for itself and the other branches. The
Court's construction of the past, including its own past, is a part of its
decision making. The Court may not only legitimize recourse to
original understanding or historical practices, but its take on original
understanding or historical practices is presented to other institutions as well as to subsequent Courts as authoritative. The point is
not that its historiography is inexorably binding or immune to review
but rather that it cannot be lightly ignored. On the Court in particular, historiographic significance has to be acknowledged so that it can
be accepted or built upon in subsequent cases.
Furthermore, the Court's choice to join one side in a historical
debate is a matter of historical concern. There are also many other
precedents providing useful surveys of constitutional history, including Nixon v. United States on the scope of Congress's impeachment authority,310 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. on the history of the Thirteenth
311
Amendment, New York Times v. Sullivan on the original understanding of the scope of the First Amendment's protection of the press
306

See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, llO YALE
LJ. 1407 (2001) (discussing the politicization of the Bush v. Gore decision).
507
See Paul E. McGreal, Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or Common Law?, 15 ALAsKA
L. REV. 209, 227 n.84 (1998) (noting that "the Court has not always been suspicious of racial
classifications; the Justices' attitudes toward race evolved over time (as did society's attitudes)").
508
See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE LJ. 1029, 1043-47 (1990)
(arguing that our judicial precedents and traditions have shaped our current attitudes and practices).
509
See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65-66 (1936) (agreeing with Hamilton's rather
than Madison's understanding of the scope of Congress's spending power); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 332 (1819) (agreeing with Hamilton's rather than Madison's understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause); see also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURI1Y CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 134-49 (1990) (detailing the regularity with which the Court has cited historical support for its siding with the
President on separation of powers issues).
"" 506 u.s. 224, 229-30 (1993).
"' 392 U.S. 409, 428-32 (1968).
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from libel actions, 312 Harmelin v. Michigan on the extent to which the
Framers meant for the Eighth Amendment to guarantee proportionality of punishment,m and Marsh v. Chambers on both the original
understanding of the Establishment Clause and the practice of open314
ing legislative sessions with prayers. The more each branch, including the Court, relies on the Court's historiography, the more entrenched prior decisions built on it will become, and the less likely
the Court will be to revisit or reconsider it.
Moreover, the Court's mediations of past events are arguably
more reliable than the histories compiled by other governmental institutions. First, the Court is more adept than the other branches at
retrospective analysis. The president and the Congress tend, for the
most part, to be prospective, or forward-looking, when tackling constitutional problems. Second, nonjudicial authorities traditionally do
not have to explain the reasons for their interpretations of history as
fully or as thoroughly as the Court does. Third, the adversaries who
appear before the Court closely scrutinize the information submitted
to and issued by the Court. A fundamental premise of the adversarial
system is that strong advocacy on each side of a dispute will expose
the flaws of the historical material submitted to the Court. The adversarial system provides a check on the Court's historiography, so
that if there is a flaw in it then the Court can make corrections during
the course of subsequent litigation.
No case better illustrates this dimension of adjudication better
315
than Lawrence v. Texas.
The Court rejected the earlier conclusion,
316
reached in Bowers v. Hardwick, that the states had traditionally crimi317
nalized homosexual sodomy.
Instead, the Court in Lawrence revised
its historiography of governmental regulation of homosexuality to
show that the states had not criminalized homosexual sodomy (as
opposed to sodomy generally) and that the criminalization of homo318
sexual sodomy is a relatively recent phenomenon in this country.
Lawrence does not, however, signify the end of the debate over either gay rights or government's authority to restrict the opportunities
available to gays and lesbians. Mter Lawrence, the debate has evolved.
It has moved into the public domain, where it has focused on the necessity for a constitutional amendment protecting traditional marriage and on the needs for states to amend their Constitutions to

376 u.s. 254, 270-71 (1964).
"' 501 U.S. 957,978 n.9 (1991).
4
"
463 u.s. 783, 786-89 (1983).
315
539 u.s. 558 (2003).
316
478 u.s. 186 (1986).
m Id. at 192.
318
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-73.
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319

prohibit same-sex marriages.
In short, the dialogue on same-sex
marriage has become a dramatic instance of constitutional activity
outside the Court.

C. Non-judicial Precedent
As the debate over gay marriage demonstrates, the Court is by no
means the only constitutional actor that creates precedents. On November 3, 2004, not only was President George W. Bush re-elected
320
but also the voters in eleven states voted to ban gay marriage.
Whatever anyone thinks of those results, the voters in those states, as
well as the president who supports a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage, are expressing their constitutional judgments.
These and other constitutional judgments, which have not been addressed and may not ever be overtumed by courts, comprise an important set of precedent. As constitutional scholar Philip Bobbitt observes, "there are as many different kinds of precedent as there are
constitutional institutions creating them."m It is perhaps more precise to note that there are at least as many different kinds of precedents as nonjudicial authorities creating them, for nonjudicial authorities each create large, diverse numbers of precedents, which
perform as many functions as judicial precedents do, including facilitating a national dialogue about constitutional meaning and implementing constitutional values. An entire article, or book, would be
needed to analyze the constitutional significance of nonjudicial
precedent fully, but it ought to suffice here to note that the social scientists who analyze whether precedent constrains the Court have
completely ignored the constitutional significance of nonjudicial
precedent. Social scientists tend to view constitutional law strictly
from the vantage point of the Supreme Court, and thus they have
missed understanding constitutional law from the vantage point of
nonjudicial authorities.

319

On President Bush's call for a constitutional amendment to protect states' efforts to preserve traditional marriage and outlaw same-sex marriage, see Peter S. Canellos, Bush Seeks Marriage Amendment; From Both Sides, Danger of Alienating Moderates, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 25, 2004, at
Al. For the debate engendered by Bush's and other officials' pleas with respect to traditional
marriage, see, for example, Elizabeth Mehran, Acceptance of Gays Rises Anwng New Generation; But
a Slim Majority of Americans StiU oppose Adoptions by Same-Sex Couples and Favor a Ban on Homosexual Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, at A1; Gayle White, GOP Gays MuU Dilemma over Bush:
They Like President, Hate Marriage Ban He Backs, ATL.j. CONST., Apr. 18, 2004, at 4A.
320
See James Dao, Same-Sex Marriage Issue Key to Some G.O.P. Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at
P4 ("The amendments [banning same-sex marriage] ... passed overwhelmingly in all 11
states ... .")
321
Philip Bobbitt, War Powers: An Essay on john Hart Ely s War and Responsibility: Constitutional Lessons of Vietnam and Its Mtermath, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1364, 1383 (1994) (book review).
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Viewing constitutional law from the perspective of nonjudicial authorities illuminates, most importantly, the vastness of the realm of
constitutional activity outside the Court. Indeed, it dwarfs the output
of the Court. The Supreme Court's output consists altogether of almost 600 volumes of reports, each of which contain at least a few constitutional decisions. But constitutional activity outside the Court requires considerably more space to document. Constitutional actors
besides the Court, including the Congress, the President, executive
branch officials, and state executive and legislative authorities, have
each made at least hundreds of ~onstitutional judgments each year,
only a fraction of which the courts ever subject to review or overturn.
In fact, judicial review is not nearly as extensive and consequential
as many constitutional scholars bemoan. As any student of constitutional law knows, the Supreme Court cannot, and does not reach out
to, decide every conceivable question of constitutional law, even
those that the Justices might be eager to review. By design, the Supreme Court must wait for constitutional questions to be brought before it. (Indeed, throughout the Court's history, it has never had ju322
risdiction to hear all possible constitutional claims. )
Not all
constitutional questions are litigated. Of the constitutional questions
that are litigated in the federal system, only some are appealed to the
nation's highest Court. Even then, the Court has never agreed to decide the merits of every constitutional question brought to it. Of the
constitutional questions that the Court does decide on the merits,
many involve reviewing the constitutional judgments of nonjudicial
authorities. Even in an era of judicial supremacy, this means that
every question of constitutional law that comes before the Court has already
been considered elsewhere and often by more than one non-judicial authority.
Far more often than not, the Court leaves the constitutional judgments of other institutions intact. Thus, it would be wrong to both
identify judicial review with judicial supremacy over constitutional law
and to assume that judicial review is necessarily at odds with relatively
extensive final constitutional decision making by nonjudicial authorities.
Moreover, the constitutional judgments of nonjudicial authorities
survive judicial review in many ways. First, the Court may take few if
any cases in which the lower courts have already upheld the constitutional judgments of nonjudicial institutions. Indeed, for a significant

322

See generally HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 320--23
(Richard H. Fallon, Jr. eta!., eds., 5th ed. 2003) (describing the various congressional restrictions on the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, including one, from 1789 to 1914, under which the
Court could not review state court decisions of federal questions unless the state court had denied a claim of federal right).
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portion of the Court's history, Congress had not authorized the
323
Court to review every case involving a federal question.
Second, the Supreme Court employs extremely deferential review
in a wide variety of areas of constitutional law. Indeed, most of the
constitutional activity subject to judicial review is subject only to satisfying the rational basis test-the most deferential standard of review
the Court employs-in assessing the constitutionality of governmental action. It is extremely rare for the Court to strike down governmental action for violating the rational basis test. 324
Third, both the standing and political question doctrines have insulated several areas of constitutional law from judicial review altogether. Standing doctrine restricts who may litigate certain constitutional claims in Article III courts. For instance, the Court recently
decided on standing grounds not to address the constitutionality of
325
public schools' daily recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance.
By overturning the Ninth Circuit on standing grounds, the Court left intact
the congressional decision made at the outset of the Cold War to revise the Pledge of Allegiance to include the words "under God."
Hence, the congressional judgment to insert the latter words into the
Pledge of Allegiance (by means of a statute) has stood intact for more
than fifty years and counting. Moreover, the Court in Allen v.
26
Wrighf refused on standing grounds to adjudicate claims that the Internal Revenue Service had not adopted sufficient standards and procedures to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt status to racially
discriminatory private schools. The Court stressed that political
checks, rather than judicial review, provided the appropriate constraints on the Internal Revenue Service's obligations regarding the
tax-exempt status of private schools. 327 The Court thus deferred to
the discretion of nonjudicial authorities in resolving questions about
the tax-exempt status of racially discriminatory private schools.
Through its political question doctrine, the Court has avoided
reaching the merits of some constitutional questions involving the
powers of nonjudicial authorities. For instance, the Court has rec-

'" /d.; see also DanielS. Meltzer, The History and Structure of Article III, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1569
(1990) (examining the traditional view that Congress has plenary power over federal court jurisdiction).
024
For a few notable exceptions, see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (declaring unconstitutional a state amendment that denied special protections based on sexual orientation); City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (finding unconstitutional an ordinance leading to the denial of a building permit for a home for the mentally retarded).
025
See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004). Three Justices
reached the merits of the constitutional claim and defended the constitutionality of the Pledge
of Allegiance as amended by Congress .
... 468 u.s. 737 (1984).
027
/d. at 754 ("[A]n asserted right to have the government act in accordance with law is not
sufficient ... to confer jurisdiction on a federal court.").
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ognized as nonjusticiable judicial challenges to the process for ratify328
ing constitutional amendments, using Senate trial committees to
329
gather evidence and take testimony for judicial impeachment trials,
and the enforcement of the Constitution's Republican Guarantee
330
Clause.
Fourth, the Court expressly defers to various sets of nonjudicial
precedent. Such precedent has gone by different names, including
tradition, historical practices, and customs. These categories have
been loosely defined. In particular, tradition usually refers to longstanding understandings or assumptions, particularly within the
states, regarding state authority to regulate certain interests, such as
marriage or sexual autonomy. Historical practices often refer to repeated or longstanding presidential or congressional exercises of
powers within their respective spheres. Custom refers to habitual
ways of doing things, particularly in localities or nations. While the
Court treats none of these categories as sacrosanct (or immune to judicial review), it routinely acknowledges its respect for each of these
and almost routinely rules in favor of them. It is extremely rare for
the Court to overturn a particular tradition, historical practice, or
331
custom.
Fifth, there are many other areas that the Court has not subjected
and will likely not subject to judicial review (or at least anything but
deferential judicial review). For instance, the federal impeachment
process is rife with final congressional judgments on constitutional
questions, such as which kinds of misconduct qualify as impeachable
misconduct and whether "censure" (or condemning a public official
in a congressional resolution) is constitutional. Another field in
which national authorities essentially make decisive constitutional
judgments is the federal appointments process, including setting or
applying criteria for nominating or confirming judges or Justices.
Other areas in which nonjudicial precedents have developed include
the respective decisions of the House and Senate on disciplining
their respective members for ethical improprieties, including holding
them in contempt, censuring them, and expelling them; procedural
328

See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939) ("[T]he question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures ... should be regarded as a political question ... with the ultimate
authority in the Congress.").
329
See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 233 (1993) (determining that the text of the
Constitution in various places, historical practices, and original understanding supported its
treatingjudicial challenges to Senate trial committees as nonjusticiable).
""' See Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 44 (1849) (holding that for resolving Guarantee Clause
disputes, "it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State").
331
For a few notable exceptions, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding, despite
the prevalence and history of anti-miscegenation laws, that such a law was unconstitutional);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 873 (1954) (holding, in the face of a long history of segregation, that discrimination in public education was unconstitutional).
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rule-making in the House and the Senate;~~2 the various arrangements
employed to conduct presidential transitions; how the Congress and
the president have worked out conflicts over presidential claims of
executive privilege;~~~ and the evolution of the powers of congressional leadership, committees and their respective jurisdictions and
chairs. These informal arrangements further include the relatively
robust norm of senatorial courtesy, which entails presidents' deferring to the recommendations of senators from their parties for
334
nominations to federal offices in their respective states.
Still other examples of nonjudicial precedents are the Congress's
powers to increase or decrease the numbers of seats on the Supreme
Court and to abolish and create Article III judgeships. In 1869 the
Congress expanded the Court to nine seats, but it has never ex-

"' Generally, activities within the House and Senate may become precedent in several possible forms. These include, but are not limited to, formal rules, actions taken or judgments made
pursuant to the formal rules of each chamber (including both successful and unsuccessful efforts to amend particular rules), norms (or informal arrangements the deviation from which
trigger sanctions within each chamber), and traditions or customary practices. Among these
activities, the one that has provoked the most controversy in recent years has been the deployment in the Senate of the filibuster-protracted debate that precludes a floor vote that Senate
Rule XXII provides may be ended only by a supermajority vote to invoke cloture. SENATE
COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, RULE XXII, S. DOC. NO. 106-15,
at 15 (2d. Sess. 2000), available at http:/ /rules.senate.gov/senaterules/standingrules.txt. In all
likelihood, the filibuster will survive judicial review. One reason is that the courts tend to examine the constitutionality of a challenged procedural rule in the House or Senate under a very
deferential standard. See, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892) (upholding the constitutionality of a challenged rule under the rational basis test). Moreover, a federal district
judge recently dismissed on standing grounds a legal challenge to the Senate rule allowing filibusters against judicial nominations. See judicial Watch v. United States Senate, 340 F. Supp. 2d
26, 31-38 (D.D.C. 2004) (dismissing judicial Watch's lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of
judicial filibusters on the ground that the organization did not have standing under Article Ill).
Consequently, the fate of the filibuster will depend for all practical purposes on the extent to
which the Senate abides by its rules and pertinent precedents. Though many Republicans publicly denounce the filibuster of judicial nominations as unconstitutional, the Senate has never
previously declared a longstanding practice or procedure to be unconstitutional. Indeed, the
Senate has always amended its rules in accordance with its rules. Republicans do not, however,
have the requisite votes to break a filibuster of a motion to amend Senate Rule XXII as provided in Rule XXII. Under such circumstances, the only option for those interested in dismantling the filibuster, besides begrudgingly accepting the filibuster, is to circumvent the rules or to
declare Rule XXII unconstitutional. See Michael J. Gerhardt & Erwin Chemerinsky, Commentary, Senate's Nuclear Option, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at M5 (discussing the problems with
eliminating the filibuster). The difficulty with circumventing Senate rules or declaring the
longstanding practice of the filibuster to be unconstitutional is unprecedented. So, the future
of the filibuster depends on senators' willingness to follow Senate precedent or dare to set an
entirely new one.
'" See generally LOUIS FISHER, THE POUTICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (2004) (tracing the history of the conflicts between the legislative and executive branches over legislators' access to
executive information).
''"' See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointments Process, 50 DUKE LJ. 1687 (2001) (examining the inter-branch practices established in federal appointments).
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panded or contracted the size since. The closest the Congress came
to doing so was in 1937, but it did not sanction the Court-packing
plan then proposed by President Roosevelt.~~, The choices made in
1869 and 1937 constitute an important set of authority that continues
to guide the Congress. Still other fields in which nonjudicial authorities make final constitutional judgments are formal rulemaking
within the House and the Senate, and reorganizing the federal government (as occurred recently with the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security, which overtook the responsibility of coordinating a number of offices and agencies that had been located in
other federal departments). In addition, no court has ever reviewed,
much less overturned, any presidential veto, pardon, 336 or judicial
nomination.
Even when the Court employs heightened scrutiny, it is not always
fatal. For instance, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the
University of Michigan Law School's admissions program under strict
337
scrutiny, but upheld it nevertheless.
Indeed, it did so on the same
ground (and subject to similar heightened scrutiny) as Justice Lewis
Powell had urged in casting the pivotal vote in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke,~ to uphold for the first time a race-conscious
admissions program for graduate or professional school. In addition,
the Supreme Court closely scrutinized both the Bipartisan Cam~aign
339
Finance Reform Bill and the Family and Medical Leave Act, but
upheld both laws. The Court employed heightened scrutiny to ensure the former law's compliance with First Amendment interests
while it upheld the latter law only after ensuring it met the stringent
requirements for lawful enactments pursuant to Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
When the· Court overturns the constitutional judgments of other
authorities, it does so infrequently. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
thus far overturned fewer than 200 federal laws in American history.~
This rate of overturning comes out to an average of less than one
38

41

'" GERHARDT, supra note 211, at 154-55.
'"" Cf United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872) (striking down a congressional enactment
attempting to limit the effects of presidential pardons of some Southern soldiers who fought in
the Civil War).
"' Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
"'" 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
9
"
See McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the law on its face, and a federal district judge upheld a challenge to some
portions of the law as applied.
,., See Nevada Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003) (holding that the
FMLA was a constitutional abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity).
341
See THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, & DEVELOPMENTS 144-45 (Lee
Epstein et a!. eds., 3d ed. 2003) (listing all decisions holding acts of Congress unconstitutional
1789-1995).
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federal law per year that the Court has been operating. While the
342
Rehnquist Court has struck down more than forty federallaws, this
total exceeds that of any other Court in history. More importantly,
the number of laws the Rehnquist Court overturned constitutes only
a tiny fraction of the several thousand federal laws enacted during the
same period. The Court has also overturned only a fraction of states'
constitutional judgments. From 1789 to the present, the Court has
343
struck down less than 1300 state laws on constitutional grounds.
Each of the fifty states produces a much larger number of such judgments than that each year. Over the past half-century, the Court has
overturned presidents' constitutional judgments much less frequently
344
than either those of Congress or those of the states.
Almost every
other question of constitutional law considered by presidents over the
past quarter century has been left to their final discretion.
V. THE FUTURE OF PRECEDENT

This final Part suggests two important paths for future research on
precedent. The first is shifting the vantage point from which to understand constitutional law from the votes ofindividualjustices to the
patterns in the Court's operations and output. Once this shift is
made, it leads to a series of specific inquiries, whose answers are important to understanding the role of precedent in constitutional law.

342

In 2003, veteran Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse of the New York Times
found that "[h]eading into seventeen years, the Rehnquist Court has overturned forty-one
[federal] laws, 2.55 per year." Linda Greenhouse, Because We Are Final: judicial Review Two
Hundred Year.s After Marbury, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 781, 786 (2003). As compared with the
Rehnquist Court, the Warren and Burger Courts overturned both a lower number of federal
laws and a lower number of laws per year. /d.
""' SeeTHE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM, supra note 341, at 148-74.
344
For notable exceptions see for example, Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 ( 1998)
(holding unconstitutional the Line Item Veto Act that allowed the president to veto only part of
an act of Congress); Clinton v.Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1996) (denying presidents temporary immunity from civil lawsuits based on their unofficial misconduct); United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683 (1974) (denying absolute executive privilege in complying with a subpoena duces tecum); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding unconstitutional
an executive order directing the government takeover of steel mills). At the end of the 2003
Term, the Rehnquist Court overturned three different efforts by Defense Department and military officials to restrict access to the judicial system by people detained in the war on terrorism.
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (holding that a citizen-detainee was entitled to
receive notice of the factual basis for his enemy combatant classification); Rumsfeld v. Padilla,
124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004) (holding that the military detainee's habeas corpus petition should have
been brought in the place of his confinement); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (holding
the Fourteenth Amendment only protects resident aliens when they come within the United
States and develop substantial connections in the country).
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A. The Appeal of Institutional Analysis
The new institutionalism is a promising alternative to rational
choice theory and attitudinalism for understanding the operations or
dynamics of constitutional adjudication. It entails, inter alia, studying
345
the patterns and practices of political institutions over time.
Examining these patterns and practices as well as the external and internal
forces that have helped to shape the Court's operations and rulings is
likely to illuminate the relationship between the institutional design
of the Court and its performance, the multiple functions of precedent, and the relationship of the Court to other institutions and to
society generally.
The relative advantages of historical institutionalism over other
methodologies are readily apparent. First, it calls attention to the
Court's unique mission as an institution. Neither behavioralists nor
attitudinalists conceive of the Court as having a mission separate from
the fulfillment of the individual Justices' personal or policy preferences. Yet "[i]nstitutions have a mission to the extent that they possess 'an identifiable purpose or a shared normative goal that, at a particular historical moment in a particular context, becomes routinized
346
within an identifiable corporate form."'
Further, [t]he development and maintenance of this shared normative goal distinguishes
those within the institution from those outside of it and imposes a
distinctive set of responsibilities and motivations on those who are integrated into the institution. Institutions socialize and constitute, as
347
well as reward, their members."
As Rogers Smith explains, institutions "influence the self-conception of those who occupy roles de348
fined by them" both by defining a set of values that individuals
come to adopt and by creating a set of routines that individuals may
follow.
The Justices of the Supreme Court may well conceive of their role
as being different from that of a legislator, and construct precedent
accordingly. Historical institutionalism posits at least the possibility
that judicial doctrine, opinion craftsmanship, and intellectual coherence may be worthwhile goals and not simply means in pursuit of favored public policies or personal wealth or adulation. The faithful

""' See generally GERHARDT, supra note 211, at xviii-xix, 2-12 (explaining the techniques and
advantages of employing institutional analysis).
546
Whittington, supra note 50, at 623 (2000) (citing Howard Gillman, The Court as an Idea,
Not a Building (or a Game): Interpretive Institutionalism and the Analysis of Supreme Court Decision
Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES, supra note
12, at 79).
'" Whittington, supra note 50, at 623 (citation omitted).
546
Rogers M. Smith, Political Jurisprudence, the "New Institutionalism," and the Future of Public
Law, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 89,95 (1988).
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interpretation and application of the law, the duty of courts to protect individuals and minorities, the desire to provide guidance to
lower courts and other constitutional actors, or the goal of allowing
the democratic process to flourish may be important motivations of
the Justices that are inadequately captured in attitudinal or behavioral explanations of judicial behavior. More basically, thinking
within the law may become the unconscious background within
which Justices determine particular judicial decisions.
Recognizing law, or precedent, as a conceptual system facilitates
recognition of the authority of the law and its potentially coercive
power. Supreme Court Justices may adhere to precedent because
they conclude that it is part of their job. "For legislators, judicial doctrine may be an important definitional backdrop ... or a strategic
constraint that has to be respected ... [to avoid a confrontation with
the Court] but is relatively unlikely to have independent normative
349
force or intellectual appeal." For judges and Justices, the call to follow precedent carries weight and they may take positive action to
heed that call. Rational choice theory and attitudinalism cannot explain why precedent has this function or force in constitutional adjudication; nor does either approach offer any explanation as to why
the careful application of precedent is often simply accepted as the
appropriate way for judges (if not other lawmakers) to make decisions.
Furthermore, institutional analysis takes into account a wider
range of activities than either attitudinalism or rational choice theory.
These other methodologies focus on outcomes, whereas historical institutionalism seeks to clarify the relationship between outcomes and
institutional operations and norms. Institutionalism seeks to explain
the indeterminacy of the law over time. Historical institutionalism
also has the virtue of approaching the new institutionalism in sociology in noting the extent to which rational action is defined partly in
institutional terms. Institutions help establish the meaning of individual action and provide a framework for how individuals should react, or respond, to internal and external events and pressures. Institutionalism purports to clarify how the law maintains itself over time
and the preconditions for legal change.
In addition, historical institutionalism differs from attitudinalism
and rational choice theory in emphasizing the distinctiveness and
particularity of the judiciary. As Cornell Clayton notes, "[a]t the
heart of the new institutionalism is a challenge to the reductionist
and instrumentalist conception of politics that characterized behavioralism, and a renewed appreciation of the constitutive and norma-

349

Whittington, supra note 50, at 624.
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tive conceptions of politics and the role that institutions played in the
350
latter."
Historical institutionalism makes its most radical break
from these other approaches by historicizing political or judicial actors. Individuals cannot be conceptualized as autonomous, free
choosers who just happen to find themselves in a particular institutional context. Institutions do not merely impose constraints on
choices; they constitute preferences. Institutions become an important site of preference formation and the construction of a normative
order. Justices are thus likely to think and act on public problems
differently than other constitutional actors as a consequence of their
experiences and expectations on the Court. Thus, Robert Jackson
took different positions on the constitutionality of the internment of
Japanese Americans during World War II as a hi9;h-ranking Justice
51
Department official and as a Supreme Court Justice.
Historical institutionalism has two other features that have not
been sufficiently integrated into studies of judicial decision making
on precedent. First, from its origins, historical institutionalism has
been concerned with the inequities in power relations that are associated with institutions. Institutions convey power to those who lead
them or who are better situated to exploit them. Thus, historical institutionalism calls attention to why some social actors and groups
wield more power than others over judicial appointments and the
course of constitutionallaw. 352
Second, historical institutionalism focuses on path dependency in
a different way than rational choice theory or attitudinalism. While
these other approaches focus on the path dependency of the Court's
choices or decisions in particular cases, historical institutionalism illuminates the importance of institutional path dependency-how
and why institutions survive over time. Historical institutionalism
suggests that institutions are relatively persistent, and thus carry forward in time past choices about the allocation of power within society.353 The creation of institutions closes off options by making it
more costly to reverse course, by differentially distributing resources,
and by tying interests and identities to the status quo. Institutional
leaders occupy their positions in part because of their commitments
to the preservation or perpetuation of the institutions they oversee.
They are likely to work towards the preservation or enhancement of
350

Cornell W. Clayton, The Supreme Court and Political jurisprudence: New and Old Institutionalisms, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONAUST APPROACHES, supra note 12,
at 15, 30.
351
See Dennis J. Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution: Justice Jackson and the japanese Exclusion Cases, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 455,455-59 (discussingjackson's differing positions on
executive power).
352
See Whittington, supra note 50, at 616 (discussing the uneven distribution of power).
"' See id. (discussing the "path dependence" of political development).
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the powers of their respective institutions. On the other hand, the
persistence of institutions across time can foster political crises and
change as they enter radically changed social environments or abrade
discordant institutions. Howard Gillman's examination of the political crisis provoked by the Court's maintenance of the federalist constitution into the era of industrialization suggests the utility of this
354
dimension of historical institutionalism.
B. The Lessons of Institutional Analysis

The historical institutionalist perspective leads to several important insights on precedent and poses enormous implications for the
future of constitutional theory. One insight is the remarkable resilience of precedent as a source of constitutional meaning. For more
than a century, constitutional scholars have developed ingenious
355
theories for improving the Court's performance. Yet, these theories
have had virtually no impact on the Court whatsoever. Legal realism,
legal positivism, legal process, and critical legal studies are just a few
of the movements aimed at changing the ways in which lawyers and
others understand the Court. As these theories have come and gone,
however, none has deflected the Court from employing the language
356
of the law.
Throughout American history, Supreme Court Justices
(and everyone else in the legal community) have spoken in terms of,
and about, precedent. No matter how radical or arguably insightful
theory has gotten, the Court has steered a relatively stable course in
formulating its decisions in classic legal rhetoric and packaging them
357
as prece d ent.
Only within the past decade have legal scholars earnestly and systematically tried to explain the resilience and persistence of how lawyers, judges, and Justices talk about or approach constitutional law.
These scholars have proposed that the Court is in effect a conservative institution, that is, it does not lead, but rather tracks, public or

354

See Howard Gillman, &connecting the Modern Supreme Court to the Historical Evolution of
American Capitalism, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POUTICS: NEW INSTITUTIONAUST
INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 50, 235, 24l-43(discussing the transformation of federalism and
the separation of powers in industrial capitalism and the rise of the central regulatory state).
355
See generally MICHAEL j. GERHARDT ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: ARGUMENTS AND
PERSPECTIVES (2d ed. 2000) (surveying and providing commentaries on theories of constitutional interpretation).
356
See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
357
On the persistence of traditional legal reasoning in constitutional adjudication and commentary, see, for example, J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Grammar, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 1771 ( 1994); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Getting Serious About "Taking Legal &asoning
Seriously," 74 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 543 ( 1999). On the steadfastness and significance of the Court's
institutional commitment to particular modes of argumentation, see CHARLES FRIED, SAYING
WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT 3-l 0 (2004).
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358

majoritarian sentiments. Yet, none have yet employed institutional
analysis as the means by which to substantiate the extent to which
such tracking occurs. 359 At the very least, it should be possible to confirm empirically the precise number of constitutional cases that have
deviated from popular opinion on the same subject. Once these
cases have been comprehensively identified, one can then track their
fate, including subsequent overruling or severe narrowing by the
Court.
A second insight has to do with the important relationship between constitutional adjudication and interpretation ignored by most
legal scholars. The preoccupation of constitutional theorists with developing the better mouse trap, that is, with trying to find a superior
method for deciding cases than any used by the Court, has come at
the cost of ignoring the question of how if at all such a method might
360
ever be adopted by the Court.
A common mistake made by constitutional theorists is to confuse a theory of interpretation with a theory
361
of adjudication.
Advising the Justices on how they may better decide cases is different from figuring out what advice if any are the Justices amenable to taking.
The latter is the critical question of how a constitutional methodology or vision is actually implemented on or by the Court. This is a

"'" For the classic social science study asserting that the Supreme Court tracks majoritarian
sentiments, see Robert A. Dahl, Decision Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6]. PUB. L. 279, 293 (1957).
359
The closest any legal scholar has come to undertaking such tracking systematically is Barry
Friedman. In a series of articles, he has written extensively about the countermajoritarian difficulty as a genuine dilemma in American history. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajaritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333 (1998)
(chronicling the history and growth of judicial supremacy and attempts to curtail the Court).
Though significant, Friedman makes no pretense that his work is empirical, whereas several
social scientists have undertaken empirical inquiries into the Court's countermajoritarian capacity. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 110 (1956) (observing, in
the face of the countermajoritarian view, that there is "no case on record where a persistent lawmaking majority has not, sooner or later, achieved its purposes"); ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICf AND CONSENT 154-63 (1967) (calling into question, using statistical data of decisions, the notion of the Court as defender of minority views);
see also StuartS. Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and judges' Decisions, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 843
(1961) (identifying a statistical correlation between judges' political affiliations and their likelihood of deciding an issue in one manner or another in a study of the relationship between the
part compositions of the Court and of the Congress).
"'"' See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the Countermajaritarian Difficulty, 112 YALE LJ. 153 (2002) (arguing that the academic obsession with the countermajoritarian difficulty was born from historical circumstances present in the mid-twentieth
century).
361
See David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 Nw.
U. L. REv. 641, 652 (1994) (stating that "[c]riticizing balancing for failing to identify neutral
principles confuses the substantive problem of value identification in constitutional interpretation with the process problem of integrating some identified values into factual contexts for
purposes of adjudication").
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question that has only recently begun to be addressed by some scholars.362 In examining this question, it might be useful to employ psychological methods as some political scientists have done. Indeed,
some studies have implications for both understanding the Court and
the relevance of precedent in constitutional decision making. For
example, Deborah Gruenfeld examined the "integrative complexity"
of the Justices in majority and minority opinions, that is, she studied
the extent to which being in the majority or dissent pressured Justices
to modify their opinions to include some discussion of opposing
viewpoints. 363 Her findings supported a "status-contingency model,
which predicts higher levels of [integrative] complexity among members of majority factions [on the Court] than among members of either minority factions or unanimous groups independent[] of the
364
ideological contents of their views."
In another study, Gruenfeld
examined the extent to which a Justice's status, in the majority or dissent, shaped her integrative complexity in decisions to uphold or
overturn precedent. Gruenfeld and Preston found that 'Justices writing on behalf of decisions to uphold precedent exhibited greater integrative complexity than did Justices writing on behalf of decisions
to overturn precedent, but this effect was stronger for the authors of
365
majority than minority opinions."
These findings support the legal
rather than the attitudinal model.
A third insight relates to the importance of under-theorizin~on
the Supreme Court. I share the normative hope of Cass Sunstein to
resist the temptation to put the onus on the Court to explain its decisions to the satisfaction of theorists. Theorists are obliged, inter alia,
to make sense of the Court's reasons for maintaining fidelity (or not)
to precedent, but it is unclear why the Court ought to do anything
more than what it is already doing. The Court has never felt the
need, much less the pressure, to appease constitutional theorists. Its
principal institutional concern has been to decide cases or controver. 367
s1es.

362

See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 1-12 (2001) (arguing, contrary to Ronald Dworkin, that the actual practices of the Supreme Court belie the idea
of the Court as a "forum of principle"); Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional Self-Government
and judicial Review: A Reply to Five Critics, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 115 (2002) (defending his framework
ofjudicial review as not a constraint on democracy but as a factor of self-govemance).
563
See Deborah H. Gruenfeld, Status, Ideology, and Integrative Complexity on the U.S. Supreme
Court: Rethinking the Politics of Political Decision Making, 68 j. PERSONALI1Y & SOC. PSYCHOL. 5, 5
(1995).
364

/d.

365

Deborah H. Gruenfeld & Jared Preston, Upending the Status Quo: Cognitive Complexity in
U.S. Supreme Court justices "Who Overturn Legal Precedent, 26 PERSONALI1Y & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
1013, 1013 (2000).
366
367

See Sunstein, supra note 300, at 3--6 (supporting a minimalist conception of the Court).
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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A fourth insight to which institutional analysis gives rise is Keith
Whittington's recognition of the significance of nonjudicial precedent. He demonstrates, inter alia, that presidents and Congress each
view their own past practices as functionally the equivalent ofJ?recedents and therefore give them some weight in their decisions.
Understanding how the other branches make decisions about constitutional meaning necessitates analyzing how they conceive of
precedent, the extent to which precedent guides their actions or decisions, and how they coordinate their precedents with those of the
other branches, including the Supreme Court.
C. Future Research on Precedent

The attitudinal and rational choice models of the Court are based
in part on the presumption of a coherent distinction between internal and external factors influencing the Court. There is, however, no
such neat distinction. In the real world of the law, judicial decisions
are not made in a vacuum. Justices operate not only with formal
strictures (such as laws forbidding bribery), procedural requirements,
and norms, but also within a conceptual framework. Legal scholars
and social scientists have only begun to examine the relationship between the special institutional environment with which Justices decide cases and the Justices' choices and decisions. Below, I suggest
several new lines of inquiry for measuring how the law, particularly in
the form of precedent, shapes judicial decision making.

1. Supreme Court Selection
One lingering question involves the relationship betweenJustices'
backgrounds and their decisions. For example, Richard Lazarus examined the correlation between Justices' votes in cases involving environmental law and their love of the outdoors or personal involvement in activities that familiarize them with the importance of
369
environmental protection (such as hiking, fishing, and hunting) .
More recently, Tracey George suggested that former academics show

!168 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCfiON:
DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANINGS (1999) (using four instances in American history to illustrate how
the executive and legislative branches provide their own constitutional constructions and then
use these constructions to guide future decisions).
369
See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Suprf!TTU! Court, 47 UClA L. REv. 703, 764-66 (2000) ("The extent to which a person, including a
Supreme Court Justice, cares about environmental protection seems especially susceptible to
being defined by their own personal experiences with the natural environment.").
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the greatest skepticism about or willingness to question doctrine.
Hence, she proposes that a president who wants to appoint a Justice
inclined to challenge accepted doctrine should consider leading academics as possible appointees. In addition, Lee Epstein, Jack Knight,
and Andrew Martin suggested that over the past two decades, prior
judicial experience has become a norm in Supreme Court selection.371 On their view, this norm has evolved at the expense of greater
diversity in the backgrounds and experiences of the Justices, which
could improve the quality of the Court's decisions. 372 These studies
should spur inquiries into why some Justices vote consistendy with
their backgrounds and why some do not.
Moreover, presidential selection criteria merit a much closer look.
David Yalofs study of Supreme Court selection shows that presidents
generally have very specific selection criteria in mind when choosing
373
Supreme Court nominees.
This has been particularly true for Republican presidents over the past two decades. President George W.
Bush, who has not yet had the opportunity to nominate someone to
the Supreme Court, has chosen lower court nominees thus far pursu374
ant to careful ideological screening.
While each president's selection criteria might not explain senators' conceptions of or reactions
375
to particular nominations, they represent the keenest insights on
370

See Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REv. 9, 42 (2001) ("[Law professors] would
be more likely to use cases as an opportunity to argue original positions or force the law in certain directions.").
371
Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Consequences for Career Diversity
on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REv. 903, 905 (2003) ("For at least three decades now, those
charged with nominations and confirming Justices to the Supreme Court seem to be following a
norm of prior judicial experience .... ").
372
See id. at 954-56 (describing the benefits of career diversity among the Justices for judicial
decision making). This research is hardly without problems. For instance, Supreme Court selection is rarely based on a single factor, such as background, while persons with backgrounds
unlike those on the Court might still share the Justices' methodological commitments and attitudes.
373
See DAVID ALISTAIR YALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES: PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS AND THE
SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES passim (1999) (analyzing the numerous issues behind
a president's nomination of someone to the Supreme Court).
374
See, e.g., Kris Axtman, The Case ofJudges v. Ideology; A Texas judge Fuels Debate over Whether
Appointees Will Interpret Law, or Make It, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 23, 2003, at 2 (describing
the debate over the nomination of Priscilla Owen, a controversial conservative, to a federal circuit court); Hans S. Nichols, White House Wishes, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, Dec. 24, 2002-Jan. 6,
2003, 18, at 20 ("Old ideological battles over judicial nominees also will resurface to threaten
the president's wish list.").
375
Other research suggests that in times of divided government, institutional considerations
(such as consulting with congressional leaders) have been more important in Supreme Court
selection than they have when the president's party controls the Senate. See, e.g., Christine L.
Nemacheck & Rachel Paine Caufield, Congressional Endorsements and Supreme Court Selection Politics from 1930-1992, presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science
Association, Chicago (2003) (manuscript on file with authors). In the latter circumstances,
presidents have been relatively free to make choices based primarily on their preferred criteria.
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Justices' likely ideologies at the outset of their respective tenures.
Rather than look for proxies for Justices' ideologies based on presidents' and senators' attitudes, scholars should consider testing Justices' and judges' votes against selection criteria. A correlating pattern would support the attitudinal model, but the absence of such a
pattern would require explanation.

2. Institutional Patterns
Social scientists have only recently begun to measure patterns in
the Court's decisions over time. These patterns hold the promise of
reflecting the extent to which internal and external factors influence
the Court's decision making. First, one could determine how each
Justice has prioritized major sources of constitutional meaning, in377
cluding text, structure, original intent, and precedent.
Such research would clarifY whether these priorities hold true across different cases and the conditions under which they change.
Second, no data have been collected on the areas in which the
Court has achieved closure or stability. It would be interesting to
know how many areas of constitutional law have been firmly settled,
how many have not been, and what the impediments are to calculating either of these figures.
Third, researchers have yet to comprehensively document the
kinds and ranges of nonjudicial precedents, including but not limited to such areas as rule-making within each chamber of the Congress, international trade, impeachment, the scope of executive orders (extending to such diverse matters as the desegregation of the
armed forces and restricting the use of federally funded research on
stem cells),judicial appointments (including the recess appointments
of judges and other officials), presidential vetoes, and presidential
use of military force in the absence of formal declarations of war.
Fourth, scholars should explore whether some models explain
378
some votes or decisions better than others.
This research would
clarifY the utility of each model.
Moreover, more research needs to be done on the relationship
379
between legal reasoning and motivated reasoning.
Legal scholars

6

Additional work requires clarifying what lawmakers (and others) mean by judicial ideology. For a promising beginning, see Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, judges and Ideology: Public
and Academic Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005).
377
See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Many Faces of judicial Restraint," 1993 PUB. INT. L.
REv. 3 (differentiating consetvative Justices based on their respective prioritizing of different
sources).
8
"
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis,
47 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 569, 572-73 (2003) (suggesting four models to explain different Justices'
votes).
"
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often dodge the possibility that it might be a coincidence that outcomes track the purported ideological preferences of the Justices by
insisting that they do not need to construct a falsifiable model of legal
reasoning. As long as this pattern holds, the burden shifts to legal
scholars to demonstrate how the law, rather than ideological preferences, explains the outcomes of the cases that come before the Supreme Court.
Last but not least, it would be useful to compare the development
of judicial doctrine in Article III and state courts in areas in which
state constitutions provide identical guarantees. In state jurisdictions
with the same constitutional commitments, their respective highest
judicial tribunals start at the same place relative to each other (if not
as well to the United States Supreme Court). One thing that measuring the paths of judicial doctrine in each of these states might illuminate is the extent of path dependency of their respective constitutional commitments.
Do states, for instance, with identical
commitments with respect to freedom of speech or religion end up
with the same doctrine? If the state courts end up following the same
or different paths from each other, we would of course want to know
why and particularly whether this is because of the development of,
and adherence to, different judicial decisions in each of the different
jurisdictions. At the same time, we would want to know about the extent of path dependency of precedent in each of the different jurisdictions. Other intriguing questions are whether the jurisdictions
experience, for instance, similar or different rates of overruling of
79

'
The theory of motivated reasoning suggests although a Justice may adopt a "neutral"
method of constitutional adjudication, such as an adherence to original understanding or a
reliance upon precedent, her personal preferences will nevertheless influence arguments she
finds persuasive. This implies that a Justice will subconsciously reach her "desired result"
through facially neutral reasoning. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Causes of the Recent Turn in
Constitutional Interpretation, 51 DUKELJ. 307,356-58 (2001). Schroeder writes:
The theory of motivated reasoning, though, suggests that there is [an alternate] explanation for how judges think: judges may be successful, at least some of the time, in preventing their policy preferences from serving as the conscious objective of their decisionmaking, and yet those 'private' preferences can provide directional goals that affect
the arguments and evidence judges find persuasive.
/d. at 356 (citations omitted); see also Howard & Segal, supra note 7, at 113 (2002). Howard and
Segal note:
[W) e know from social psychology that the ability to convince oneself of the propriety of
what one prefers to believe-motivated reasoning-psychologically approximates the
human reflex. This is particularly true when plausible arguments support one's position.
Since originalism is not inherently conservative, our findings do not necessarily discredit
the notion that Justices sincerely believe they are following originalist principles. Nevertheless, our results do suggest, to no one's surprise we hope, that originalist dreams of a
neutral method of constitutional interpretation that can remove judicial bias remain illusory. Instead, the results show that ideological predispositions to vote a particular way
overwhelm Supreme Court decision making, regardless of whether or not one premises
it on an originalist interpretive method or on some vague notion ofJustice.
/d. at 133-34 (internal citation omitted).

Apr. 2005]

THE UMITED PATH DEPENDENCY OF PRECEDENT

999

precedent, whether the state courts consult each other's doctrine or
federal constitutional law in formulating their respective doctrines,
and the extent to which and the areas in which the state courts develop rules and standards in the course of interpreting the identical
constitutional commitments. The data would improve our understanding of the path dependency of precedent across jurisdictions
and over time.
CONCLUSION

This Article attempts to clarify the limited path dependency of
precedent in American constitutional law. A number of factors, generally ignored by legal scholars, support the limited rather than the
robust path dependency of precedent in constitutional adjudication.
These factors include the nature of constitutional adjudication in
which constitutional precedents lack the essential prerequisites for
path dependency (such as sequentialism, consistency, and compulsion); the indeterminacy of the constitutional text (whose openended language invites multiple interpretations); constitutional design (which fails to specify rules for interpreting ambiguous constitutional text); the nature of constitutional adjudication (which does not
require consensus within the Court on its mission); whether the
Court frames its judgments as rules or standards; the absence (and
practical impossibility of the Court's adoption) of rules for construing
precedent; political and other pressure keeping some constitutional
issues politically salient and unresolved; and changes in the composition of the Court. Moreover, legal scholars have yet to engage with
the findings or implications of several significant social science studies demonstrating the absence of the path dependency of precedent
in constitutional adjudication.
While social scientists have raised legitimate concerns about the
extent of meaningful path dependency of precedent in constitutional
adjudication, Supreme Court precedent is not irrelevant to the development or content of constitutional law. To appreciate the multiple functions of precedent in constitutional law (besides merely constraining outcomes), a shift in perspective on the Court is in order.
The shift requires moving from trying to understand precedent solely
from the vantage point of the votes of individual Justices to understanding precedent by studying the patterns of the Court's decisions
and operations over time. This shift illuminates the multiple functions of precedent long taken for granted, including but not limited
to, resolving particular disputes over constitutional meaning, providing a modality of constitutional argumentation, providing a conceptual framework for understanding constitutional law, legitimizing
other sources of constitutional argumentation and meaning, facilitating a public dialogue about constitutional meaning, chronicling and
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shaping constitutional history, and implementing constitutional values (within and outside of the courts). Empirical analysis of the impact of precedent on constitutional law has thus far failed to catalogue the extent or significance of these functions, and better
understanding of the role of precedent in constitutional law requires
empirically
analyzing
these
functions
of
precedents.
Further research on the role of precedent in constitutional law
has important implications for clarifying the connection between
constitutional theory and constitutional adjudication. While some
scholars (and judges) favor minimalist reasoning in constitutional
opinions, it is possible to acknowledge the limited path dependency
of precedent without expecting elaborate discussion from the Justices
on why they treat precedent in all the ways that they do. The important point is that greater appreciation for the limited path dependency does not put so much of an onus on the Court to explain everything it does to the satisfaction of theorists but, rather, on theorists to
break with their attachment to the myth of the path dependency of
precedent in constitutional law. At a minimum, constitutional theorists ought to engage more fully with the implications of all the factors endemic to the legal process, including the absence of rules for
construing precedent, that lead to incoherence, inconsistency, and
unpredictability in a number of areas of constitutional law in any
given era.
Further work on precedent also will help to illuminate how it
functions not only descriptively but also normatively. In one form or
another, precedent refers to some past experience(s). Just as the past
does not necessarily constrain decision making in the present or
make subsequent decision making perfectly predictable, it informs
our decisions. The past is nothing more, or less, than our history; it is
simply the record of human experience. It is naive to think that the
Court, or any other institution, ought to operate without a knowledge, or awareness, of its own history. We learn from our past. We
build on it. Sometimes we repeat it. And we ignore whatever lessons
it has to teach us at our peril.

